




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L I V E S

OF

JOHN GREGORY, M. D.	DAVID HUME, ESQ.
HENRY HOME, LORD	AND
KAMES.	ADAM SMITH, L. L. D.

(TO WHICH ARE ADDED)

A DISSERTATION ON PUBLIC SPIRIT;

AND

THREE ESSAYS.

BY THE LATE

WILLIAM SMELLIE,

MEMBER OF THE ANTIQUARIAN AND ROYAL SOCIETIES OF
EDINBURGH.

EDINBURGH :

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TO THE
RIGHT HONOURABLE
ROBERT DUNDAS
OF ARNISTON,
LORD ADVOCATE OF SCOTLAND.

MY LORD,

I HAVE presumed, without asking permission, to Dedicate this Work to your Lordship.

THOUGH men, like you, who are engaged in the important business and active scenes which your High and Honourable Office in a great nation necessarily requires, have little leisure either of time or of mind for abstract studies, an Account of the Lives of four of your eminent Countrymen, may find,

find, amidst your more serious occupations, a vacant hour which it may interest or amuse.

My Father's design, had he lived to execute it, was to have written Literary and Characteristical Accounts of Scottish Authors with whom he was personally acquainted, and to have published them after the manner of Biographical Dictionaries, in an Alphabetical Arrangement.—Among these were,

Arnot (Hugo), Esq; Ad-	Cullen (Dr).
vocate.	Dalrymple (Sir David),
Alston (Dr) Professor of	Bart. Lord Hailes.
Botany in the Univer-	Erskine, Professor of Scot-
sity of Edinburgh.	tish Law.
Blair (Dr Hugo) one of	Elibank (Lord).
the ministers of Edin ^r .	Ferguson (Professor).
Beattie (Dr).	Garden (Francis), Esq; one
Blacklock (Dr).	of the Senators of the
Black (Dr).	College of Justice.
Campbell (Dr) Professor	Gardiner (Dr John).
at Aberdeen.	Gregory (Dr John).

Home,

DEDICATION.

v

Home, Lord Kames	Stuart (Dr Gilbert).
Hume (David).	Stuart (Dr Matthew).
Hutton (Dr).	Tytler (William), W. S.
Monboddo (Lord).	of Woodhouselee.
Monro (Dr Alex.)	Wilson (Dr) Professor of
Plummer (Dr).	Astronomy at Glasgow.
Robertson (Principal).	Wilkie (Dr).
Smith (Adam), L. L. D.	White (Dr).

THE Author's intention, beside the particular information and remarks which he meant his Work to convey, was to encourage in his native country a taste for biographical writing, which never fails to excite a spirit of inquiry, and, of course, to expand the views of men with regard to science and every thing that contributes to aggrandise, or to adorn a nation.

BIOGRAPHY besides affords that reward most valued by generous minds which the gratitude of posterity bestows on patriotism and virtue. The interest, My LORD, which
this

this circumstance might induce you to feel in it, your Countrymen will acknowledge much more readily than yourself. But truth, not panegyric, is equally the object of this Address as it was of my Father's Work, to which I take the liberty of prefixing it. Allow me, therefore, only to add the assurance of that sincere respect and attachment with which I have the honour to be,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most

Humble Servant,

EDINBURGH, }
Nov. 20. 1799. }

ALEX. SMELLIE.

CON-

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ADVERTISEMENT.

A Small Addition to the Price mentioned in the Prospectus of this Book is made on Account of the Work being Larger than what was originally intended.

THE
L I F E
OF
JOHN GREGORY,

M. D. F. R. S.

*LATE PROFESSOR OF MEDICINE IN THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH, AND FIRST PHYSICIAN
TO HIS MAJESTY IN SCOTLAND.*

DR JOHN GREGORY was the son of Dr James Gregory, Professor of Medicine in King's College, Aberdeen, and grandson of James, the inventor of the Gregorian Telescope. His father was first married to Catharine Forbes, daughter of Sir John Forbes of Monymusk, by whom he had six children, but most of them died in infancy; sometime afterwards, he married Anne Chalmers, daughter of the Rev. Mr George Chalmers Principal of King's College, by whom he had two sons and a
A daughter.

daughter. John, the youngest of the three, was born at Aberdeen June 3. 1724. When only seven years of age, his father died; and his education was superintended chiefly by his grandfather Principal Chambers. At the grammar school of Aberdeen, he received the rudiments of his classical education, which he afterwards improved and extended by studying the antient authors with whose writings he was greatly delighted; and, under the inspection of his grandfather, he finished, in King's College, his studies in the Latin and Greek languages, as well as in the sciences of Ethics, Mathematics, and Natural Philosophy.

Mr Gregory, in the year 1742, went to Edinburgh, where, at that time, the now so celebrated school of medicine was rising into high reputation. He attended the Anatomical Lectures of Dr Alexander Monro the elder, of Dr Sinclair on the Theory of Medicine, and of Dr Rutherford on the Practice. He likewise attended the Prelections of Dr Alston on the Materia Medica and Botany, and those of Dr Plummer

mer on Chemistry. The Medical Society of Edinburgh was instituted for the purpose of discussing with freedom all subjects connected with Medicine and Philosophy. Mr Gregory, it appears, was a member of that society in the year 1742, when the famous Dr Mark Akenfide, his fellow student and intimate companion, belonged to that useful institution. In 1745, Mr Gregory went to Leyden, where he studied under the celebrated Gaubius, Albinus, and Van Royen. While residing at Leyden, he had the honour of receiving, from the King's College of Aberdeen, an unsolicited degree of Doctor of Medicine; and, soon after his return from Holland, he was elected Professor of Philosophy in that University. Agreeably to the nature of his employment, in the years 1747, 1748, and 1749, he delivered lectures on Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Moral Philosophy. Towards the end of the year 1749, however, he chose to resign his Professorship of Philosophy, having directed his views chiefly to the Practice of Physic. But, previously to his settling as a physician at Aberdeen, he went for
some

some months to the Continent, both, perhaps, to enlarge his ideas and to procure amusement. After his return to Scotland, Dr Gregory in the year 1745, married Elizabeth daughter of Lord Forbes, a beautiful and accomplished young lady, with whom he received a considerable addition to his fortune. During the period of their union, which was nine years only, they mutually enjoyed a high degree of domestic felicity.

At that period, the chief medical practice was pre-occupied by his elder brother, Dr James Gregory. This circumstance induced Dr John to try his fortune in London; to which city he repaired in the year 1754, where his reputation as a man of genius soon procured him the countenance and intimate intercourse of many of the first literary characters in England. In the same year, he was made a member of the Royal Society in London; and he would unquestionably, if he had remained in that metropolis, soon have acquired an extensive practice.

practice. But the death of his brother Dr James Gregory, in November 1755, occasioned a vacancy in the Professorship of Medicine in King's College, Aberdeen. To this chair, in his absence, he was elected, and solicited to perform the duties of that office. For this purpose, in the beginning of the following year, he returned to his native country.

The philosophical opinions and writings of Reid, of Campbell, of Beattie, of Gerard, and of Gregory, establish virtue on a firm and unalterable basis, give stability to morals, and vindicate the supremacy of what is denominated common sense. Many of the most celebrated works of those and other Philosophers derived their origin from a literary society, which held its meetings, in Aberdeen, once every week. A part of the entertainment for the evening was the reading of short essays, which were composed, in rotation, by the members. Dr Reid and Dr Gregory were the institutors of this Society. It consisted chiefly of some
of

of the Professors of the King's and Marischal Colleges of Aberdeen, but admitted other literary gentlemen of the place. In this Society, Dr Gregory read occasionally those Essays which he afterwards methodised and published in the year 1764, under the title of *A Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World.*

To convey some idea of this book, I shall give a short sketch of its plan.—The condition of man, in a state of society, may be viewed in three different aspects. In his savage state, he is distinguished by the highest improvement of his corporeal powers, and, of course, by a proportional neglect of his intellectual faculties. As society advances in its progress, the social affections begin to appear; the heroic virtues are displayed; war is, in some measure, regulated by the principles of honour; and the spirit of patriotism produces high exertions of generosity and courage. Succeeding ages behold the same people extending their territory; holding intercourse with distant nations;

tions ; acquiring wealth by means of commerce ; and gradually advancing to the period of refinement and luxury. In this stage of society, the heroic virtues are obliterated, and are succeeded by a passion for the objects of Taste in productions of the fine arts. Invention is excited and industry stimulated by the artificial wants created by luxury. Extension of intercourse refines the manners of mankind, and leisure and ease invite them to improve their understandings and their genius. The possibility of any nation being capable of uniting the advantages peculiar to each of those stages of society, is perfectly chimerical ; but it appeared to our author, that, though it was impossible for large associations of men to realise this idea, still it was practicable for individuals to attain this most desirable end. To him, it seemed not irrational to think, that men endowed with the most perfect use of their bodily powers, might also reach the highest improvement of their mental faculties ; that the heroic virtues might be united with a taste for elegance and of beauty ; that they might, to
simplicity

simplicity and inoffensive manners, add genuine politeness, and, at once, cultivate the virtuous feelings of the heart and the faculties of the mind.

Dr Gregory's observations, in the first section of this small but ingenious and useful book, on the management of infants, and their education, merit the particular attention of all parents. Here he shews, that most human calamities derive their origin, not from Nature, but from mens own caprice, inattention, and folly. Of this kind are the innumerable evils which arise from the mismanagement of infants, and the absurd severity in the mode of educating them. These evils the remarks and remonstrances of Dr Gregory, soon contributed, in a great measure, to eradicate. But with regard to the too common system of early education, his observations, though extremely just, have not obtained equal success. Every man must regret, with our author, that "the happiest period of human life, the days of health, chearfulness, and innocence, on which we always reflect with
pleasure,

pleasure, not without some mixture of regret, are spent in the midst of tears, punishment, and slavery; and this to answer no other end, but to make a child a man some years before Nature intended he should be one."

In treating more directly of the comparative state of man and the inferior animals, he remarks, that, by the most accurate calculations, one half of the human species die before they arrive at their eighth year. This mortality is greatest among the opulent and luxurious part of mankind. It gradually diminishes as the diet becomes simpler, the exercise more frequent, and the manner of living more hardy. Among wild animals no such calamity takes place. From these facts, the general foundations of this mortality among the offspring of men are, in some measure, apparent. The great havock made by diseases arises chiefly from the unnatural treatment they receive. Their own instincts, and the conduct of Nature in rearing other animals, are never regarded. When farther advanced in
B life,

life, the instincts of Nature become irresistible. The great mortality among children has been considered as a natural evil, and, therefore, an unavoidable one, and, of course, is submitted to without examination. Why the state of infancy is the most sickly, and why so great a proportion of mankind is cut off at that early period, physicians have ascribed to several causes ; as, the dangers arising from the sudden and almost total change of the animal oeconomy which takes place immediately at birth ; the dangers produced by the free admission of the external air to their bodies ; the high degree of irritability in their nervous system ; the delicacy of their whole frame, and the acclency of their food. This account of the matter, though seemingly plausible, is by no means satisfactory. It should be considered, that all these supposed causes of the diseases of infants are not confined to the human species, but extend to many other animals, without producing those or similar effects ; that the diseases most fatal to children have no existence among savage nations ; and that their prevalence is proportioned

tioned to the progress of luxury and of effeminate manners, joined to the neglect of the plain dictates of instinct and of Nature.

During infancy, children, in general, enjoy a greater luxuriance of life and health than in any other period. Infants, it is true, are more delicately sensible of injury than those advanced in life. But, as a compensation, their fibres and vessels are more capable of distention, and their whole system more flexible; their fluids are less acrid, and less liable to assume a putrescent quality; they can support every evacuation more easily, except the loss of blood; and, what is much in their favour, they are entirely emancipated from the often injurious consequences of imaginary terrors. Their animal spirits, if not blunted by the pressure of disease, are always vivacious; they soon forget past sufferings, and never anticipate future. These, and similar advantages, enable children to recover from diseases which are always fatal to adults.

All animals, except the females of the
human

human species, bring forth their young without assistance, except some which we have corrupted and debilitated by forcing them from a natural to a domestic state. But we most absurdly think Nature unqualified for this important office ; and, to supply that defect, call in the assistance of ignorant and often dangerously blundering midwives. It is too well known, that numbers of infants, as well as mothers, fall daily victims to the preposterous management of those pretended artists. A well instructed midwife, it must be acknowledged, is, for many reasons, preferable to an accoucheur. Women have generally more patience than men ; besides, men are often so occupied with business as surgeons, &c. that they tire, cannot wait the slow but sure operations of Nature ; and, for these reasons, not unfrequently employ force when no force is necessary. The most skilful practitioners allow, that, in all common cases, Nature alone is perfectly sufficient, and that it is their business only to assist her efforts when the mother is weak, or the child presents itself in an unfavourable position. An infant

fant no sooner comes into the world than it is crammed with phyfic. At their birth, the bowels of infants, and of many other animals, contain a viscid kind of liquor, which it is necessary to have discharged. Nature has prepared a medicine that produces this salutary effect; this medicine is the first milk of the mother. But practitioners absurdly think that some drug forced down the child's throat will answer the purpose much better. On this subject, it is worthy of remark, that calves, the only animals generally under our immediate care and management, when brought forth, are treated in the same manner as infants. The same kind of phyfic is administered to them, which is followed by the same effect, for many of them either die under the operation, or of its consequences.

The natural instinct of an infant, some hours after birth, induces it to cry, in order to procure the milk of the mother. But the common practice is very generally to deny that salutary gratification till after the third day. By this preposterous suppression
of

of the natural evacuation of the milk, a fever is usually brought on ; the consequences of which are not unfrequently fatal to the mother : At any rate, it prevents her, for some time, from giving suck to her child. Another bad consequence of this delay is a sudden swelling of the breasts, which generally happens about the third day. When the breasts are thus suddenly and greatly distended, a child is unable to suck, and, by struggling and crying, fatigues and heats both the mother and itself. This is another cause which often prevents maternal nursing. Here it is worthy of notice, that the gentlemen, who superintended the Lying-in Hospital of London, were the first who had the honour, in this momentous and interesting business, of bringing us back to Nature and common sense, and of preserving the lives of thousands. They made the children be put to the breast of the mother as soon as they discovered any desire for it, which generally happened ten or twelve hours after birth. This management rendered the usual dose of physic perfectly unnecessary : and
the

the milk flowed gradually, and with ease, into the breasts. It is much to be regretted, however, that this most sensible and salutary practice has been but very partially followed. If a mother, from weakness, or other causes, is resolved not to nurse her own child, she ought, for her own sake, to suckle it for some weeks before she transfers it to the charge of a stranger. By pursuing this conduct, she, in all probability, will prevent the dangers arising from repelling the milk.

Mothers who are able, and do not nurse their own children, violate one of the strongest laws of Nature. This violation is committed by none of those inferior animals which were destined, by the structure of their organs, to suckle their young. This unnatural practice is unknown among barbarous nations ; and was equally unknown in the polished nations of Greece and Rome. A woman, whatever be her condition in life, by not nursing her child, is in imminent danger of losing her life by a milk-fever, beside the risk of inducing swellings
and

and impostumes in the breasts, and such obstructions in their vessels as frequently give rise to cancers.—In the Lying-in Hospital of London, of 4,400 women, who brought forth children, four only had milk-fores ; and even these had either very small nipples, or formerly fore breasts. Children should be suckled from nine to twelve months. Several circumstances indicate the propriety of weaning them about that time. In many parts of Europe, and in the whole of the Levant, children are allowed nothing but the milk of the mothers till they complete their first year. By giving children food of more difficult digestion at a more early period, many disorders are often produced in their tender frames. Infants, recently after birth, often suffer by giving them particular kinds of nourishment which are thought to be perfectly mild and agreeable to their constitution, such as gruels, milk and water, wine-whey, &c. At this time, however, Nature requires very little food, but a great deal of repose. During some weeks after birth, infants sleep almost perpetually. Children should be weaned
by

by degrees, and every subsequent alteration in their diet should likewise be gradual; for too sudden transitions often produce very bad effects. We are astonished at the absurdity, and even cruelty, of some nations exhibited in the management of children, and of the various modes of dress in different nations and regions of the globe. The Chinese, from some capricious fancy, think that the feet of their females, if not squeezed, from the earliest infancy, into one fourth of the size which Nature intended, are unhandsome. The Africans have a similarly absurd practice of flattening the noses of their offspring, with a view to make them more beautiful. But we seldom think of an equally absurd and more pernicious practice in our own and many other nations of Europe. We think, that the natural shape of a woman's body is not so elegant as when compressed with stays, which, by the deep infection of the lower part of the abdomen, makes her resemble an *ant*.

Disorders in the stomach, and even consumptions, are often the effects of this hurtful

C

ful practice. Nature resents this practice in a most remarkable manner, by rendering more than one half of the women of fashion, in one degree or other, deformed. Deformity, except from accidental causes, is peculiar to civilized nations. The Turkish, the Asiatic women, as well as those who inhabit the numerous islands of the southern ocean, who are distinguished by the elegance of their form and the gracefulness of their movements, wear no dress but what is perfectly loose. The strength, fine proportions, and agility of Savages, are the natural results of their hardy education, of their living chiefly in the open air, and of their members having never suffered any confinement.

The remainder of this section * is occupied with judicious and pertinent remarks concerning the general management of children, with regard to food, clothing, exercise, &c. till they arrive at their fourth or fifth year.

The second section treats of those powers
or

* The book consists of five.

or faculties which give man a superiority over other animals. Those powers are derived from reason, from the strong associating principle, from what is called *taste*, and from religion. How far each of these contributes to the happiness and comfort of mankind, Dr Gregory considers at some length. Reason of itself, he remarks, unless when a proper use is made of it, cannot be reckoned an immediate blessing. We are furnished by Nature with a variety of internal senses and tastes. If properly cultivated, all these are sources of manly pleasures. This culture is the province of reason. It is by reason that we analyse our tastes and pleasures, and assign to each that degree of indulgence and cultivation which its rank deserves. But, if reason, instead of doing justice to the benevolence of Providence, neglects her superintending charge, reason has no right to the denomination of a *blessing*. The advantages of genius, and of a superior understanding, are obvious. But these uncommon talents seldom procure much emolument either to the possessor or the public. This waste or abuse of
genius

genius exhibits a melancholy picture. "A large library," Dr Gregory remarks, "gives a full view of it. Among the multitude of books of which it is composed, how few engage any one's attention? Such as are addressed to the heart and imagination, such as paint life and manners in just colours and interesting situations, and the very few that give genuine descriptions of Nature in any of her forms, or of the useful and elegant arts, are read and admired. But the far more numerous volumes, productions of the intellectual powers, profound systems and disquisitions of philosophy and theology, are neglected and despised, and remain only as monuments of the pride, ingenuity, and impotency of human understanding. Yet many of the inventors of these systems discover the greatest acuteness and depth of genius; half of which, exerted on any of the useful or elegant arts of life, would have rendered their names immortal."

It has always, however, been the misfortune of philosophical men to attempt the
investigation

investigation of objects which Nature has placed beyond their reach, and to ascend to general principles, and to fabricate systems, without a previous collection and arrangement of facts, which alone can give them a solid foundation. This only proper mode of philosophizing was inculcated in the most strenuous and clear manner by the celebrated Bacon, Lord Verulam. But few attempts have been made to cultivate philosophy upon his most rational and excellent plan. Sir Isaac Newton, Mr Boyle, and some others, however, must be excepted. Genius is naturally impatient of restraint, and impetuous in its pursuits. Hence, it delights in employing its own internal materials, or those which the imagination spontaneously supplies. But the materials necessary for the improvement of arts or sciences must be collected by such slow and patient observation, as is, in a great measure, incompatible with the rapidity and sprightliness of genius. Men of real genius cannot endure the fetters of method and system; but they are the only people whose province it is to invent them. Lord Verulam

culam brought the systematic method of those who are called the schoolmen, which was founded on metaphysical and often nominal subtleties, into merited contempt, and pointed out a mode of investigation founded on the most just and extensive views of Nature. For these and similar reasons, it has happened, that few of the useful arts of life have been improved by philosophers. Improvements of this kind have chiefly originated from accidental discoveries, or from men who exercised those arts, and were totally unacquainted with philosophical speculations.

Dr Gregory, with much liberality of sentiment, applies the above remarks to Medicine. "If by medicine," says he, "be meant the art of preserving health, and restoring it when lost, any man of sense and candour, who has been regularly bred to it, will own, that his time has been mostly taken up with inquiries into branches of learning, which, upon trial, he finds utterly unprofitable to the main ends of his profession, or wasted in reading useless theories and voluminous

voluminous explanations and commentaries on these theories; and will ingenuously acknowledge, that every thing useful, which he ever learned from books in the course of many years study, might be taught to any man of common sense and attention in almost as many months, and that a few years experience is worth all his library. Medicine, in reality, owes more to that illiterate enthusiast, Paracelsus, for introducing some of the most useful remedies, than to any physician who has written since the days of Hippocrates, if we except Dr Sydenham, who owes his reputation to a great natural sagacity in making observations, and to a still more uncommon candour in relating them.*”

Philosophers, generally, in their inquiries, keep at an unfortunate distance from subjects which might redound to the utility of mankind. Agriculture, as a science, for instance, is still in a lamentably imperfect state. A philosopher, or a mathematician, who happens to possess a farm, does not understand

* Gregory's Works, vol. 2. p. 91.

understand the construction of a cart or a plough, so well as the servant who drives them : Neither is he so well acquainted with the method of cultivating the ground to advantage. Many of what are denominated systems of agriculture have been published ; but they are only collections of maxims, or rather nostrums, accompanied with a profusion of ridiculous reasonings. What is chiefly to be wished for in husbandry, is a detail of observations and experiments, fully and distinctly related, as well as properly attested ; for no less authority can give stability to general maxims in any science whatever. With pleasure, however, we observe the spirit of a liberal philosophy beginning to arise, better calculated to promote both private and public utility. In matters of opinion, the authority of antiquity and of celebrated names is now less regarded. Men begin to tire of theories which produce no useful consequences. The load of contemptible rubbish, under which science had been so long oppressed, begins to be removed ; and a general disposition arises to expose and despise those

those quackish arts which have so often disgraced literature and gentlemen who were even trained to what always ought to be liberal professions. The best method of promoting useful science, is to communicate it with perspicuity, and in language as void of technical terms as the nature of the subject will permit.

The good effects of method and perspicuity are no where more remarkable than in Chymistry. For many ages, this science was involved in the deepest obscurity. It was concealed from mankind by a jargon which was intelligible only to a few adepts ; and, by an absurd association, it was interwoven with a mad religious enthusiasm. The great Dr Boerhaave was the first who brought this valuable science out of obscurity, and illustrated it in a language intelligible to all men possessed of common sense. Since that period, the knowledge of Chymistry has advanced with rapidity. The French philosophers have had particular merit in rendering this science, as well as many other branches of natural philosophy,

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subservient,

subservient, by their easy mode of conveying their sentiments, to the useful and elegant arts of life. The same liberal spirit of inquiry has now begun to exhibit itself in the theory and practice of medicine. Greater weight is now given to experiment and observation; idle and useless theories are not only quickly detected, but held in contempt; and the pedantry and quackery of the profession have become objects of just ridicule.

Great natural parts are not unfrequently rendered useless to the world, as well as to the possessor. The force of genius, by grasping at too great a number of objects, is exhausted in the endless labour of accumulating promiscuous or insignificant facts, while, by confining its exertions to fewer objects, it might have improved and extended science, as well as some of the useful arts. The most effectual check to this dissipation of genius is the love of fame, which stimulates men to become authors. Superior powers of understanding, though they adorn any human character, are too seldom

seldom of much use to the public, and often still less to the individual who possesses them. Men who spend most of their time in the exertions of the understanding, are by no means the most happy. They derive pleasure, it must be acknowledged, from the pursuits or discovery of truth, and from a consciousness of superior talents. But they are, in a great measure, deprived of many natural sources of pleasure. All the social and public affections, if not properly cherished and cultivated, soon become languid. People of this description must, of course, live, in a manner, abstracted from the world. Envy and jealousy are remarkable among this class of men. Hence there is, perhaps, less real friendship among authors than among the rest of mankind. Men of independent fortunes, who feel not the rivalry of authors, connect themselves with those who resemble them in taste and sentiment; and, as there are no interferences in their pursuits, their friendships are often sincere, and continue through life. In professions where interest is the chief object, men are often most cordially attached to

to one another, provided the field of employment be sufficiently spacious. In the pursuits of fame or vanity, however, the case is entirely reversed. Here jealousy admits of no rival. It makes people regard what is given to others as taken from themselves. Hence that expressive silence, that cold and extorted approbation, bestowed by rival authors on works which, by more impartial and disinterested judges, receive the warmest applause. Such generosity and greatness of mind as render men superior to so mean a jealousy, are virtues too rarely exhibited to the view of the world.

This almost perpetual contest among men of genius and learning prevents many of them from receiving that degree of fame to which they are justly entitled: It is also one of the chief causes which exclude them from that influence and ascendancy in the various professions and affairs of life, which their talents would otherwise readily procure. Ignorant or dull people cannot comprehend the labours of men of genius, are afraid of them, and naturally combine

bine against them ; and the mutual dissensions and jealousies among such men give dunces all the advantages which they so eagerly desire.

Those who occupy their time in the study of speculative sciences, soon blunt their social affections, because they are not properly exercised. For the same reason, the love of liberty and of country are rendered extremely feeble. No men, perhaps, entertain sentiments of patriotism and public liberty with so much arduor, as those who are just entering upon the world, and have received a liberal education. Youth, indeed, is the season when generous and elevated sentiments most easily penetrate the heart. At this most happy period of life, that acute love of independency, that zeal for public prosperity, which animated the antient Greeks and Romans, are felt with peculiar warmth and enthusiasm. This fervour, however, too soon subsides. When young men engage in the business of active life, the manly and disinterested motives are in danger of being suffocated by dissipation

tion and corruption of manners, which every where solicit attention, and debauch the manners of mankind. Depravity of manners at last becomes so enormous, that every pretension to public virtue is regarded as folly or hypocrisy. On the other hand, when particular men chuse to lead a speculative and sedentary life, the active powers and virtues of the mind are still more effectually annihilated. Steady and vigorous exertions can alone be supported by uniform habits of activity. Love of country and of the public can have no existence among men who neither know nor love the individuals of which it is composed. When a man has a family and friends, these give him an interest in the community, and attach him to it. But, if he is a single solitary animal, unconnected with family or friends, he can feel little or no affection for one country in preference to another.

If abstraction from social intercourse be carried beyond its proper limits, it is uniformly accompanied with gross ignorance
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of life and manners, and deprives a man of all those little but necessary accomplishments which are essential in polished societies. A neglect of those often prevents the success of persons of real merit, and is a common source both of disgust at the world and at themselves. Such men are apt to complain that merit, in this world, is almost entirely neglected. But no man, who has never taken the trouble of making his merit known, can have any title to make such a complaint. Want of health is, likewise, most frequently a concomitant of genius, especially when its exertions are more occupied with the speculative than the active scenes of life. Vivacity of genius is generally attended with remarkable delicacy of constitution. A studious, and, of course, a sedentary life, augments this weakness, and creates a train of nervous disorders, which render life burdensome to the possessor, though not always useless to the public. Exercise and frequent relaxations of mind are the only effectual means of preventing or of removing these maladies.

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Among the many inconveniencies which originate from superior talents, we may reckon that solitude in which they necessarily place a person on whom they are bestowed. To the few who are capable of forming a judgment of his abilities, he becomes an object of jealousy and of envy. Most men regard him with a distant awe which is perfectly incompatible with friendship and confidence. They never can unbosom themselves to a person of whom superiority of learning and genius makes them afraid. Hence it is not unfrequent to see men of parts associating affectionately with those who are greatly inferior to them in understanding, good-humoured people, with whom they can indulge, without reserve, all their peculiarities and even weaknesses.

From what has been delivered concerning the boasted high privilege of being possessed of the reasoning faculty, Dr Gregory draws the following strange, but, perhaps, just conclusion ; “ That, from the little influence it seems to have in promoting either public or
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private good, we are almost tempted to suspect, that Providence deprives us of those fruits we naturally expect from it, in order to preserve a balance and equality among mankind. Certain it is, that virtue, genius, beauty, wealth, power, and every natural advantage one can be possessed of, are usually mixed with some alloy, which disappoint the fond hope of their raising the possessor to any uncommon degree of eminence, and even, in some measure, bring him down to the common level of his species.*”

That principle which induces men to associate with one another, in Dr Gregory's estimation, seems to have no natural connection with the understanding; for persons of the best understanding often possess it in a very inferior degree. But this, he observes, does not proceed from insensibility of heart, but from the languishing of the social principle by neglecting its proper cultivation and exercise. The idle and dissipated derive most enjoyment from this

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* Gregory's Works, vol. 2. p. 113.

principle ; because not only their pleasures but their vices are generally of a social nature. Even drinking, if not carried to excess, is favourable to this principle, particularly in northern climates, where the affections are naturally cold and phlegmatic : For generous liquor excites a warmth of temper, opens the heart, and dispels that gloomy reserve, which is perhaps too common among learned men, but is always inconsistent with the joys arising from sympathetic and chearful affections. Those elevated and warm descriptions of friendship, which charm the minds of youth, and represent it as the highest degree of human felicity, are seldom, if ever, realised in northern regions. High sentiments of friendship, and even of love, are the productions chiefly of warmer climes. Many of the male sex, because they have some learning, assume a tone of superior wisdom, and consider sexual attachment as a weakness below the dignity of man ; though they allow, that the fair sex are useful, and sometimes deign to regard them as rational and agreeable companions. But this is, perhaps, only the
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the language of insensibility of heart, or of disappointed pride, rather than of wisdom. Women were never despised by any man who was a favourite with them ; nor does any man contemn love who ever was conscious of loving and of being loved by a woman of merit.

In eastern climates, as the power of beauty is very absolute, nothing but personal accomplishments are held in estimation. Hence women, in these countries, are deprived of every opportunity of improvement, and spend their days in an ignominious confinement, excluded from a free and promiscuous intercourse with society. But, in northern climates, such as our own, the power of beauty is extremely limited. With us, accordingly, love is a feeble passion, and easily yields to interest, ambition, and even to vanity. Hence, in proportion as luxury advances among us, love must soon be extinguished, especially in the higher ranks of life. To give love more force and permanency, it must be connected with sentiment and esteem. But this desirable effect

effect can never be produced as long as we continue to treat women like children. While used in this manner, their minds are depressed, and all generous emulation is annihilated. If treated in a more liberal manner, a sense of their own dignity and value would induce them to become, what they ought to be, our friends and companions. This, however, can never be accomplished by laying aside their own natural characters and assuming those of the men. The two sexes have very different parts to act on the theatre of life. Nature has sufficiently marked their different characters, and enables both of them to perform their respective duties in society. The original destination of men was to protect the women, and to provide subsistence for them and their children. The more laborious and active parts in the great scene of human affairs must be performed by the men. They must, of course, exert greater bodily strength, greater personal courage, and greater powers of understanding. Domestic life, as friends, wives, and mothers, constitute the highest glories of the female character. Their office

fice is to superintend the oeconomy of families. A more important office is committed to their charge. Not only during infancy, but during that critical period when both the constitution of body, and the temper and dispositions of the mind, are principally formed, the training of youth of both sexes devolves chiefly upon the women. They soften our hearts and polish our manners. Men, it is true, have the power of directing public societies as well as private families. But women possess a strong defence against the abuse of this power, by employing that soft and insinuating address, which enables them to control it, and frequently to transfer it to themselves.

From these and other circumstances it is apparent, that women have a part to act in life which is both important and respectable; and Nature has amply provided them with the means of accomplishing that end. They possess, in a superior degree, sweetness of temper, gentleness of manners, and sensibility of heart. They are more chearful
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and vivacious than men ; and they have a quicker discernment of characters. They enjoy a more lively fancy and a greater delicacy of taste. They are better judges of grace, elegance, and propriety. Hence they are superior to men in such works of taste as depend on these qualities.

In the third section of his *Comparative View*, Dr Gregory gives an ingenious account of the several advantages and pleasures which mankind derive from what is called *Taste*, or a proper use of the powers of imagination. These, however, he considers as very limited in their number. Taste implies a quick and just intellectual discernment, joined to a delicacy of feeling with regard to pleasure or pain excited by different objects either of sentiment or imagination. The servile and laborious, who constitute the great body of mankind, are necessarily deprived of the means of improving the various powers of their minds. Nature bestows on us the seeds only of taste, which it is our business to foster, and bring to maturity, otherwise they will never produce

duce much pleasure. The powers of the understanding, till of late, have chiefly been cultivated in this island. A disunion between philosophy and the fine arts has, accordingly, been one unhappy consequence. We left Music, Painting, Sculpture, Architecture, &c. in the possession of artists who derived no aid from philosophy, and were equally unacquainted with the works of the most celebrated masters. The productions of natural genius, though unassisted by culture, are sometimes great and surprising. But they are generally accompanied with a wild luxuriance, which is totally inconsistent with genuine taste. To analyse and ascertain the principles of every art which depends upon taste, is the province of philosophy. But to be master of the executive parts of these arts, or even to be an inventor in them, does not require the aid of philosophers. It is their proper business to direct the exertions of genius in such a manner as to produce the greatest perfection.

In this country, it was so late as the days of Hogarth and of Avison, that the principles of beauty and of musical expression were unfolded. Both were eminent masters and performers in their respective arts, which was a singular advantage to them in writing upon those subjects, but not so essential as is commonly imagined. Mr Webb was not a painter; but he analysed the principles of painting with an accuracy and a perspicuity which would have done honour to the greatest master.

Music has, perhaps, a greater influence on the mind than any of the other fine arts. By music all our passions and emotions may be either excited or soothed. Still its real effects are not considerable; which is principally owing to its being left in the hands of practical musicians, and not under the direction of taste and philosophy. In order to give music any extensive influence over the mind, both the composer and performer must understand the various associations of the passions, and the natural transitions from one to another, that, in consequence
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of their skill in musical expression, they may be enabled to command them. No science, Dr Gregory remarks, ever flourished as long as it was confined to men who lived by it as a profession. The interested views of a trade differ greatly from the liberal prospects of genius and science. When an art is limited in this manner, private practitioners must either adhere to the generally received principles of their craft, or run the risk of starving. This has been particularly the case with music, the science of which is scarcely understood by any person, except a few composers and performers. They alone direct the public taste, or rather fashion. While men of candour and sense, when they derive not that pleasure from music which they expected, relinquish all pretensions to the knowledge of it.

Dr Gregory next examines some of the first principles of taste in music. Music, he observes, is "the science of sounds, so far as they affect the mind." Independently of custom, Nature has connected certain sounds with particular sensations.

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Measure

Measure and proportion in sounds are likewise founded in Nature. Certain tones are adapted to solemn, plaintive, and mournful subjects, and the movements are slow; others are expressive of the joyous and elevating, and the movements are quick.—Distinct from their gravity or acuteness, sounds affect the mind according to their loudness or softness, as well as their roughness or smoothness. The tones produced by the *Æolian* harp, for instance, are pleasant, though it gives no succession of notes which vary in acuteness, but in loudness only. The effect of the *drum* in rousing, in elevating, or in depressing the mind, is strong; but the drum possesses no variety of notes, though the effect produced arises chiefly from the measure and proportion of the notes it is capable of expressing.

Melody, Dr Gregory remarks, consists of a succession of single and agreeable sounds. Melody which pleases in one country is not equally grateful to the natives of another. *Harmony* is that agreeable sensation of sounds, which, though produced together, differ

differ in acuteness. The mere communication of pleasure, by giving a transient gratification to the ear, is one end of music: But its more noble and important purpose is to influence the passions, and to affect the heart. In the one view, it is an innocent amusement, which agreeably relaxes the mind after the fatigues of business or of study; in another, it is one of the useful arts of life. It has always, however, been an art of greater importance among uncultivated than civilized nations; and it appears, from many ancient authors, that under the term *music* melody, dance, and song, were comprehended. By the exertions of these, barbarous nations, in almost every climate, have expressed all the strong and animated emotions of the mind. By these powerful and attractive arts, they celebrate their public solemnities, and lament their private and public calamities, as the death of friends, or the loss of warriors; by these united, they express their joy on marriages, harvests, huntings, and victories; praise the great actions of their heroes; and stimulate each other to fight bravely,

bravely, or to suffer torments and death with a firmness and constancy which are perfectly astonishing to polished and effeminate nations. In the earlier periods of the Grecian States, their maxims, exhortations, laws, and even their history, were written, or recited, in verse. The rites of their religion were accompanied by dance and song*; and their oracles were delivered in verse, and sung by the priests or priestesses of their multifarious gods. Hence, as long as melody, conjoined with poetry, continued to be the vehicles of the chief principles of religion, morals, and polity, they were the proper and natural objects of public attention, and constituted a principal part of the education of children†.

The character of a *bard*, in antient times, was universally held in the highest estimation; for it was commonly united with that of legislator and chief magistrate. After the separation between music and poetry took place, the bard, for some time, continued

* A practice common among the savages of the islands in the Pacific Ocean.

† Plutarchus, de Musica.

nued to be the second character in the community, because he assisted the magistrate in governing and administering justice to the people *. The bards, in all the Celtic nations, and particularly in Britain, were highly esteemed. The characters of general, poet, and musician, were united in Fingal and Ossian. "Such was the song of Fingal, in the day of his joy. His thousand bards leaned forward from their seats, to hear the voice of the king. It was like the music of the harp on the gale of the spring. Lovely were thy thoughts, O Fingal ! Why had not Ossian the strength of thy soul ? But thou standest alone, my father ; and who can equal the King of Morven ? †" The influence of the Welsh bards so much retarded the progress of the arms of Edward I. that he shamefully ordered the whole of them to be slain. As the simplicity and purity of ancient manners declined in ancient Greece, the arts of music and poetry, formerly the strongest incitements to virtue and every manly exertion, were gradually prostituted to answer

* Suidas on the Lesbian Song. Hesiod. † Carthou.

swer the purposes of vice, or of mere amusement.

The powers of *eloquence* derive their force chiefly from music, or the art of affecting the mind by sounds variously combined. The most pathetic compositions may be pronounced in such an awkward and uninteresting manner as makes them lose all their natural influence. Orations which have roused the minds of the greatest men, and determined the fate of nations, have not unusually been read in private with langour, and even with disgust. Like eloquence, music should be directed to have some determined effect upon the hearers. If this effect is produced, the music is good; if it fails, it is bad. Every country possesses a peculiar melody adapted to effect different passions or emotions, to which composers should pay the greatest attention. In Scotland, for example, there is a chearful music perfectly suited to inspire the joyous sensations which excite dancing and mirth; and a plaintive music that is highly expressive of the tenderness and pleasant melancholy which are felt
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by lovers in distress. Both these species are original, and differ greatly from every other in Europe. It is of little consequence from what source this music derived its origin, whether it be simple or complex, and whether agreeable to the strict rules of composition or not. As long as it produces the intended effects, either joyous or mournful, in a degree superior to that of any other country, it deserves the preference. It is to be lamented, however, that the Scottish nation is likely to lose its original music. The greater part of musical people in Scotland either neglect it, or deprive it of that simplicity upon which its surprising and agreeable effects depended, by absurd and fantastical additions, most preposterously denominated *graces*.

The admiration pretended to be given to foreign music in Britain is, in general, a most despicable affectation. In Italy, the natives are often transported, at the opera, with all the variety of delight and passion which the composer intended to produce. But, in Britain, the same opera is viewed
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with the most apathetic inattention. To the very few who understand the language, and who relish Italian music, the dramatic part of an opera appears to be perfectly ridiculous. An absurd vanity, however, is so predominant over people of fashion in England, that the Italian opera is more frequented than any other public amusement. In all melody intended to touch the heart, or even to please the ear, simplicity is indispensable. If simplicity of melody be so necessary to move the passions, it is still more necessary in harmony. The antient music produced greater effects than the modern, even if the accounts of it handed down to us should be allowed to be much exaggerated. Among them, music, as a science, was, however, in a very low state. They were probably ignorant of harmony; for all their voices and instruments were unisons in concert. Besides, the instruments they employed seem to have been greatly inferior, in compass, expression, and variety, to those we now possess. Still these deficiencies might render their music more powerfully expressive.

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Though we are ignorant of the particular construction of the antient music, we know, that it must have been very simple; for it was often composed by statesmen, warriors, and bards; and people of all ranks, and even children, could practice this delightful art. In music, Dr Gregory remarks, the introduction of harmony opened a new and an extensive field. It promised to exhibit a variety which melody alone could never produce: It likewise promised to bestow on melody an additional charm and energy. But, unfortunately, the first composers were so totally occupied with the study of harmony, which was soon discovered to be a science of great intricacy and extent, that the principal ends of it were entirely overlooked. These composers valued themselves on the laboured construction of parts, which they multiplied surprisngly. The art of counter-point and complicated harmony was invented by Guido in the eleventh century, and carried to its highest perfection by Palaestrini, who lived in the days of Leo X. This species of music, however, was understood only by such persons as had

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made it a particular study. The few who did understand it, acknowledged that it was evidently defective in air or melody, especially when the parts ran into fugues or canons. It must be allowed, however, that these old full compositions were frequently attended with a gravity, a majesty, and a solemnity, which were admirably adapted to the public services of the church. They gave a soothing tranquillity to the mind, which dispelled all earthly cares, and elevated it to heaven.

Fugues, in vocal music, is ill adapted to move the passions. When four voices are employed at the same time, and each of them is expressing a different sentiment, as well as a different musical passage, it is impossible that a hearer should attend to, and be affected by, all of them. Catches are a species of fugues, the pleasure of which arises not from the melody nor from its being expressive of the subject, but from the unexpected assemblage of words, joined to the spirit and humour of the singers. Vocal is the first and most natural music of every

every country ; it is, therefore, reasonable to expect, that it should have some analogy with the poetry of the country, to which it is always adapted. The remarkable superiority of the Scottish songs to the English, may be accounted for from the following facts. The Scottish songs are simple, pathetic, and abound in strokes of Nature and passion. Their music is finely adapted to their songs. But most of the English songs are full of childish conceits. All of them aim at wit, and some of them attain their end. But music has no expression for wit. Hence the music of their songs is flat and insipid, and so little esteemed by the English themselves, that it is perpetually fluctuating, and has never reached any characteristic stile. Dr Brown properly remarks, “ that most countries peopled by colonies, which, after a certain period of civilization, have issued from their native soil, possess no characteristic music of their own ; that the Irish, Welsh, and Scotch, are strictly natives, and, accordingly, have a music of their own ; that the English, on the contrary, are a foreign mixture

ture of late established colonies, and, as a consequence of this, have no native music ; and that the original music of England must be sought for in Wales."

England has, however, produced many excellent composers of church-music. Religion opens an ample field for musical, as well as poetical genius. Religion furnishes almost the whole variety of subjects which music is capable of expressing ; the sublime, the joyous, the serene, the devout, and the plaintive. It, at the same time, warms the heart with an enthusiasm which works of genius uniformly excite. The finest compositions in music, accordingly, are in the church stile. Though far advanced in years, and when his constitution and spirits seemed to be nearly exhausted, Handel was so much roused by this subject, that, in his *Messiah*, he exhibited an extent and sublimity of genius, superior to any he had discovered in the most vigorous periods of his life. Marcello, a noble Venetian, is another instance of the same kind. He set to music the first fifty psalms of David, King of Israel.

Israel. In this performance, Marcello united the simplicity and pathos of antient music with the grace and variety of the modern.

In vocal music, the great object is to make it expressive of the sentiments meant to be conveyed. Where imitation is intended, it should be laid not upon the voice, but on the instrumental accompaniments, which, by their greater compass and variety, are better suited to perform the imitation, while the voice is left at liberty to express the sentiment. In the union of music with poetry, the music should always be subservient to the poetry : But the reverse is the common practice ; for the poetry is universally made subordinate to the music. Handel obliged those who composed the words of his oratorios to alter and transpose them, as he thought best suited his music ; and, as no man of genius could possibly submit to such a practice, the poetry is generally most abominable.

Beside its connection with poetry, the effects of music depend upon many other circumstances.

circumstances. For instance, the effect of cathedral music depends greatly on its being properly adapted to the service of the day and the discourse of the preacher: Yet this circumstance is never regarded. The whole conduct of the music is left entirely to the caprice of the organist, who makes it airy or grave, chearful or plaintive, as suits his own fancy. The same want of taste is often exhibited in the music performed between the acts of a tragedy, where the tone of passion is frequently interrupted and destroyed by impertinent and chearful music. The effusions of unbridled fancy are often honoured with the titles of invention, spirit, and genius, and musical taste, in general, seems to mean nothing more than an attachment to what is new, and a contempt for whatever is old. Hence it is pretty generally admitted, that, in music, there are no fixed principles, as in other fine arts, and that it has no foundation but in fashion and caprice.

Dr Gregory, however, with much propriety, remarks, that the principles of taste
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in music are equally founded in human nature as those of any other art or science. The chief principles which merit attention are those which bestow on music the power over the passions. The next principles to be examined are those which the art exhibits merely for the purposes of amusement and a transient gratification of the ear. In the last and lowest place, may be considered the powers of execution, when employed solely with the view of exciting surprise and admiration of the abilities of the performer.

In the fourth section, Dr Gregory remarks, that as he had formerly made a few observations on the effects produced by a cultivated taste in some of the fine arts, he shall now proceed to consider its influence on the pleasure we derive from such works of genius as are peculiarly addressed to the imagination and the heart. In the earlier periods of life, this pleasure is often very great. In youth the imagination is lively, and the heart is equally susceptible of the joyous impressions of wit and humour, the energy of the sublime, and of every delicate

delicate sentiment of humanity. Like every other thing in nature, the imagination is governed by fixed and general laws, which can be discovered by experience alone. But these laws are not easily ascertained. The subject varies so much in different countries, and even in the constitutions and ages of individuals, that very superior talents are necessary to form any kind of system of these laws. Such a system, particularly with regard to dramatic and epic poetry, was devised by some eminent men of antiquity, and has since been almost universally adopted. It has thrown considerable light on some of the leading principles of criticism; and rules have been established which were derived from the perception of such beauties as conveyed pleasure to the reader. Without detracting, however, from the merit of ancient critics, it must be observed, according to our author, that nothing has a greater tendency to check the improvement of any art or science, than too hastily reducing all its principles into a regular system. The great body of mankind cannot think or judge for themselves. There are a few

Few leading spirits whom the rest must follow implicitly. This is one reason why systems are so universally acceptable. These observations are peculiarly applicable to systems and rules of criticism. When considered solely as assistances to the exertions of taste ; as unfolding and heightening our discernment of beauty, by collecting and arranging the feelings of Nature, they promote the improvement of the fine arts. But, when they are regarded as fixed and established standards from which there is no appeal ; when they impose on us the weight of authority, and prescribe a precise line beyond which the works of imagination cannot pretend to pass ; then they are productive of much more harm than good. Of all the powers of the human mind, taste is the most impatient of strict confinement. Some general principles may be inculcated ; but it must be a fruitless attempt to limit the imagination entirely to these rules or principles. Besides, all criticism must, in a certain degree, be both local and temporary.

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Some nations, as well as some individuals, are best pleased with Nature in her fairest and most regular forms; while others admire her in the great, the wild, and the wonderful. In France, elegance, regularity, and sentiment are the chief objects of their taste and criticism. But the French maxims and rules of criticism cannot, with any degree of propriety, be adopted in Britain; for the natural genius and taste of the people are widely different. In Britain, the grand, the sublime, the surprising, and every object which forcibly strikes the imagination, are chiefly regarded and admired. Without these, the utmost elegance and propriety appear cold and uninteresting. Wherever what is denominated a very *correct taste* is generally prevalent, genius and invention soon languish. Delicacy or refinement of taste is an acquisition both dangerous and deceitful. It flatters our pride by giving us a consciousness of superiority, and, by specious promises of conferring on us enjoyments of which the common herd of mankind are totally ignorant, not unfrequently deprives us of those pleasures
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which are attainable by the whole of our species. Most of our internal and external sensations, by constant indulgence and attention, may be brought to such a degree of diseased acuteness as to be disgusted at almost every object. This extreme sensibility, though originally founded on affectation and vanity, yet, by habitual indulgence, soon becomes real. Nature, however, has set bounds to all our pleasures. Within these bounds, we may enjoy them with safety. But, if we refine too much upon them, chagrin and disappointment are the certain consequences. A delicacy so false and absurd, in works of taste, checks every effort of genius and imagination, enervates the natural powers of language, and gives rise to that cold mediocrity in composition, which does not always disgust, but never affords any great degree of pleasure.

Clearness of understanding is not the only quality requisite to form a good critic. Here the heart is as much concerned as the head. In general, it seems to be more properly the business of philosophical criticism to watch the excursions of fancy at a distance, than

than to be continually checking all its unimportant irregularities. The beauties of works of taste are of different kinds, and so are their blemishes. The French dramatic writers, by strictly adhering to the general oeconomy and unity of their fable, and the construction of their scenes, have universally obtained the character of being superior in correctness to those of the English. But, when considered in another point of view, we find that the French are much excelled by the English writers. Even in the best French dramatic pieces, there is a want of energy, and often a degree of languor. The speeches are generally too long and declamatory, the sentiments are over-refined, and the characters enervated. But, in the English dramas, though not so elegant and regular, there is much more fire, force, and strength. The passions are expressed in a language suitable to their respective natures ; and the characters drawn with, perhaps, a coarser, but with a more manly pencil. Shakespear, by his creative imagination, by his strokes of nature and of passion, and by preserving an uniform consistency

consistency in his various characters, more than fully compensates for his transgressions against the fettering rules of time and place, with which the imagination can easily dispense. He frequently interrupts the current of the passions by introducing low and ridiculous characters, which is a still greater opposition to Nature, and the laws of the drama.

Critics have chosen to confine the imagination within the boundaries of probability. But genius and imagination know no such bounds. The ingenious Dr Johnston, in his *Adventurer*, remarks, that, to our reason, events may appear to be not only improbable, but even absurd and impossible; yet they are often embraced, with facility and delight, by the imagination. It is not very long ago, since it was universally believed, that invisible beings, of different ranks and dispositions, interested themselves in human affairs. A belief well calculated to make deep impressions on some of the most powerful principles of our nature. It gratified the love of the marvellous; it dilated

lated the imagination, and gave it a boundless range. No wonder, therefore, that, in those days, the old romances were highly esteemed. Though a belief in the existence of those invisible powers is now almost entirely annihilated; yet it still has considerable influence on the imagination. It is from this circumstance that oriental tales continue to be read and admired by people who have no belief in the existence of Genii, or of any similar spirits. In all such works of imagination, we only require an unity and consistency of character. Though the imagination is willingly induced to believe in the existence of beings which reason rejects as ridiculous; still events must be represented in such a regular manner as might be naturally expected to be produced by these supposed intelligences and powers. The facility with which the imagination is deceived appears in a remarkable manner from the effects of a well-acted tragedy. In this case, the imagination soon becomes too much heated, and the passions too much agitated, to permit reason to reflect that the distress exhibited is only feigned.

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In modern novels, the deception is more complete than in the old romance. But, as it is the chief object of the former to paint Nature and to delineate characters as they really exist, the powers of fancy cannot be equally exerted, nor the succession of incidents be so quick and surprising. Hence great genius is requisite to give them that degree of vivacity which is necessary to captivate the imagination.

The pleasures we derive from history, arise, in a great measure, from the same sources with those we receive from romance. It is not the mere recital of facts that gives us pleasure; they must be of that important kind which agitate and interest the mind. But events of this nature do not frequently occur in history; nor does it paint those minute features of particular persons or characters which often engage our affections and influence our passions more than the fate of nations. It is not, therefore, surprising that we often find a difficulty in keeping our attention awake when reading history, and that few authors have

have been remarkably successful in this species of composition. To make history pleasant and interesting, it is sufficient that it be impartial, that it be written with elegance, and abound with the most judicious observations. History never interests us agreeably, unless we contract an attachment to some important cause, or to some distinguished characters. The fate of these engages the attention, and keeps the mind in an anxious but pleasing suspense. Even in history, we expect a sort of unity or consistency of character.

The most important end of history is to promote liberty and virtue, to which impartial history will always be favourable. But, when an historian pays little or no attention to the principal objects of history, if he regards it solely as a vehicle of amusement, he may unquestionably make his work answer a very different purpose. The circumstances which accompany all great events are so complicated, and the inconsistencies of human characters are so various, that a writer of ingenuity is enabled
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to place them in any point of view he choofes. Under the plaufible pretence of a regard to truth, and of being fuperior to vulgar prejudices, he may render the beft caufe doubtful, and the moft refpectable characters ambiguous. This effect may be produced without any abfolute deviation from truth, by fuppreffing fome circumftances; and representing others in vivid colours; by taking advantage of the frivolous fpirit of the age, which derives pleafure from feeing the moft facred and important fubjects ridiculed; and by infinuations which the author, from an affected fear of the laws, or a pretended delicacy with regard to eftablifhed opinions, feems unwilling fully to exprefs. This, of all the methods which have been employed to unhinge the principles of virtue, of liberty, and of human happinefs, is the moft dangerous and illiberal. We cannot confute a hint, or answer an objection, that is not expicitly ftated.

A lively imagination, efpecially in poetry, cannot poffibly be reftained in the ufe of

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metaphor and imagery, which is the peculiar province of the imagination. In it, the soundest understanding can neither assist nor judge. As Shakespear remarks, the poets eye, as it *glances from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven*, sees numberless similitudes which pass unnoticed by the rest of mankind. Between particular external forms in Nature, and certain affections of the mind, there is a correspondence, which may be felt, but cannot always be explained. The association may sometimes be accidental; but it seems to be often innate. From this circumstance, the difficulty of ascertaining the true *sublime* chiefly arises. In truth, it cannot be limited by any bounds. It is entirely relative, and depends on the liveliness and warmth of the imagination. Hence it is often very different in different countries. Wherever, for the same reason, there is a rich profusion of imagery, which, in some kinds of poetry, constitutes a principal beauty, obscurity is generally complained of. This obscurity is increased by those sudden transitions which confound common readers, but are easily comprehended by men who
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are versant in poetry. It is a fruitless task to attempt an accurate scrutiny into the propriety of images or metaphors. If not felt at once, it can seldom be communicated; for while we endeavour to analyse it, the impression vanishes. The same observation is applicable to *wit*, or a rapid and unexpected assemblage of ideas, which agreeably strike the mind either by their incongruity or resemblance. Neither is the justness of *humour* a subject that will bear reasoning. This consists in a lively painting of those weaknesses of character, which are not of importance enough to raise pity or indignation, but only excite mirth and laughter. We must have an idea either of the original humourist or be affected with the representation of his humour: and if we do not, at once, feel its justness, we can never perceive it. Hence, most works of humour, satire, and ridicule, which paint the features and manners of the times, being merely local and transient, soon lose their poignancy.

Objects of imagination and taste can only be viewed with advantage at a certain distance,

distance, and in a particular light. When too near, the beauty which formerly charmed us appears to be either faded, or distorted. Whatever we admire as great or beautiful, is attended with particular circumstances, which, if examined too minutely, would annihilate our enjoyment, and, in many cases, create disgust. We derive pleasure from the grandeur of Nature in some of her wildest forms ; from the prospect of stupendous mountains, and other magnificent objects ; but, at the same time, we are under no necessity to consider the coldness and barrenness which are so generally connected with them. Many passages in the Night Thoughts of Dr Young are offensive to a correct taste. That work gives a false and gloomy representation of human life. The poetry sometimes sinks into quaint conceits, or prosaic flatness, but oftener rises into a species of false or turgid sublime. The reasoning is frequently weak ; and the general plan of the work is both unhappily laid, and ill conducted. This work, however, contains many strokes of sublimity which few poets have been able to reach ; and is full of those pathetic descriptions

scriptions of Nature and passion which most tenderly affect the heart. Though the mind is sometimes disposed to be pleased with dark views of human life ; yet there are afflictions too deep to bear either reasoning or amusement. They may admit of being soothed, but cannot be diverted. The gloom of the Night Thoughts corresponds perfectly with this state of mind. It indulges the present passion, and, at the same time, administers those motives of consolation which alone are capable of making certain griefs supportable. There is a secret pleasure which Nature has annexed to all our sympathetic feelings. We enter into scenes of deep distress and sorrow with a tenderness of heart far more delightful than all the joys which dissipated mirth can produce.

The discovery of many beauties in the works of Nature and of art, which would otherwise pass unnoticed, ought chiefly to be regarded in the cultivation of taste. Thomson in his justly admired poem, called *the Seasons*, conveys much pleasure by the justness of his painting. But his principal merit is the impressing the mind with numerous

merous beauties exhibited by Nature, which did not formerly attract the attention of mankind. To open new sources of innocent pleasures, is the most useful effect of criticism; and, it is for this reason chiefly that taste can be esteemed as a real benefit to society. A good taste and a good heart have been thought to be strictly associated. But there is a species of taste which is perpetually occupied with the discovery of blemishes and deformity, and, of course, can have no good effect either on the temper or the heart. The mind takes a natural tincture from those objects which usually engross its attention. Frequent disgust sours the temper; and a habit of too nice discrimination contracts the heart, and, by exhibiting the faults and follies which exist in every character, not only checks the generous and benevolent affections, but extinguishes all the pleasant emotions of love and admiration.

In subjects of taste, the dwelling too much on what is ridiculous has also a bad effect upon the character, because it produces a sullen and gloomy pleasure only,

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by cherishing envy and malignity, which are the worst and most painful feelings in human nature. But an intimate acquaintance with the works of Nature and of genius, in their most beautiful forms, softens the temper, extends the imagination, and disposes us to embrace the most pleasing views of mankind and of Providence. By contemplating Nature in this light, the heart is dilated, and filled with the most benevolent feelings. Then the secret sympathy and the connection between the perceptions of moral and natural beauty, between a good heart and a good taste, become illustriously manifest.

In the fifth and last section of the *Comparative View*, Dr Gregory treats of *Religion*; and he considers it chiefly as a principle founded in human nature, and treats of the influence it may or actually has on the happiness of our species. There is, the Doctor remarks, something peculiarly soothing and comfortable in a firm belief that all Nature is supported and governed by a good and an omnipotent Being; a belief that we know the means of obtaining his favour; a belief
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that this life is only the infancy of our existence ; that we shall survive the seeming destruction of our present frame, and have it in our power to secure our entrance into a new state of endless happiness. Though the belief of a Deity, however, and of a future existence, has prevailed in all nations and ages ; yet it has been too frequently attended with a variety of superstitions, which have sometimes rendered it not only useless but hurtful to the human race. The supreme Being has often been represented as an object of terror rather than of reverence and esteem ; as executing both present and eternal vengeance on the greatest part of mankind for crimes they never committed, and for not believing doctrines which they never heard. Men have been taught that they did God an acceptable service by withdrawing from all the duties they owed to society, by denying themselves all the pleasures of life, and even by voluntarily enduring, and even inflicting on themselves, the severest tortures which Nature could support. They have been taught that it was their duty to persecute, in the
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most cruel manner, their fellow creatures, in order to bring them to an uniformity with themselves in religious tenets; an attempt equally barbarous and impossible. In fine, religion has often been used as an engine to deprive men of their most valuable privileges, and to subject them to the most despotic tyranny.

Some ingenious men, induced by these pernicious consequences, were led to question, whether superstition or atheism were most unfavourable to the happiness of society. But experience has now shown, that religion may subsist in a public establishment, divested of that pernicious and absurd superstition, which was only adventitious, and obviously repugnant to its genuine and original spirit. To banish superstition entirely from religion, in every individual, is indeed impracticable; because it is impossible to make the whole human race think wisely and properly on any subject whatever, where the understanding alone is concerned, and much more where the imagination and affections are so deeply interested. Inde-

pendently of religious belief, mankind are unquestionably endued with a sense of right and wrong. But, experience teaches us, that the allurements of pleasure, and the impetuosity of passion, often prevent man from obeying the dictates of his moral sense, unless it be supported by the influence which religion has upon the imagination and passions. Many of the greatest enemies of religion, it must be allowed, have been distinguished for honour and probity. But it should be considered, at the same time, that some virtues as well as vices are in a great measure constitutional. A cool temper, a dull imagination, and an unfeeling heart, prevent even the desire of committing many vices. But keen passions, a warm imagination, and great sensibility of heart, too frequently give rise to prodigality, debauchery, and ambition. This disposition of mind, however, is accompanied with the seeds of all the social and heroic virtues. It carries along with it a check to its constitutional vices, by rendering the possessors peculiarly susceptible of religious impressions. It is true, they of-
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ten appear to be enemies to religion ; but that conduct originates entirely from their impatience of its restraints. Temperate and chaste philosophers have always been the most dangerous enemies to religion. Void of passion and sensibility, they had no vicious appetites to be checked by its influence, and were equally unsusceptible either of its terrors or pleasures.

Infidelity in religion, it must be owned, is no proof of a defect in the understanding, or of a vicious disposition ; but it certainly indicates a want of imagination and sensibility of heart, as well as a perverted understanding. Some philosophers have been infidels, but few men of taste and sentiment. It is sufficiently evident, however, from the examples of Bacon, Lord Verulam, Mr Locke, and Sir Isaac Newton, among many others of the most eminent philosophers, that religious belief is perfectly compatible with the clearest and most enlarged understanding. Men who have got the better of religious prejudices, as they are called, affect to treat such as

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avow a regard to religion as people of weak minds. The fundamental principles of religion, however, have been generally believed by people distinguished for accuracy and acuteness of judgment. It is improper to infer, on other subjects, the imbecility of a person's head from his attachment even to the absurdities of superstition. We learn from experience, that, when the imagination is heated, and the affections much interested, they overlook, or rather repel, all distinctions of the understanding. Men of warm, chearful tempers, and who have a sense of religion, are not unfrequently reproached with feebleness of mind. But this reproach has no foundation in truth; for strength of mind does not imply a peevish temper, nor a hard and inflexible heart. On the contrary, it implies an active and a resolute spirit, which enables a man to act with propriety, and to support the misfortunes of life with dignity and fortitude, which neither atheism nor scepticism are capable of producing. These, on the other hand, chill all the powers of imagination, depress the genius, sour the temper,

temper, and contract the heart. A high religious spirit, and a great veneration for Providence, are exhibited in the writings of the antient Stoics; a sect which produced the most intrepid and virtuous men that ever appeared in the world.

At all periods, immense numbers of people exist, who have survived the age of youth and vigour, impaired in their health, depressed in their fortunes, deprived of their former friends, their children, and perhaps still more endearing connections. What resources can this world afford to people in such situations? It presents nothing but a dark and dreary waste. Every delusive prospect of pleasure, or of ambition, is now extinguished. Long experience of the too general conduct of mankind has made the heart almost totally incapable of contracting new friendships. When we lose those for whom we laboured, and who sweetened the toils of life, where can the mind find refuge, but in the consolations and prospects offered to us by religion; prospects of Providence and
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of futurity, which alone can warm and gratify the heart?

Dr Gregory considers religion in three points of view. I. Its doctrines relating to the existence and attributes of God, his moral administration of the world, and particular communications to mankind by an immediate supernatural revelation. II. Its influence as a rule of life and manners. III. He treats of religion as a source of particular affections of the mind, which produce either pleasure or pain, according to the spirit of that species of religion by which they are inspired.

In the *first* of these views, which contains the foundation of all religious belief, our author remarks, that our reasoning powers are chiefly concerned. On this subject, the greatest efforts of genius and of application have been exerted, particularly with regard to those important articles which more immediately affect the interest and happiness of the human species. But, when our inquiries are pushed too far, we are humbled
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by the discovery, that Providence has set bounds to our reason, and likewise to our capacity of apprehension. Our ideas, for example, concerning infinity, and the moral oeconomy of the Deity, are and must be extremely limited. Even when we prosecute our inquiries into any part of Nature beyond certain bounds, we soon find ourselves involved in perplexity and darkness. But there is a remarkable difference between these and religious inquiries. When we investigate natural objects, we always make some progress in knowledge, and approximate the truth by proper exertions of genius and observation. But our inquiries into religious subjects are confined within very narrow bounds ; nor can any exertion of reason or of application enable us to advance one step beyond that impenetrable gulf which separates the visible from the invisible world.

The articles of religious belief, which fall within the comprehension of mankind, are few and simple ; but they have been erected by ingenious men into monstrous systems of metaphysical subtleties. Various
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have been the pernicious consequences of such systems. By attempting to establish too much, they have hurt the foundation of the leading principles of religion. The bulk of mankind are taught to believe the peculiar opinions of some particular religious sect, and that these are founded on Divine authority, as well as the soundest reasoning. Hence their system of religion hangs so closely together, that one part cannot be shaken, without endangering the whole. Wherever freedom of inquiry is permitted, the absurdity of some of those opinions, and the uncertainty of others, are soon exposed and derided. The natural consequence is a general distrust of the whole. The very habit of frequent reasoning upon religious topics diminishes that reverence with which they should always be treated. This is particularly the case, when men presume to make too curious scrutinies into the views or designs of Providence in the administration of the world, why the Supreme Being made it as it is, the freedom of his actions, and similar questions, which are infinitely above our comprehension. But the most
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hurtful effect of this speculative theology has been to withdraw the attention of mankind from its practical and most essential duties. It consists with daily experience, that those who are distinguished by an over-zealous attachment to particular tenets in religion, discover great coolness and indifference with regard to its moral precepts, which ought to be the principal end of all religion.

Besides, speculative and controversial theology injure both the temper and the affections. When the mind is perpetually embarrassed, and can find no firm foundation to rest upon, the temper becomes gloomy and severe, from the chagrin arising from disappointment, as well as from the kind and social affections being blunted, or perhaps extinguished for want of exercise. If this evil be exasperated by opposition and dispute, the consequences often destroy the peace of society; especially when men fancy, that their espousing certain opinions entitles them to the divine favour; and that all those who differ from them are devoted

to eternal damnation. A persuasion of this destructive nature dissolves at once all the bonds of society. Tolerating men, whom we conceive to entertain erroneous opinions in religion, are regarded as conniving at their destroying, not themselves only, but all those over whom they happen to have influence. Such infamous and diabolical doctrines give rise to that cruel spirit, which has often dishonoured humanity, and disgraced religion. The effects of religious controversy, however, have sometimes, though very rarely, been of use to mankind. That spirit of free inquiry, which, in many nations of Europe, incited what are called most justly the *Reformers* to break the yoke of ecclesiastical tyranny, created proper ideas of civil liberty. Such sentiments united with that bold enthusiasm, and severity of manners by which some of the reformed sects were animated, produced those resolute men, who alone were capable of maintaining the cause of liberty, at a period when the Christian part of the world was enervated both by superstition and luxury. To those men
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we are indebted for that liberty we now enjoy.

Dr Gregory *next* considers religion as a rule of life and manners. In this respect, its influence is both extensive and beneficial; because, even in its worst forms, it has an evident tendency to moderate those passions which reason alone is too weak to conquer. But it is to be regretted, that the application of religion to this beneficial purpose has not been attended to with that care which the importance of the subject required. The speculative parts of religion have chiefly occupied the minds of ingenious men. All the useful and practical arts of life have undergone a similar fate. Philosophers have a natural aversion against every application which does not immediately occupy the active powers of their own minds; for, in acquiring a practical art, a philosopher must spend most part of his time in employments which afford immediate employment to the active powers of his mind.

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Vice has not so much dependence on a perversion of the understanding, as on the effects of the imagination and the passions. Vicious men are sufficiently sensible that their conduct is wrong. They know that vice is contrary both to their duty and their interest. Hence, it is fruitless to employ any process of reasoning to convince them of these truths ; because the disease is not seated in the understanding, but in the heart. Vice is supported by the imagination and the passions, and to these alone the remedy should be applied. This has been the almost universal defect of sermons and other writings which were intended to reform mankind. Ingenious and sensible remarks have repeatedly been made on the different duties of religion, and they have been enforced by judicious and solid arguments. Performances of this kind may convey pleasure as well as instruction to pious and well disposed people. Even the vicious, when they peruse books of this description, acknowledge that they contain great and important truths ; but the impressions they make soon vanish. Pathetic addresses

dresses and representations to the imagination and passions are the only successful modes of making men perceive the deformities of their own characters. In addresses to a numerous audience, the great end of reforming mankind is most effectually promoted by the union of voice, action, and the other arts of eloquence. Some of those arts, however, are not to be attained by any strength of genius or understanding; because they depend upon peculiar gifts of nature; and even these gifts must be highly cultivated by study and practice before the proper exercise of them can be acquired. It is the business of art to represent Nature in her most graceful and amiable forms, unattended with those peculiarities which she exhibits in particular instances. It is this difficulty of representing Nature properly, which renders the eloquence of the pulpit, the stage, and the bar, accomplishments so uncommon.

Beside the talents of the preacher himself, an intimate acquaintance with Nature will suggest the necessity of paying attention

tion to some external circumstances, which operate strongly in the mind, and prepare it for receiving the impressions designed to be made; such is the proper regulation of church-music, and the solemnity of public worship. Independently of the effects which circumstances of this kind have upon the imagination, a just taste, and a sense of propriety and decorum, should recommend them to our attention. They have, indeed, been abused, and have given rise to the most gross superstition. But this propensity to carry them to excess, is the strongest proof that our attachment to them is natural; and, therefore, instead of extinguishing them, they ought, under proper regulations, to be encouraged. Without any of these external supports, many of these religious sects have supported themselves for some time. But, after the fervour of their first zeal has abated, their public worship has uniformly been conducted with a remarkable coldness and insipidity. It consists with experience, that those sects who have distinguished themselves by a religious enthusiasm, who despised all forms, have
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either been of short duration, or terminated in scepticism. The difficulties which render the art of making religion influence the manners of mankind, by commanding the imagination and passions, have made it too generally neglected by clergymen of great learning and good sense. They have rather chosen to follow a tract in which they were sure to excel by the strength of their own genius, than to attempt a doubtful path where inferior men might outshine them. Hence religious tenets and principles have chiefly been enforced by men possessed of lively imaginations and of some natural advantages derived from voice and manner. As no art, however, can be extensively useful to mankind, unless it be conducted by good sense and genius, it has too frequently happened, that the art of preaching has produced the most absurd fanaticism.

In his *third* view of religion, Dr Gregory considers it as interesting the affections, and, of course, comprehends its devotional or sentimental part. The spirit of devotion

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is, in a great measure, constitutional ; for it depends upon a vivacious imagination and a sensibility of heart. Accordingly, in warm climates, devotion is most prevalent, and rises to a greater height. Its great dependence on the imagination is obvious from the remarkable attachment it has to poetry and music. Music constitutes a principal part of the paradise of every sect of religion and of every country. The Deity may be said, with much propriety, to dwell in light inaccessible, when viewed by the cool eye of reason. The mind struck with the immensity of his being, and a sense of its own littleness and unworthiness, admires with that distant awe and veneration that rather excludes love. But, when viewed by a warm and devout imagination, he may become an object of great affection. A philosopher contemplates the Deity in the wisdom and benignity displayed in the works of Nature. A devout man confines his views chiefly to his own connection with the Deity, to many instances of his goodness he himself has already experienced, and the many greater he expects to receive in futurity. The devotional taste is too often condemned as

a weakness by those who are strangers to its joys. It must be allowed, that too frequent opportunities have been given to turn this subject into just ridicule. A strongly devout imagination, when not directed by a sound understanding, is apt to run wild, and is often eager to publish its extravagances. Devotional writings, however, when executed with judgement and taste, are highly useful and engaging.

A devotional spirit, when united to good sense and a chearful temper, gives a peculiar support and steadiness to virtue. It creates a gentleness and sensibility in the heart, and a mildness in the manners; and, what is of still greater importance, it excites an universal love to mankind. There is a sublime and tender melancholy which almost universally accompanies genius; but it is too apt to degenerate into a gloomy disposition, and not unfrequently into a disgust with the world. To sooth this disposition, by leading the mind to those prospects of Nature and providence which calm every discontented emotion, and diffuse a

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cheerfulness over many of the dark hours of life, devotion is most admirably calculated.

I cannot conclude this analysis of Dr Gregory's *Comparative View of the State and Faculties of Man with those of the Animal World*, without remarking, that, after perusing the book, every intelligent reader must perceive the little connection between the title and the work itself. The idea was ingenious; but it is by no means elucidated, or even followed. An accurate investigation of the mental faculties and dispositions of the inferior animals compared and occasionally contrasted with those of man, is a great and a fertile subject; and it is to be regretted that Dr Gregory did not execute his seemingly intended plan; for his genius and abilities would certainly have enabled him to accomplish a task, which would infallibly have both pleased and informed the public. He, indeed, makes a few cursory and general remarks on the condition of brute animals. But man is his principal object;

object ; and he has considered him in many interesting points of view.

I shall now proceed with the history of this conspicuous and amiable character.

Dr Gregory remained in Aberdeen till the end of the year 1764, when he changed his place of residence, and went to Edinburgh ; and, in the year 1766, he was appointed Professor of the Practice of Physic in that University, upon the resignation of the late learned and ingenious Dr Rutherford. Here Dr Gregory continued to lecture to great numbers of pupils during the years 1767, 1768, and 1769. By agreement with the late Dr Cullen, Professor of the Theory of Medicine, these two eminent men gave alternate courses of the Theory and of the Practice of Physic. As a public speaker, Dr Gregory's manner was simple and animated ; and he expressed his ideas with uncommon perspicuity. By the
assistance

assistance of a few notes, he lectured with great facility and elegance. The only lectures which he fully extended in writing were those he read as introductory to his annual course. These he published in the year 1770, under the title of *Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician*.

Dr Gregory, in this work, has two objects chiefly in view. I. He points out those accomplishments which qualify a Physician for performing the practical duties of his profession. II. He gives rules of inquiry which he thought necessary to be observed in the study of Medicine as a branch of natural knowledge. His remarks on the former of these subjects, and particularly on the delicate attentions necessary to those whose minds are debilitated by disease, are results of the author's acquaintance with human nature, as well as of that benignity of temper by which all his writings are distinguished. Neither does his character appear in a less advantageous light from his liberal remarks on the *lucrative* part of his profession. On this topic he expresses himself

self with considerable animation against the unworthy artifices and servile manners by which it has too often been degraded. In the three first lectures, Dr Gregory's remarks on these, and other topics highly interesting to practical Physicians, fully justify his general inference, "That the profession of Medicine requires a more comprehensive mind than any other." This will appear to be an unquestionable truth to every person who considers the great variety of speculative knowledge, and of literary accomplishments which are necessarily to be acquired in a medical education; beside the sagacity, the address, and the knowledge of mankind, which ought to regulate the Physician in the practical part of his art. To all those who knew Dr Gregory, it must have been apparent, that the talents and accomplishments which he described to his pupils as the gifts of Nature conjoined with education, were actually united in his own person.

The three last lectures are principally confined to medicine as a branch of natural knowledge.

knowledge. They exhibit more fully than any of our author's other works the extent of his philosophical views, and from them we have the greatest reason to lament the loss which the science of medicine sustained by his death. No intelligent reader can possibly peruse them without regretting that his ingenious and benevolent exertions for the improvement of the medical art were so early interrupted. Lord Verulam, in his *Novum Organum*, has given many excellent rules with regard, chiefly, to the method of *philosophising*. Though he confines his views principally to Physic and Chemistry, yet his remarks upon the art of Medicine merit attention. Though no physician, Dr Gregory remarks, Lord Verulam possessed "as just and comprehensive views in medicine as any physician who ever wrote."

In the year 1772, Dr Gregory published *Elements of the Practice of Physic, for the use of Students*. This work was solely intended for his own pupils; and, in his lectures, he commented upon it as a text-book. His design was to treat of all the diseases

diseases comprehended in his lectures. But this he did not accomplish. The book, accordingly, contains only the class of Febrile Diseases. In his introductory lectures formerly mentioned, Dr Gregory had delivered his sentiments with regard to the proper mode of conducting medical inquiries in the present imperfect state of that science. He never attempted to mislead the students by flattering views of the perfection of the medical art. On the contrary, he anxiously pointed out its defects, which he considered as a principal step to promote its improvement. He exposed the futility of those theories and hypotheses which had been most generally received, and inculcated the danger of fabricating systems upon a limited and often very imperfect knowledge of genuine facts. He considered that a rational theory of medicine had never yet been devised. For this reason, he communicated to his students the greatest portion of practical facts, as the only basis on which such a theory could ever be established.

When treating of the several diseases,
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Dr Gregory first described those symptoms by which particular maladies are characterised. From the general, he proceeded to the more particular series of symptoms, together with their occasional varieties. With great precision, he points out the *diagnostic* symptoms, or those which distinguish one disease from others that resemble it, and marks the prognostics which enable a physician to form probable conjectures concerning the event of a disease. He next specified the causes of diseases, namely, the predisposing, the occasional, and the proximate. Finally, he taught the general plan of cure, the proper remedies to be employed, and the cautions requisite in administering them. Desirous of establishing the science of medicine upon the solid foundation of practice and experience, he uniformly endeavoured, both by his precepts and example, to impress on the minds of his pupils the necessity of great caution either in admitting or rejecting what are commonly, though often extremely doubtful, called *medical facts* or *cases*.

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Soon after the death of his wife, and, as he tells us himself, for the amusement of his leisure-hours, he composed that ingenious and amiable little work, entitled, *A Father's Legacy to his Daughters*, which was published after the death of the author. From this treatise it is apparent, that Dr Gregory had perused *Roussseau's* system of education; for from that work he has adopted whatever appeared to him to be valuable. But, in the character of *Sophia*, and in the plan of her education, he perceived both imperfections and absurdities. The business of the French philosopher was to paint imaginary or romantic characters. But the only aim of our author was to deliver to his daughters, in the language of prudence and parental affection, such precepts as he thought would be most conducive to their honour and happiness, and to mark those virtues and accomplishments which would make them both amiable and respectable to the worthiest part of the other sex. To him religion appeared to be of essential service to females as a great support in personal distress, as a consolation under family misfortunes,

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fortunes, and a salutary restraint against extravagance and dissipation. With regard to books written upon religious subjects, he judiciously recommends those only which are addressed to the heart, and which have a tendency to inspire devout affections; and he cautions the female mind against the bigotry of system and the hurtful wranglings of controversy. He considers the external forms of religion as of a nature so subordinate, when compared to its essential principles, that, when the latter agree, he regarded all choice in the former as a matter of perfect indifference. He himself preferred the forms of the church of Scotland; but, to his daughters, he recommended the worship of the church of England, to which their mother was attached.

The *Graces*, in *Lord Chesterfield's* plan of education, are made superior to every virtue, and indeed to every good talent that can adorn human nature. To these Dr Gregory gives their proper importance in female accomplishments; but he considers them as subordinate to moral excellence.

lence. He recommends delicacy of sentiment as the parent of delicacy of manner, and a feeling heart as the genuine source of true politeness.

After making some other pertinent remarks on the important topic of Religion, Dr Gregory proceeds to advise his daughters with regard to their *Conduct and Behaviour*. In his estimation, "one of the chief beauties in a female character is that modest reserve, that retiring delicacy, which avoids the public eye, and is disconcerted even at the gaze of admiration.—I would not wish you to be insensible to applause. If you were, you must become, if not worse, at least less amiable women." When young women cease to blush, they have lost the most powerful charm of beauty. The extreme sensibility indicated by blushing may be a weakness when exhibited by men; but, in the female sex, it is highly engaging. Blushing is so far from being a necessary attendant on guilt, that it is usually the companion of innocence. Modesty naturally disposes young women to be rather silent in
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large companies. But people of sense never mistake this silence for dulness or ignorance. A person may take a share in conversation without uttering one word, as may easily be perceived by the expressions displayed in the countenance.

Females cannot be possessed of a more dangerous talent than Wit. It should be managed with great discretion, otherwise it creates many enemies. Wit is perfectly consistent with softness and delicacy, but they are seldom united. Wit flatters vanity to such a degree, that the possessors often become intoxicated, and lose the command of themselves. Humour is of a different nature. The company of humourists is much courted ; but it should be cautiously indulged. Humour is often a great enemy to delicacy, and a still greater one to dignity of character. It may sometimes procure applause, but never respect. "Be even cautious," says Dr Gregory, "in displaying your good sense. It will be thought you assume a superiority over the rest of the company. But, if you happen to have any
learning,

learning, keep it a profound secret, especially from the men, who generally look with a jealous and malignant eye on a woman of great parts and a cultivated understanding." Men of genius and candour are superior to such weak and even mean ideas. But such characters are seldom to be met with. If by accident men of this description should come into your company, show no anxiety to unfold the full extent of your knowledge. They will soon discover it themselves; and, if you possess any advantages of person or manner, they will not fail to give you ample credit. The great art of pleasing in conversation is to make the company pleased with themselves.

The Doctor next cautions them to beware of calumny and detraction. Women are generally accused of being addicted to this vice, though perhaps unjustly. He recommends particular attention not to injure the characters of other women, especially if they are thought to be rivals. He desires them to consider every species of indelicacy in conversation as not only shameful

ful in itself, but highly disgusting to the men. Virgin purity is of so delicate a nature, that any loose conversation cannot be heard without a certain degree of contamination. No man but a fool will insult a woman with conversation which he perceives is disagreeable to her, nor will he dare to proceed, if she resents the injury with proper spirit. There is a dignity in conscious virtue, which repels the most shameless and abandoned of men. The notion, that a woman may allow all innocent freedom, provided her virtue is retained, is both grossly indelicate and dangerous, and, to many, has been completely fatal.

The Doctor concludes this section with the following judicious remarks: "You may perhaps think, that I want to throw every spark of nature out of your composition, and to make you entirely artificial. Far from it. I wish you to possess the most perfect simplicity of heart and manners. I think you may possess dignity without
pride,

pride, affability without meanness, and simple elegance without affectation."

Dr Gregory, in this little work, next treats of *Amusements*. He properly remarks, that every period of life has amusements peculiar to itself. Some of those highly promote health, as various kinds of exercise; others are connected with more diffusive usefulness, as different kinds of women's work, and the domestic cares of a family: Some are elegant accomplishments, as dress, dancing, music, and drawing. Such books as tend to improve the understanding, and to cultivate the heart, may be regarded in a higher point of view than as mere amusements. But the Doctor confesses that he is at a loss to mention what particular books he should recommend to the perusal of his daughters. He mentions the utility of reading history, or the cultivating any art or science to which their genius or inclination may lead them. He recommends to them the study of Nature, as affording an infinite variety of useful and agreeable entertainment.

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In females, an attention to dress is an important article. The love of ornament and dress is natural, and therefore proper and rational. The expence of dress should be uniformly regulated by extent of fortune, and other circumstances. The charms of a fine woman are exhibited to the greatest advantage when she apparently conceals them. The most perfect elegance of dress has always the appearance of being the most natural. But women should not confine their dress to public exhibitions. They ought to accustom themselves to an habitual neatness, that in their most careless undress, in their most unguarded hours, they may have no reason to be ashamed of their appearance. Women seldom think, that men regard their dress as expressive of their taste and characters. In dress, vanity, levity, slovenliness, and folly, conspicuously appear. An elegant simplicity indicates both taste and delicacy of sentiment.

“ In *dancing*,” Dr Gregory remarks,
“ the principal points you are to attend to
are ease and grace. I would have you to
dance

dance with spirit ; but never allow yourselves to be so far transported with mirth, as to forget the delicacy of your sex. Many a girl, dancing in the gaiety and innocence of her heart, is thought to discover a spirit she little dreams of."

With regard to the *theatre*, Dr Gregory considers it as affording great pleasure to every person of sentiment or humour. But he regrets, that few English comedies can be represented before ladies without shocking their delicacy. On such occasions, men make very unfavourable remarks on the behaviour of the ladies. Virtuous girls often hear indelicate expressions and allusions with unembarrassed countenances, because, in fact, they seldom understand the meaning intended to be conveyed. A girl often laughs, with all the simplicity of innocence, merely because she is infected by the laughing of other people.

It is unnecessary, in Dr Gregory's estimation, to say much about *gaming* ; because

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it is not a prevalent practice among the ladies of this country. It is both a ruinous and an incurable vice ; and, as it cherishes all the selfish and turbulent passions, is peculiarly odious in the female sex. In this, and in all important points of conduct, women ought to show a determined steadiness and resolution, which are by no means inconsistent with an amiable gentleness of character. On the contrary, they give that spirit to a mild and sweet disposition, without which it is in danger of degenerating into insipidity.

After discussing the subject of Amusements, Dr Gregory treats of *Friendship*, *Love*, and *Marriage*. He observes, that the luxury and dissipation which prevail in genteel life corrupt the heart in many ways ; and they, in a peculiar manner, render it almost incapable of a warm and steady friendship. A proper choice of friends is of the highest consequence ; as their advice and assistance are frequently necessary. Even the mere gratification of friendship affords the greatest pleasure to an ingenuous mind.

mind. In the choice of friends, a principal regard should be had to fidelity and goodness of heart. If they are, at the same time, endued with taste and genius, these will render them still more useful and agreeable companions. After the acquisition of friends, they should unbosom themselves to each other with the most unbounded confidence. An open temper, when restrained by moderate prudence, makes mankind happier than a cold and suspicious reservedness. But, however open young women may be when they talk of their own affairs, they should never disclose the secrets of one friend to another, especially where love is concerned. To a female friend, the heart may be opened ; but her honour and secrecy ought to be such as may be implicitly relied on. Let her not be a married woman, particularly if she and her husband live happily together : For, there are certain unguarded moments, in which a woman in that situation, though one of the worthiest of her sex, may unfold secrets to her husband, which she would by no means do to any other person ; nor will a husband feel him-
self

self under the same obligation to keep a secret of this kind with which he was not originally entrusted. "If your brothers," Dr Gregory remarks, "should have the good fortune to have hearts susceptible of friendship, to possess truth, honour, sense, and delicacy of sentiment, they are the fittest and most unexceptionable confidants. By placing confidence in them, you will receive every advantage which you could hope for from the friendship of men, without any of the inconveniencies that attend such connections with our sex."

Dr Gregory recommends to his daughters never to make confidants of their servants. Dignity, when not properly understood, readily degenerates into pride, which admits of no friendship, because it suffers no equal, and is so intoxicated with flattery, as willingly to receive it even from servants and dependents. Hence the most intimate confidants of the proud are valets and waiting women. He advises his daughters to show the utmost humanity to servants, and make their situation as comfortable

table as possible, but never to make them confidants; for such a conduct both debases the mistress and spoils the servants. The temper and dispositions of females make them more readily and warmly contract friendships than men. Their natural propensity to it is so strong, that they often form rash intimacies, of which they have soon reason to repent; and this is one reason why their friendships are so short and fluctuating. To this may be added the great clashing of their interests in the pursuits of love, ambition, or vanity. There is a weakness which is peculiarly apparent in vain women, and ought to be carefully avoided: They conceive every man to be a lover who takes particular notice of them, though, perhaps, such an idea never entered his brain. Among women, it is a prudent maxim, That symptoms of love should not be first exhibited by them, but ought to be the consequence of men's previous and evident attachment.

Nature has not bestowed on women such an unlimited choice as men enjoy. But,
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ſhe has wiſely aſſigned to them a greater flexibility of taſte in this moſt important buſineſs. A man of taſte and of delicacy, marries a woman becauſe he loves her. A woman of equal taſte and delicacy receives his addreſſes becauſe ſhe eſteems him, and becauſe he gives her that preference to others. If a man be ſo unfortunate as to become enamoured of a woman whoſe heart is pre-engaged, his attachment, inſtead of meeting with a favourable return, is perfectly offenſive ; and, if he perſiſts, he renders himſelf both the object of her ſcorn and averſion.

Among men, the effects of love are greatly diverſified by their different tempers. An artful man may counterfeit every one of them, and eaſily deceive a young woman of an open and feeling heart, unleſs ſhe be extremely cautious. In ſuch girls, the fineſt parts are not always ſufficient for their ſecurity. The dark and crooked paths of cunning are inſcrutable, and not to be conceived by an honourable mind. Among men, the moſt genuine effects of real affection

tion to women are very difficult to be counterfeited. Men of delicacy often discover their passion by too great anxiety to conceal it, especially when their hopes of success are not great. Real love renders a man not only respectful, but even timid, in his behaviour to the woman whom he adores. To conceal his awe, he may sometimes affect pleasantry, but he soon relapses into his former seriousness. His imagination magnifies all her genuine qualities; and he is either blind to her imperfections, or regards them as beauties. Like persons who are conscious of guilt, he thinks that every eye observes the situation of his mind. To avoid this disagreeable feeling, he shuns all the little attentions of common gallantry. His attachment will improve both his heart and his character. His manners will be rendered more gentle, and his conversation more agreeable. But, in the company of his mistress, diffidence and embarrassment will give him always a disadvantageous appearance.

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In the same sensible strain, the Doctor advises his daughters, when the marks of affection above described are apparent, and the gentleman's attachment is agreeable, to follow nature, good sense, and delicacy. If the love be reciprocal, never discover the full extent of your regard. Marriage sufficiently marks your preference. A woman may justifiably play the coquet, when a man purposely declines to make his addresses till he thinks he has insured her consent. A most despicable vanity is the only motive of such a conduct. It is of great importance to distinguish whether a gentleman delays to discover his intention explicitly from the motive just mentioned, or from a diffidence created by a real attachment. In the one case, he deserves to be treated with contempt; in the other, he should be used with tenderness, and, as soon as possible, be informed that his addresses cannot be favourably received. Women of superior taste and sense sometimes employ the most artful coquetry to engage the affections of a man whom both themselves and the world esteem, though they are determined never
to

to marry him. But they are amused by his conversation, and his attachment is a high gratification to their vanity. A woman of sense has it always in her power, if she cannot give him her affections, to convert a disappointed lover into a steady friend. If she explains herself to him with a generous freedom, he must feel the stroke as a man ; but he will also bear it as a man.

Male coquetry, though rare in this country, is more inexcusable, as well as more pernicious than female. Few men take the trouble of gaining a woman's affections, unless they have views either of an honourable or dishonourable nature. That ambiguity of behaviour, which keeps people in suspense, is the great secret of coquetry in both males and females.

From motives of propriety, Dr Gregory declines pointing out to his daughters what particular persons he would have them to marry ; but, with great confidence and affection, describes characters which they

ought not to marry. He advises them to avoid a companion who may entail any hereditary disease on their posterity, and particularly madness, that most horrible of all human calamities. Neither marry a fool; for he is the most untractable of all animals. He is entirely governed by caprice and passion, and is incapable of listening to the voice of reason. But, the worst circumstance attending a fool is his perpetual jealousy, lest his wife should be thought to govern him; and he is constantly doing absurd and disagreeable things, merely to shew that he dares do them. Never marry a rake: He is always a suspicious husband; because he has associated with the most worthless women only. He likewise often entails on his wife and children the worst of diseases.

Dr Gregory likewise advises his daughters, if they have a sense of religion themselves, not to think of husbands who have none. If they happen to be weak men, they will continually tease and vex you about your religious principles. If you
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have children, you will suffer the greatest distress, by seeing all your endeavours to form their minds to virtue and piety, all your efforts to secure their present and future happiness, abortive and turned into ridicule.

The Doctor concludes this small but valuable tract in the following manner: "I have thus given you my opinion on some of the most important articles of your future life, chiefly calculated for that period when you are just entering the world. I have endeavoured to avoid some peculiarities of opinion, which, from their contradiction to the general practice of the world, I might reasonably have suspected were not so well founded. But, in writing to you, I am afraid my heart has been too full, and too warmly interested, to allow me to keep this resolution. This may have produced some embarrassment, and some seeming contradictions. What I have written has been the amusement of some solitary hours, and has served to divert some melancholy reflections.—I am conscious I undertook a
task

task to which I was very unequal ; but I have discharged a part of my duty.—You will at least be pleased with it, as the last mark of your father's love and attention.”

Good sense was the most conspicuous feature in the mind of Dr Gregory ; but, what is by no means always the case, it was united with genius and acuteness of intellect. From his 18th year, he had been occasionally afflicted with the gout, which he inherited from his mother, who, in the year 1770, died suddenly, when sitting at table. Dr Gregory went to bed on the 9th of February 1773, apparently in good health ; but was found dead next morning.

In his person, the Doctor was above the ordinary size. His limbs were not very active ; he stooped a little in his gait ; and his countenance, from a fullness of feature and a heaviness of eye, exhibited no marks of superior powers of mind. But, in conversation, his features became animated, and his eye expressive. He had a warmth of tone and of gesture, which were highly interesting.

interesting. United with this animated manner, he discovered a mildness and simplicity, which were more attractive than the most artificial address. In the company of literary men, his conversation flowed with ease; and, on whatever subject, he delivered his sentiments without affectation or reserve. His benevolent affections were strong, and, in the line of his profession, they were most peculiarly exerted.

With regard to his pupils, he confined not himself to a faithful discharge of his professional duties. Many of these were far removed from all those who had a natural interest in their happiness. To young men so situated, it was a great consolation to find a friend who was of easy access, and always ready to assist them with his advice and protection. To his intimate friends, by whom he was highly beloved, his spirit of philanthropy peculiarly endeared him.

In the latter period of his life, when he resided in Edinburgh, he lived in habits of great intimacy with most of the Scottish
Literati ;

Literati; such as, Doctors Robertson and Blair, David Hume, John Home, Lord Monboddo, Lord Kames, and the elder Mr Tytler. He left three sons,—James Gregory now Professor of the Theory of Medicine, the respectable and ingenious successor of his father; William Gregory, M. A. of Baliol College, Oxford, Rector of St Mary Breadman, and one of the Six Preachers in the Cathedral Church of Canterbury; John, who died in the year 1783: And two daughters,—Dorothea, wife of the Rev. Mr Archibald Alison of Baliol College, and Anne-Margaret, married to John Forbes, Esq; of Blackford, in the county of Aberdeen.

Upon the whole, whether he is considered as a man of genius and of the world, or with regard to his conduct in the line of his profession, few human characters will be found to equal that of the late Dr JOHN GREGORY.

T H E

L I F E

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HENRY HOME, LORD KAMES.*

MR HOME never mentioned the time of his birth ; but, from many circumstances known to his relations and friends, it appears that he was born in the course of the year 1696. He was descended of a very honourable and antient family. Lord Kames's grandfather, Henry Home, was a younger son of Sir John Home of Renton, who held the high office of Lord Justice Clerk, or chief criminal judge of Scotland, in the year 1663. Mr Home received the estate of Kames from his uncle, George, brother

* The AUTHOR intended to have made this Life much more complete, by introducing many private and interesting anecdotes, but his death prevented him from executing his intention.—It was originally written for the Dictionary of *Arts and Sciences* of Edinburgh.

brother to the then Lord Justice Clerk. The family of Renton is descended from that of the Earls of Home. The county of Berwick in Scotland has the honour of having given birth to this great and useful member of society. In early youth he was lively, and eager in the acquisition of knowledge. He never attended a public school; but was instructed in the antient and modern languages, as well as in several branches of mathematics, and the arts necessarily connected with that science, by Mr Wingate, a man of considerable parts and learning, who spent many years as preceptor or private tutor to Mr Home.

After studying, with acuteness and diligence at the University of Edinburgh, the civil law, and the municipal law of his own country, Mr Home early perceived that a knowledge of these alone was not sufficient to make an accomplished lawyer. The forms and practical business of courts, and especially of the supreme court, as a member of which he was to seek for fame and emolument, he considered as essentially necessary

cessary to qualify him to be a complete barrister. He accordingly attended, for some time, the chamber of a Writer to the Signet, where he had an opportunity of learning the styles of legal deeds, and the modes of conducting different species of business. This wise step, independently of his great genius and unwearied application, procured him, after his admission to the bar, peculiar respect from the court, and proportional employment in his profession of an advocate. Whoever peruses the law-papers composed by Mr Home, when a young man, will perceive an uncommon elegance of style, besides great ingenuity of reasoning, and a thorough knowledge of the law and constitution of his country. These qualifications, together with the strength and vivacity of his natural abilities, soon raised him to be an ornament to the Scottish bar; and, on the second day of February 1752, he was advanced to the bench as one of the judges of the Court of Session, under the title of *Lord Kames*; and as a Lord of Justiciary on the 15th April 1763.

Before this period, however, notwithstanding

standing the unavoidable labours of his profession, he favoured the world with several valuable and ingenious works. In the year 1728, Mr Home published *Remarkable Decisions of the Court of Session from 1716 to 1728*, in one volume folio.

In 1732 appeared *Essays upon Several Subjects in Law, viz. Jus tertii; Beneficium cedendarum actionum; Vinco Vincentem; and Prescription*, in one volume 8vo. This first produce of his original genius, and of his extensive views, excited not only the attention, but the admiration of the judges, and of all the other members of the College of Justice.

This work was succeeded, in the year 1741, by *Decisions of the Court of Session from its first institution to the year 1740, abridged and digested under proper heads, in form of a Dictionary*, in two volumes folio. Upon the same plan, at the instigation of Lord Kames himself, who was then far advanced in years, a third volume was added to the *Dictionary of Decisions* by the ingenious Alexander Fraser Tytler, Esq; Advocate, Professor

Professor of Civil History in the University of Edinburgh. This laborious work is of the greatest utility to every practical lawyer.

In 1747 appeared *Essays upon Several Subjects concerning British Antiquities, viz. I. Introduction of the Feudal Law into Scotland. II. Constitution of Parliament. III. Honour, Dignity. IV. Succession or Descent; with an Appendix upon hereditary and indefeasible Right, composed anno 1745, and published, 1747, in one volume 8vo.* In a preface to this work, Lord Kames informs us, that, in the years 1745 and 1746, when the nation was in great suspense and distraction, he retired to the country; and, in order to banish, as much as possible, the uneasiness of his mind, he contrived the plan, and executed this ingenious performance. Though not in the order of time, we shall continue the list of all our author's writings on law, before we proceed to his productions on other subjects.

In 1757, Lord Kames published *The Statute Law of Scotland abridged, with Historical*

torical Notes, in one volume 8vo, a most useful and laborious work.

In the year 1759, our author presented to the public a new work under the title of *Historical Law Tracts*, in one volume 8vo. It contains fourteen interesting tracts, viz. *History of the Criminal Law*.—*History of Promises and Covenants*.—*History of Property*.—*History of Securities upon Land for Payment of debt*.—*History of the Privilege which an Heir Apparent in a Feudal Holding has to continue the Possession of his Ancestor*.—*History of Regalities, and of the Privilege of Repledging*.—*History of Courts*.—*History of Brieves*.—*History of Process in Absence*.—*History of Execution against Moveables and Land for Payment of Debt*.—*History of Personal Execution for Payment of Debt*.—*History of Execution for obtaining Payment after the Death of the Debtor*.—*History of the Limited and Universal Representation of Heirs*.—*Old and New Extent*.

Concerning this work the Monthly Reviewers

vi wers remark; " Our author not only points out the defects which are often visible in treatises of law ; he sets an example of writing on that subject in a more rational and instructive manner. He possesses, in a high degree, all the talents requisite for doing so : His knowledge of human nature is just and profound : His acquaintance with the history of mankind. and with the progress of society, is accurate and extensive. Those principles in our constitution on which laws are founded ; those passions which render them necessary, are appealed to and explained with great ingenuity. The gradual advances of mankind towards perfection and refinement in government are traced with great care ; and the ideas naturally arising from those circumstances, which, in different ages, dictated laws and regulated the opinions of judges, are observed with minute attention ; and by such investigation, customs and institutions, which formerly appeared to be inexplicable, accidental, or capricious, are seen to be the natural effects of powerful causes. But though researches of this kind

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be necessarily intricate and profound, our author writes with remarkable perspicuity, and in a vigorous and manly stile. A subject seemingly dry and abstruse becomes, in his hands, not only instructive but amusing."

In 1760, he published, in one volume folio, *The Principles of Equity*, a work which shews both the fertility of the author's genius and his indefatigable application.

"It is with real satisfaction," the Critical Reviewers remark with much liberality of sentiment, "we behold the rapid progress our neighbours of North Britain are making to the highest pinnacle of glory, in arms and in letters. It increases our satisfaction, when we perceive that their generous efforts excite no mean jealousies, no narrow prejudices to damp the rising spirit of loyalty and learning; and that those very persons, who once denied them every kind of merit, are now the foremost in twining garlands of ivy and laurel to adorn their temples. Long may this harmony, arising
from

from congenial sentiments, continue! May all the future rivalship between Englishmen and Scotchmen be, which shall most promote the welfare of their country, and the honour of their king! May every party distinction be forgot, and all unite in the glorious endeavour of transmitting to posterity this reign as the most complete in valour, in learning, in patriotism, and in every public and private virtue, of any other in the annals of Great Britain! Be it, in the mean time, our care to avoid all national attachments, to pay to each the just tribute of his merit, not to be dazzled by a name, or misled by false colours, but critically to review every sentiment which may tend to the prejudice or the perfection of this great end, at least as far as our own ability, and the imbecillity of human nature will admit.

“ There could be no undertaking of more general utility, than the object of the ingenious volume before us. To reduce the crabbed intricacies of the law to the level of common understandings, and unveil the hidden mysteries of this deity to the view
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of the studious in general, is a work equally new in the design, and difficult in the execution."

In 1766, he gave to the public another volume in folio of *Remarkable Decisions of the Court of Session*, from 1730 to 1752.

In 1777, appeared our author's *Elucidations respecting the Common and Statute Law of Scotland* in one volume 8vo. This book contains many curious and interesting remarks upon some intricate and dubious points which occur in the law of Scotland.— In 1780, he published a volume in folio of *Select Decisions of the Court of Session from 1752 to 1768*.

From this sketch of Lord Kames's compositions and collections, with a view to improve and elucidate the laws of Scotland, the reader may form some idea of his great industry, and of his anxious desire to promote the honour and welfare of his country. It remains to be remarked, that, in our supreme court, the law-writings of Lord
Kames

Kames are held in equal estimation, and quoted with equal respect, as those of Coke or Blackstone in the courts of England.

Lord Kames's mind was very much inclined to metaphysical disquisitions. When a young man, in order to improve himself in his favourite study, he corresponded with the famous Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, Dr Butler author of that wonderful book, *The Analogy between Natural and Revealed Religion*, Dr Samuel Clark, and many other ingenious and learned men both in Britain and Ireland. The letters of correspondence, I am happy to learn, have been carefully preserved by his son and heir George-Home Drummond, Esq; of Blair-Drummond.

The year 1751 gave birth to the first fruits of his Lordship's metaphysical studies, under the title of *Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, in two parts*. Though a small volume, it was replete with ingenuity and acute reasoning, excited general attention, and gave rise to much controversy. By the boldness of his genius,

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he seemingly departed from a few commonly received opinions. Some persons, whose zeal exceeded their knowledge, accused him of heterodox notions with regard to religion. The Essay on *Liberty and Necessity* was the chief object of their resentment, though, by some writings published at the time, it was clearly shown, that Lord Kames's doctrine nearly coincided with that of the famous Calvin, whose tenets are generally considered as the standard of orthodoxy in Scotland. One clergyman, whose name was *Anderson*, a man of a warm and violent temper, wrote a whole volume against the *Moral Essays*; in which he treats the learned author, who was then a Senator of the College of Justice, with an unbecoming degree of rudeness and asperity. Not satisfied with this abuse, Anderson afterwards brought a formal charge of heresy against his Lordship before the presbytery of Edinburgh. But the presbytery dismissed the accusation with that contempt which it so justly merited. This injurious attack, however, gave Lord Kames an opportunity of exhibiting a remarkable proof of his candour and liberality.

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In a second edition, after considering the subject more maturely, he acknowledged his mistake, and retracted some ingenious notions, which, contrary to his intention, had given offence. How few philosophers are capable of such greatness and generosity of mind !

In 1761, Lord Kames published an *Introduction to the Art of Thinking*, in one volume 12mo. This small, but valuable book, was originally intended for the instruction of his own family. The plan of it is both curious, amusing, and highly calculated to catch the attention, and to improve the minds of youth. It consists of maxims collected from Rochefoucault and many other authors. To illustrate these maxims, and to rivet their spirit and meaning in the minds of young persons, his Lordship has added to most of them beautiful stories, fables, and historical anecdotes.

In the department of belles lettres, his *Elements of Criticism* appeared in 1762 in
three

three volumes 8vo. In this valuable work, his Lordship discovers profound erudition and taste in every species of composition, both antient and modern. It is the first and a most successful attempt to show that the art of criticism is founded on the principles of human nature. Such a plan, it might be thought, should have produced a dry and phlegmatic performance. Lord Kames, on the contrary, from the sprightliness of his manner of treating every subject he handled, has rendered the *Elements of Criticism* not only highly instructive, but one of the most entertaining books in our language. Before this work was published, Rollin's *Belles Lettres*, a dull book, from which a student could derive little advantage, was universally recommended as a standard. But, after the *Elements of Criticism* were presented to the public, Rollin instantly vanished, and gave place to greater genius and greater utility. With regard to real instruction and genuine taste in composition of every kind, a student, a gentleman, or a scholar, can, in no language, find such a fertile field of information.

tion. Lord Kames, accordingly, had the happiness of seeing the good effects of his labours, and of enjoying for twenty years a reputation which he so justly merited.

To give the reader a still farther proof of the genius and various pursuits of this active mind, Lord Kames, in the year 1772, published a work in one volume 8vo, under the title of *The Gentleman Farmer, being an attempt to improve Agriculture, by subjecting it to the test of rational principles*. With regard to this book, it must be remarked, that all the intelligent farmers in Scotland uniformly declare, that, after perusing Young, Dickson, and a hundred other writers on agriculture, Lord Kames's *Gentleman Farmer* contains the best practical and rational information on the various articles of husbandry which can any where be obtained. As a practical farmer, Lord Kames has given many obvious proofs of his skill. After he succeeded, in right of his Lady, to the ample estate of Blair-Drummond in the county of Perth, he formed a plan for turning a large moss, consisting of at least

1500 acres, into arable land. His Lordship had the pleasure, before he died, to see the plan successfully, though but partially, executed. The same plan is now carrying on, in a much more rapid manner, by his son George Drummond, Esq.

In the year 1773, Lord Kames favoured the world with *Sketches of the History of Man* in two vols. 4to*. This work consists of
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* *Letter, William Smellie to Lord Kames.*

“ My Lord, Edin. April 23d. 1774.

“ I have perused the *Sketches*. No book ever afforded me so much entertainment and instruction. The curious remarks and hints are innumerable, and conveyed in so light and so easy a manner, that women and children, if they please, may become philosophers with little expence of thought; and the philosopher, at the same time, has so much food for thought and reflection, that a few pages would require a volume of commentary. This I take to be the summum bonum of good-writing. I hope your Lordship's example will give an effectual check to those mystical, I might say, those nonsensical writers on human nature, who involve themselves in clouds of obscurity, and expect their readers to understand what they themselves cannot explain. Of this stamp is the *Treatise of*——
——, and

a great variety of facts and observations concerning the nature of man, the produce of much and profitable reading. In the course of his studies and reasonings, he had amassed a vast collection of materials. These, when considerably advanced in years, he digested under proper heads, and submitted them to the consideration of the public. He intended that this book should be equally intelligible to women as to men ; and, to accomplish this end, when he had occasion to quote antient or foreign books, he uniformly translated the passages. The *Sketches* contain much useful information ; and, like all his Lordship's other performances, are
lively

——, and some later publications are liable to the same exception.

“ Your Lordship's views of natural history will, I hope, lead the attention of naturalists to the only thing valuable in that science. I have read this part with great delectation, and shall soon write a short commentary, which will be sent for your Lordship's perusal.

“ I have the honour to be, &c.

“ WILLIAM SMELLIE.”

lively and entertaining.—This work has been both blamed and commended. We shall, however, quote a passage from the Edinburgh Magazine and Review, a publication not much famed for dealing deep in *panegyric*. “There are few writers,” the Reviewer remarks, “to whom Scotland is more indebted than to the author of the present performance. At a period when literature was neglected, and the public ear unrefined, he applied himself to enlighten his fellow citizens, and to accommodate his compositions to an English standard. His example was contagious. It seemed that the natives of Scotland, though at a distance from the court, could attain a propriety and a purity of expression. The peculiarities of the Scottish idiom wore away; loose and inaccurate modes of diction were reprobated. Men, studious to excel, became skilled in the delicacies of a language which they could not speak; and their remains not, perhaps, an obstruction to retard a most general diffusion of a correct and an elegant taste in this quarter of the island,

island, but that anomalous jargon, which still disgraces the courts of Law.

“ We mean not, however, to insinuate that the language of this author constitutes his greatest merit. To a curious observer, it may yet seem to retain somewhat of the rust which had tarnished literature and science when he began to illustrate them. It may want elevation, and polish, and variety. But it is every where perspicuous. Phrases and expressions may have been admitted, which approach perhaps too near to the familiar tone of conversation; yet, if it flows not with uniform majesty, it is often manly and forcible, and cannot justly be censured as deficient in grammatical precision.

“ But neither in this stricture on the style of our author, nor in any observations we may make with respect to some small defects in his reasoning or information, do we intend to detract from his conspicuous merit. The public spirit, which has animated all his researches, his various erudi-

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tion,

tion, the freedom with which he proposes his sentiments, the extensiveness of his views, and the persevering industry which he has exerted for the instruction of the present age and posterity, amidst the duties of an important function, and the multiplied occupations of an active private life, entitle him, on the whole, to the most honourable applause."

We now come to Lord Kames's last work, to which he modestly gives the title of *Loose Hints upon Education, chiefly concerning the Culture of the Heart*. It was published in the year 1781, in one volume 8vo, when the venerable and astonishing author was in the 85th year of his age. Though his Lordship chose to call them *Loose Hints*, the intelligent reader will perceive in this composition an uncommon activity of mind, at an age so far advanced beyond the usual period of human life, and an earnest desire to form the minds of youth to honour, to virtue, to industry, and to a veneration of the Deity.

Beside the books we have enumerated, Lord Kames published many temporary and fugitive pieces in different periodical works. In the *Essays Physical and Literary*, published I may say by this society, we find compositions of his Lordship *on the Laws of Motion*.—*On the Advantages of Shallow ploughing*—*and on Evaporation*; all of which exhibit evident marks of genius and originality of thinking.

Upon reflecting on the studiousness of Lord Kames's disposition, and his numerous literary productions, the reader will naturally recal to his mind a striking similarity between his Lordship and the laborious Pliny the Elder. In a letter from Pliny the Younger to Macer, the following passage occurs which is equally applicable to both. *Nonne videtur tibi, recordanti quantum legerit, quantum scripserit, nec in officiis ullis, nec in amicitia principum fuisse?* which is thus translated by Melmoth: "When you reflect on the books he has read, and the volumes he has written, are you not inclined to suspect that he never was engaged in
the

the affairs of the public, or the service of his prince?"

To give a proper delineation of the public and private character of Lord Kames, would far exceed the limits I have prescribed to myself. As, however, I had the honour of an intimate acquaintance* with this
great

* *WHEN the AUTHOR was an apprentice to a printer in Edinburgh, the second edition of the Elements of Criticism was printing at the press of his master. He took the liberty of making observations on that work; and sent them to Lord Kames. His Lordship, in consequence of this, returned the following letter, which was the beginning of WILLIAM SMELLIE'S acquaintance with LORD KAMES.*

"To the Person who has made observations on the Elements, and likewise on the proof sheets of that work.

SIR,

Edinburgh, December 6. 1764.

"THE manuscript you sent me, and which I here return, gave me pleasure; and I am not a little obliged to you for it. I could have wished for more time to consider it deliberately; but as I would avoid the least suspicion of neglect, I have chosen to return my answer as soon as you could possibly expect it.

"IN

great and good man for more than twenty years, I must be indulged in mentioning a few

“ In general I like your observations ; they must flow from one who has read with attention and with judgment. At the same time, the nature of my performance will not allow me to make much use of them. In the Elements, I keep altogether to general views ; and it would swell the work beyond bounds if I were to follow these general views through all their consequences. This work I leave to the reader, who I suppose will be better pleased to have these consequences left to himself than to be led by the hand, as it were, in every step. There are besides several observations that, according to the plan of the work, cannot come in properly in those parts of the book that are referred to ; and which are taken in, in substance at least, under other heads.

“ It is both difficult and tedious to explain all in writing. I shall, however, proceed to a few particulars to clear my meaning.

“ You observe very rightly, that to make a composition orderly and connected, it is not alone sufficient that the thoughts be connected, &c. But then you'll consider that I am here only treating in general of perceptions and ideas in a train ; and I fancy you'll find that I have omitted nothing which was proper to be brought in, in that general view. At the same time, you'll remark, that it is no part of the design of that chapter to handle

few facts which fell under my own observation.

Lord Kames was remarkable for public spirit, to which he conjoined activity and
great

dle all the requisites of a complete discourse or composition : These, or the most of them, may be picked out from different Chapters.

“ WITH respect to the sympathetic emotion of virtue, I am of opinion that the principle upon which it is founded may produce pleasant emotions from many agreeable objects ; and probably had this occurred at the time, it would have been added. But the sympathetic emotion of virtue was sufficient for my purpose ; and I think it better to be modest in my additions, to prevent an ugly suspicion of a design to force a man to buy the same book twice.

“ WITH respect to the affection a man bears to his children, I had occasion to give it in the place cited as an example of the communication of passion. But you'll remark that it could not be my design there to give a dissertation upon the love of Parents to Children ; and if that could make part of my work, I should thankfully adopt several of your observations. At the same time, I have not said, or at least did not intend to say, that the love of Parents to Children is entirely
resolvable

great exertion. He, for a long tract of time, had the principle management of all our Societies and Boards for promoting the trade, fisheries, and manufactures in Scotland.

resolvable into this communication of passion. I am not certain, because that part of the book is at the press; but if there be any such unwary expression, there is yet time to correct it.

“ WHAT you observe of grandeur fairly accounts for the difference of taste about it. I was born and bred in a flat country; and the first time I saw a small round hill, perhaps not above 40 feet perpendicular, it made a stronger impression upon my mind, than the greatest mountain I have seen since that time. But such particular observations, though pretty, are too minute for a general plan; and, in order to preserve the unity of design, I often denied myself the satisfaction of introducing them.

“ WITH respect to what is observed upon volume 2d page 92, the theory is pretty, but I doubt of it's being solid.

“ I shall be glad to see more of your observations; though I cannot find any necessity for this sort of blind intercourse. You have no reason to be ashamed of your observations; and the Author of the Elements will

land. As conducive to those ends, he was a strenuous advocate for making and repairing turnpike roads through every part of the country. He had likewise a chief lead in the distribution and application of the funds arising from the estates in Scotland which had unfortunately been annexed to the crown. He was no less zealous in supporting, both with his writings and personal influence, literary associations. He was, in some measure, the parent of what was called the *Physical and Literary Society*. This society was afterwards incorporated into the *Royal Society of Edinburgh*, which received a charter from the crown, and which is daily producing marks of genius, as well as works of real utility.

As

will be glad of the acquaintance of a Gentleman who studies to so good purpose a work that he thought worthy to see the light.

I am, Sir,

Your obliged humble servant,

“ HENRY HOME.”

As a private and domestic gentleman, Lord Kames was admired by both sexes. The vivacity of his wit and of his animal spirits, even when advanced in years, rendered his company not only agreeable, but greatly solicited by the literati, and courted by ladies of the highest rank and accomplishments. Instead of being jealous of rivals, the characteristic of little minds, Lord Kames fostered and encouraged every symptom of merit that he could discover in the scholar, or in the lowest mechanic. Before he succeeded to the estate of Blair-Drummond, his fortune was small. Notwithstanding this circumstance, he, in conjunction with Mrs Drummond, his respectable and accomplished spouse, did much more service to the indigent than most families of greater opulence. If the present necessity was pressing, they gave money. They did more. When they discovered that male or female petitioners were capable of performing any art or labour, both parties exerted themselves in procuring that species of work which the poor people could perform. In cases of this kind, which were very frequent,

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quent,

quent, the lady took charge of the women, and his Lordship of the men. From what has been said concerning the various and numerous productions of his genius, it is obvious that there could be few idle moments in his long protracted life. His mind was incessantly employed; either teeming with new ideas, or pursuing active and laborious occupations. At the same time, with all this intellectual ardour, one great feature in the character of Lord Kames, besides his literary talents, and his public spirit, was a remarkable innocency of mind. He not only never indulged in detraction, but when any species of scandal was exhibited in his company, he either remained silent, or endeavoured to give a different turn to the conversation. As natural consequences of this amiable disposition, he never meddled with politics, even when parties ran to indecent lengths in this country; and, what is still more remarkable, he never wrote a sentence, notwithstanding his numerous publications, without a direct and a manifest intention to benefit his fellow creatures. In his temper he was naturally
warm,

warm, though kindly and affectionate. In the friendships he formed, he was ardent, zealous, and sincere. So far from being inclined to irreligion, as some ignorant bigots insinuated, few men possessed a more devout habit of thought. A constant sense of Deity, and a veneration for Providence dwelt upon his mind. From this source arose that propensity, which appears in all his writings, of investigating final causes, and tracing the wisdom of the Supreme Author of Nature.

Two days before his death, Lord Kames, who had uniformly retained the firmest belief in the future existence of human souls, told the late celebrated Dr Cullen, that he earnestly wished to be away, because he was exceedingly curious to learn the nature and manners of another world. He added, " Doctor, as I never could be idle in this world, I shall willingly perform any task that may be imposed upon me." But here we must stop. Lord Kames, to the great regret of the public, died on the 27th day of December 1782. As he had no marked disease,

disease, but the debility necessarily resulting from extreme old age, a few days before his death, he went to the Court of Session, addressed all the judges separately, told them he was speedily to depart, and took a solemn and an affectionate farewell.

THE

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L I F E
OF
DAVID HUME, Esq.

IT is an arduous task to give an impartial account of an author who has been the object of so much praise and of so much obloquy as Mr Hume : Yet the attempt must be made.

Mr Hume was born at Edinburgh on the 26th of April 1711, old style. He was descended of respectable families both on the father and mother's side. His father's family was a branch of the Earl of Hume's, and his mother was a daughter of Sir David Falconer, president of the College of Justice.

tice. His family, however, was not opulent; and he being a younger brother, his patrimony was, of course, very trifling. His father died when Mr Hume was an infant; and he, along with a sister and an elder brother, were left to the care of their mother, who devoted her whole attention to the rearing and educating of her children. Mr Hume passed through the ordinary courses of education with great success, and very early discovered an uncommon passion for literature. This last circumstance suggested to his friends the idea that the profession of the law would be a proper employment for him; but young Hume had an insuperable aversion to every thing but the pursuits of philosophy and of general learning; and he tells us, that, when he was supposed to be studying Voet and Vinnius, Cicero and Virgil were the authors which he was secretly devouring.

This plan, however, his narrow fortune was unable to support. He, therefore, made an attempt to enter upon a more active scene of life. With this view, in the
year

year 1734, he went to Bristol, and had recommendations to some of the most eminent merchants in that city. In a few months, he discovered that this species of business was irksome and disagreeable to him. In order to prosecute his studies with the greater success, as well as to enable him to live upon his small fortune, he went to a country retreat. His chief residence was at La Fleche, in Anjou, where he composed his *Treatise of Human Nature*, which, after returning to London, he published in the year 1738. "Never literary attempt," Mr Hume remarks, "was more unfortunate than my *Treatise of Human Nature*. "It fell *dead-born from the press*, without reaching such distinction as even to excite a murmur among the *zealots* *."

This complaint is curious, and confirms the old adage, that an author is the worst judge of the merit or demerit of his own works. Mr Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature*, as he himself informs us, excited no attention, either of praise or of censure,
from

* Vide his own Life, p. 8.

from the public. No wonder ! When much younger, I read that book with great ardour, and with great application. Some parts of it I perceived to be both ingenious and brilliant, and others so involved in obscurity, that I found it impossible to comprehend the meaning. At that period of life, I naturally attributed this seeming obscurity to my own inability, and was often ashamed, for that reason, to acknowledge that I had read it, because I could not give any distinct account of the book. When older, I perused it a second time, and then perceived an ingenious literary *trick*, if I may use such an expression. Mr Hume, when he begins an essay, or turns the *corner* of any argument, most artfully lays down a seemingly simple position, to which almost every reader gives a ready assent. From that moment, however, the reader is most completely bewildered : For, whenever these plausible positions are admitted, or inadvertently passed over, such is the force of Mr Hume's reasonings, and such the beauty and energy of his eloquence, that no reader can resist the torrent. Dean Swift

Swift says, that the best way to conquer a woman, is to catch her by the *tail*. But the only successful mode of conquering Mr Hume is to catch him by the *nose*.

In the year 1742, Mr Hume published at Edinburgh the first part of his *Essays*. This work met with a more favourable reception from the public, and gave him some consolation for his former disappointment. In 1745, he was invited by the Marquis of Annandale, who was then indisposed both in mind and in body, to come and live with him in England, where Mr Hume continued during twelve months; and, by his appointments in that station, was enabled to make a considerable addition to his small fortune. He then received an invitation from General St Clair to attend him as secretary to an expedition against Canada, but which ended in an incursion on the coast of France. In 1747, Mr Hume was again invited by General St Clair to attend him in the same station in his embassy to the courts of Vienna and Turin. He then wore the uniform of an officer; and, in the character of aid-de-camp

to the General, was introduced into these courts. These two years, he tells us, were almost the only interruptions he met with to his studies during the course of his life. But he passed them agreeably; and his appointments, joined to his own frugality, soon enabled him to amass near a thousand pounds.

Mr Hume imagined that his *Treatise of Human Nature* had failed of success more from the manner of writing than from the matter. He, therefore, to use his own expression, *cast* the first part of that work anew in his *Inquiry concerning Human Understanding*, which was published while he was at Turin. But, at first, this piece was not much more successful than the former. Mr Hume, however, though he must have felt those disappointments, was not altogether discouraged. In the 1749, he came down from London to Scotland, and lived at his brother's country-house, where he composed the second part of his Essay, which he called *Political Discourses*, and likewise his *Inquiry concerning the Principles*

ciples of Morals, which, he tells us, in another part of his *Treatise*, that he *cast* anew. Soon afterwards, he was informed by Mr A. Millar, his London bookseller, that his former publications, except his unfortunate *Treatise*, were beginning to be the subject of conversation; that the sale of them was gradually increasing; and that new editions were become necessary to answer the demands of the public. "Answers," he archly remarks, "by Reverends and Right Reverends, came out two or three in a year; and I found, by *Dr Warburton's railing*, that the books were beginning to be esteemed in *good company* *."

Mr Hume, in the year 1751, removed from the country, and came to Edinburgh, which he emphatically terms the *true scene for a man of letters* †. In 1752, he published his *Political Discourses*, the first work of his which was successful at the outset. In the same year appeared his *Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals*, "which is," says he, "of all my writings, historical, philosophical,

* Mr Hume's own *Life*, p. 10.

† *Ibid.* p. 11.

“philosophical, or literary, incomparably
“the best *.” But the public were of a
contrary opinion ; for the book was either
totally neglected, or treated with contempt.

In the same year, he was appointed by
the Faculty of Advocates their Librarian,
from which office he received only a trif-
ling emolument ; but it gave him the com-
mand of a great collection of books and
manuscripts. When this Library falls na-
turally to be mentioned, it would be unpar-
donable not to tell a truth of which every
man of letters in Edinburgh has daily
experience. The collection, especially of
printed books, exceeds greatly that of any
library in Britain ; and free access to the
perusal of them is cheerfully and politely
allowed. On this subject, I must go far-
ther. The occasional use of books or manu-
scripts in a public library is a most valuable
privilege. The Faculty of Advocates, how-
ever, not only grant this privilege, but any
member of that Faculty can, by his signa-
ture, oblige his friends with such books as
he

* Mr Hume's own Life, p. 11.

he chuses out of doors for a reasonable time; and such requests, on all proper occasions, are most liberally granted. The Faculty do more. Literary gentlemen, by giving bond for a certain sum, often acquire the privilege of taking out books upon their own receipts. To this noble collection, joined to the generosity of its proprietors, Scotland, for these hundred years past, has been indebted for the many productions of genius and of learning which have enabled her sons, within that period, to make such a distinguished figure in almost every department of science. I must not, however, omit her powerful auxiliaries: The libraries of the University of Edinburgh, and of the College of Physicians, are very great, and particularly enriched with books of Medicine, of Anatomy, and of Natural History. The access to these libraries is equally easy as to that of the Faculty of Advocates. But, to return.—In this most favourable situation, where he had an opportunity of consulting almost every authentic resource, Mr Hume formed the plan of writing the *History of England*.

land. He commenced with the accession of the House of Stuart, and afterwards observed a kind of retrograde motion. Of the success of this work, he acknowledges his expectations were sanguine. “But,” says he, “miserable was my disappointment: I “was assailed by one cry of reproach, dis-
 “approbation, and even detestation; Eng-
 “lish, Scotch, and Irish, Whig and Tory,
 “Churchman and Sectary, Freethinker and
 “Religionist, Patriot and Courtier, united
 “in their rage against the man who had
 “presumed to shed a generous tear for the
 “fate of Charles I. and the Earl of Straf-
 “ford; and, after the ebullitions of their
 “fury were over, what was still more mor-
 “tifying, the book seemed to sink into ob-
 “livion*.”

Some time afterwards, he published at London his *Natural History of Religion*. “Its public entry,” he remarks, “was ra-
 “ther obscure, except only that Dr Hurd
 “wrote a pamphlet against it, with all the
 “illiberal petulance, arrogance, and scurri-
 “lity,

* His own Life, p. 11, and 12.

“ lity, which distinguish the Warburtonian
 “ school. This pamphlet gave me some
 “ consolation for the otherwise indifferent
 “ reception of my performance *.”

Two years after the miscarriage of the first volume, viz. in 1756, he published the second volume of his History of England, which included the period from the death of Charles I. to the Revolution. This performance gave less umbrage to the Whigs, and was more favourably received by the public. “ It not only rose itself,” says he, “ but helped to buoy up its unfortunate brother †.” In the year 1759, Mr Hume published his *History of the House of Tudor*. The clamour excited by this work was nearly equal to that against the History of the two first Stuarts. The reign of Elizabeth was particularly offensive. “ But,” he tells us, “ I was now callous against the impressions of public folly, and continued very peaceably and contentedly in my retreat at Edinburgh, to finish, in two volumes, the more early period of the English History, which

* His own Life, p. 11, and 12.

† Ibid.

“ which I gave to the public in 1761, with
“ tolerable, and but tolerable, success *.”

Notwithstanding, however, a very general clamour and many rude attacks, Mr Hume's writings gradually acquired more and more reputation ; and he received from the booksellers higher copy-money, than had been given to any other author in Britain before that period. He now found himself not only independent, but opulent ; and, therefore, he retired to his native country of Scotland, with a design never to leave it again. At that time, he was turned of fifty years, when, in the year 1763, he received an invitation from the Earl of Hertford to attend him on his embassy to Paris, with a near prospect of being his secretary. This offer, however, Mr Hume at first declined, on account of his age, and the reluctance he felt against mingling again with the gay company of the French metropolis. But, upon his Lordship's repeating the invitation, Mr Hume at last consented. He was afterwards appointed secretary to the embassy.

* His own Life, p. 13.

embassy. In summer 1765, Lord Hertford was called home to be Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, and Mr Hume was left *chargé d'affaires* till the arrival of the Duke of Richmond about the end of the same year. In the beginning of the year 1766, Mr Hume left Paris, and next summer went to Edinburgh with the view of enjoying an agreeable retreat among philosophical friends, with which that city, though not large, peculiarly abounds. Mr Amyat, King's Chymist, a most sensible and agreeable English gentleman, resided in Edinburgh for a year or two. He one day surprised me with a curious remark. There is not a city in Europe, said he, that enjoys such a singular and such a noble privilege. I asked, What is that privilege? He replied, Here I stand at what is called the *Cross of Edinburgh*, and can, in a few minutes, take fifty men of genius and learning by the hand. The fact is well known; but to a native of that city, who has all his days been familiarized with it, and who has not travelled into other countries, that circumstance, though very remarkable, passes un-

noticed : Upon strangers, however, it makes a deep impression. In London, in Paris, and other large cities of Europe, though they contain many literary men, the access to them is difficult ; and, even after that is obtained, the conversation is, for some time, shy and constrained. In Edinburgh, the access to men of parts is not only easy, but their conversation and the communication of their knowledge are at once imparted to intelligent strangers with the utmost liberality. The philosophers of Scotland have no nostrums. They tell what they know, and deliver their sentiments without disguise or reserve. This generous feature was conspicuous in the character of Mr Hume. He insulted no man ; but, when the conversation turned upon particular subjects, whether moral or religious, he expressed his genuine sentiments with freedom, with force, and with a dignity which did honour to human nature.

In the year 1767, Mr Hume was invited by Mr Conway to be under Secretary, which both the character of the person, and
his

his connections with Lord Hertford, prevented him from declining. He returned to Edinburgh in 1769 very opulent; for he then possessed a revenue of 1000*l.* a-year; and, though pretty far advanced in life, he was in good health, and had the prospect of long enjoying ease, and seeing the increase of his reputation.

In spring 1775, he began to be afflicted with a disorder in his bowels, which at first did not alarm him; but he soon afterwards apprehended that a mortification, and, of course, a speedy dissolution, were to ensue. Still, however, his cheerfulness and usual alacrity, notwithstanding the great decline of his body, did not desert him. He considered, that a man of sixty-five, by dying, cuts off only a few years of infirmities, and perhaps of peevishness and anxiety. Mr Hume concludes his life with a short sketch of what he apprehended to be his own character and dispositions: "I am, or rather was," says he, "a man of mild disposition, of command of temper, of an open, social, and cheerful humour, capable
of

of attachment, but little susceptible of enmity, and of great moderation in all my passions. Even my love of literary fame, my ruling passion, never soured my temper, notwithstanding my frequent disappointments. My company was not unacceptable to the young and careless, as well as to the studious and literary; and, as I took a particular pleasure in the company of modest women, I had no reason to be displeased with the reception I met with from them*.”

Though Mr Hume believed the disease which afflicted him was to carry him off the stage of life, as we are informed by a letter from the late most ingenious and excellent Dr Adam Smith to William Strahan, Esq; (of the latter of whom he had such a favourable opinion, that he left him the charge, with discretionary powers, of all his manuscripts, some of which, and particularly that of his own life, were afterwards published;) yet he was prevailed upon, by the entreaties of his friends, to try what might be the effects of a long journey. He, accordingly, about the end of April

* His own Life, p. 15.

April 1776, set out for London; and when he came the length of Morpeth, he met with Dr Adam Smith, and Mr John Home*, a gentleman well known for his poetical genius, and particularly for his theatrical writings. These two gentlemen were on their road from London expecting to find Mr Hume at Edinburgh. Mr Home returned with him, and "attended him," Mr Smith tells us, "during the whole of his stay in England, with that care and attention which might be expected from a temper so perfectly friendly and affectionate †."

Mr Hume's disease seemed to yield a little to exercise and change of air; for, when he arrived in London, he was apparently in much better health than when he left Edinburgh. He was advised to go to Bath and drink the waters, which, for some time, had so good an effect upon him, that he began to have some hopes of recovering his health. His former symptoms, however,

* The AUTHOR often mentioned as a curious circumstance, that he had the honour of being acquainted with all the literary men, of his time, in Scotland, except the ingenious Mr JOHN HOME.

† Dr Smith's Letter to Mr Strahan.

ever, returned with their usual violence. From that moment, he relinquished all hopes of the continuation of life, and of ease. But he submitted to his fate with the utmost cheerfulness and complacency. When he returned to Edinburgh, though he found himself much weaker, his spirits never failed him. His cheerfulness was so great, and his conversation and amusements continued so much in their accustomed strain, that, notwithstanding many bad symptoms, few of his friends could believe his dissolution to be so fast approaching. Doctor Dundas, when taking leave of Mr Hume one day, said to him, "I shall tell your friend Colonel Edmonstone, that I left you much better, and in a fair way of recovery."—"Doctor," Mr Hume replied, "as I believe you would not chuse to tell any thing but the truth, you had better tell him, that I am dying as fast as my enemies, if I have any, could wish, and as easily and cheerfully as my best friends could desire*."

Soon afterwards, Colonel Edmonstone went to see Mr Hume, and to take a last
farewell

* Dr Smith's Letter to Mr Strahan.

farewell of him. But, on his way home, he could not refrain from writing a letter, bidding him once more an eternal adieu. Such were Mr Hume's magnanimity and fortitude of mind, that his most intimate and affectionate friends knew they hazarded no offence in talking or writing to him as a-dying man. Mr Adam Smith happened to call upon Mr Hume when he was reading Colonel Edmonstone's letter, which he immediately showed to Mr Smith. After perusing this letter, Mr Smith remarked, that appearances were against Mr Hume; still, however, he said, your cheerfulness is so great, and your spirit of life so strong, that I must entertain some faint hopes of your recovery. Mr Hume answered, "Your hopes are groundless. An habitual *diarrhoea*, of more than a year's standing, would be a very bad disease at any age. At my age, it is a mortal one. When I lie down in the evening, I feel myself weaker than when I rose in the morning; and, when I rise in the morning, weaker than when I lay down in the evening. I am sensible, besides, that some of my vital parts are affected,

fectcd, so that I must soon die*.” Mr Smith replied, “If it must be so, you have at least the satisfaction of leaving all your friends, your brother’s family in particular, in great prosperity †.” Mr Hume said, he felt that satisfaction so sensibly, that, a few days before, when reading Lucian’s Dialogues of the Dead, among all the excuses which are usually made to Charon by souls who are backward to be ferried in his boat over the river Styx, he could not find one that suited him. He had no house to furnish, no children to provide for, nor any enemies upon whom he wished to be revenged. “I could not well imagine,” said he, “what excuse I could make to Charon, in order to obtain a little delay. I have done every thing of consequence which I ever meant to do, and I could at no time expect to leave my relations and friends in a better situation than that in which I am now likely to leave them: I, therefore, have all reason to die contented.”

He then amused himself with inventing
some

* Ibid.

† Ibid.

some whimsical excuses, which he supposed he might make to Charon, and with imagining the surly answers which it might suit the character of Charon to return to them. "Upon further consideration," said he, "I thought I might say to him, Good Charon, I have been correcting my works for a new edition. Allow me a little time that I may see how the public receives the alterations." But Charon would answer, "When you have seen the effect of these, you will be for making other alterations. There will be no end of such excuses; so, honest friend, please step into the boat." But Mr Hume said, I might still urge, "Have a little patience, good Charon, I have been endeavouring to open the eyes of the public. If I live a few years longer, I may have the satisfaction of seeing the downfall of some of the prevailing systems of superstition." But Charon would then lose all temper and decency.—"You loitering rogue, that will not happen these many hundred years. Do you fancy I will grant you a lease for so long a term? Get into the boat this instant, you lazy loitering rogue *."

Y

Though

* Ibid.

Though Mr Hume frequently talked of his approaching dissolution with great ease, he never affected to make a parade of his magnanimity. He never mentioned the subject but when the conversation naturally suggested it. Mr Hume had now become so weak, that the company of his most intimate companions fatigued him; for his cheerfulness was still so great, his complaisance and social disposition were still so entire, that, when any friend was with him, he could not refrain from talking more, and with greater exertion, than the weakness of his body could easily sustain. Mr Smith, therefore, agreed, at Mr Hume's desire, to leave Edinburgh, and go to live in Kirkcaldy with his mother, who then resided in that town. The ingenious and well known Dr Black, professor of chymistry in the University of Edinburgh, undertook occasionally to write Mr Smith an account of the state of his friend's health. Accordingly, on the 22d day of August, Dr Black wrote Mr Smith the following letter: "Since my last, Mr Hume has passed his time pretty easily, but is much weaker. He sits up,

goes

goes down stairs once a-day; and amuses himself with reading, but seldom sees any body. He finds, that even the conversation of his most intimate friends fatigues and oppresses him; and it is happy that he does not need it, for he is quite free from anxiety, impatience, or low spirits, and passes his time very well with the assistance of amusing books."

The next day, Mr Smith received a letter from Mr Hume himself, of which what follows is an extract.

" *My dearest friend, Edin. Aug. 23. 1776.*

I am obliged to make use of my nephew's hand in writing to you, as I do not rise to-day. I go very fast to decline, and last night had a small fever, which I *hoped* might put a *quicker period* to this tedious illness, but unluckily it has, in a great measure, gone off."

Three days after, Mr Smith received the following letter from Dr Black.

" Dear

“ Dear Sir, *Edin. Aug. 26. 1776.*

Yesterday, about four o'clock afternoon, Mr Hume expired. The near approach of his death became evident in the night between Thursday and Friday, when his disease became excessive, and soon weakened him so much, that he could no longer rise out of his bed. He continued to the last perfectly sensible, and free from much pain or feelings of distress. He never dropped the smallest expression of impatience; but, when he had occasion to speak to the people about him, always did it with affection and tenderness. I thought it improper to write to bring you over, especially as I heard that he had dictated a letter to you, desiring you not to come.—When he became very weak, it cost him an effort to speak, and he died in such a happy composure of mind, that nothing could exceed it.”

“ Thus died,” says Mr Smith, in his letter to Mr Strahan, “ our most excellent and never to be forgotten friend, concerning whose philosophical opinions men will no doubt judge variously, every one approving,

proving, or condemning them, according as they happen to coincide or disagree with his own ; but concerning whose character and conduct there can scarce be a difference of opinion. His temper, indeed, seemed to be more happily balanced, if I may be allowed such an expression, than that, perhaps, of any other man I have ever known. Even in the lowest state of his fortune, his great and necessary frugality never hindered him, on proper occasions, from exercising acts both of charity and generosity. It was a frugality founded not upon avarice, but upon the love of independency. The extreme gentleness of his nature never weakened either the firmness of his mind, or the steadiness of his resolutions. His constant pleasantry was the genuine effusion of good nature and good humour, tempered with delicacy and modesty, and without even the slightest tincture of malignity, so frequently the disagreeable source of what is called wit in other men. It never was the meaning of his raillery to mortify ; and, therefore, far from offending, it seldom failed to please and delight even those who
were

were the objects of it. To his friends, who were frequently the objects of it, there was not, perhaps, any one of all his great and amiable qualities, which contributed more to endear his conversation. And that gaiety of temper, so agreeable in society, but which is so often accompanied with frivolous and superficial qualities, was in him certainly attended with the most severe application, the most extensive learning, the greatest depth of thought, and a capacity in every respect the most comprehensive. Upon the whole, I have always considered him, both in his lifetime and since his death, as approaching as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit. I am, &c.

ADAM SMITH."

Thus far have I proceeded in giving a biographical account of this great literary and worthy man. Hitherto this account has been chiefly derived from printed authorities. I shall now conclude with adding

ing a few anecdotes from my own personal knowledge, joined to some other well known facts, which Mr Hume, in *his Own Life*, has not recorded.

His own Life, as well as Mr Adam Smith's letter to Mr Strahan, are written with great candour and truth. Mr Hume, like perhaps every man of genius, had a *keenness* of temper, which he happily balanced by a strong and decisive mode of reasoning. His works met with so many and often so rude attacks from a variety of authors, that, though he did not deign to answer them in writing; yet, in conversation, he frequently discovered the resentments which he felt from the indelicate and often ignorant insults of inferior scholars. In all cases of this kind, his forcible mode of expression, the brilliant quick movements of his eyes, and the gestures of his body, discovered the acuteness of his feelings, and the highest marks of contempt as well as of aversion.

One author, however. Dr Campbell, Professor of Morals in the University of Aberdeen, a learned, a worthy, and an ingenious man, wrote a pretty large book against Mr Hume's *Essay on Miracles*, in such a style and manner, and so much like a gentleman, that Mr Hume never spoke of him but with the utmost respect; and often said, that, of all his opponents, Doctor Campbell was not only the most acute, but wrote with the best temper, and in the mildest, though forcible and elegant terms. In the first edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, which was published at Edinburgh in the year 1771, under the word *Abridgement*, as an example of what I then thought to be the best and most useful mode of abridging books, I gave a short view of Mr Hume's *Essay on Miracles*, and of Dr Campbell's *answer* to it. I still think, that, as the article is short, a transcript of it may be of some value, especially to young readers.

“ *Abridgement*, in literature, a term signifying the reduction of a book into a smaller compass. The art of conveying much
sentiment

sentiment in few words, is the happiest talent an author can be possessed of. This talent is peculiarly necessary in the present state of literature; for many writers have acquired the dexterity of spreading a few critical thoughts over several hundred pages. When an author hits upon a thought that pleases him, he is apt to dwell upon it, to view it in different lights, to force it in improperly, or upon the slightest relations. Though this may be pleasant to the writer, it tires and vexes the reader. There is another great source of diffusion in composition. It is a capital object with an author, whatever be the subject, to give vent to all his best thoughts. When he finds a proper place for them, he is peculiarly happy. But, rather than sacrifice a thought he is fond of, he forces it in by way of digression, or superfluous illustration. If none of these expedients answer his purpose, he has recourse to the margin, a very convenient apartment for all manner of pedantry and impertinence. There is not an author, however correct, but is more or less faulty in this respect. An abridger, however, is

not subject to these temptations. The thoughts are not his own ; he views them in a cobler and less affectionate manner ; he discovers an impropriety in some, a vanity in others, and a want of utility in many. His business, therefore, is to retrench superfluities, digressions, quotations, pedantry, &c. and to lay before the public only what is really useful. This is by no means an easy employment : To abridge some books requires talents equal, if not superior, to those of the author. The facts, spirit, manner, and reasoning, must be preserved ; nothing essential, either in argument or illustration, ought to be omitted. The difficulty of the task is the principal reason why we have so few good abridgements. Wynne's abridgement of Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding is, perhaps, the only unexceptionable one in our language. These observations relate solely to such abridgements as are designed for the public. But,

“ When a person wants to set down the substance of any book, a shorter and less laborious

laborious method may be followed. It would be foreign to our plan to give examples of abridgements for the public : But, as it may be useful, espécially to young people, to know how to abridge books for their own use, after giving a few directions, we shall exhibit an example or two, to shew with what ease it may be done.

“ Read the book carefully ; endeavour to learn the principal view of the author ; attend to the arguments employed : When you have done so, you will generally find, that what the author uses as new or additional arguments, are, in reality, only collateral ones, or extensions of the principal argument. Take a piece of paper, or a common-place book, put down what the author wants to prove, subjoin the argument or arguments, and you have the substance of the book in a few lines. For example, in his *Essay on Miracles*, Mr Hume’s design is to prove, That miracles, which have not been the immediate objects of our senses, cannot reasonably be believed upon
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the testimony of others. Now, his argument (for there happens to be but one) is,

“ That experience, which in some things is variable, in others uniform, is our *only* guide in reasoning concerning matters of fact. A variable experience gives rise to probability only ; an uniform experience amounts to a proof. Our belief of any fact from the testimony of eye-witnesses is derived from no other principle than our experience in the veracity of human testimony. If the fact attested be miraculous, here arises a contest of two opposite experiences, or proof against proof. Now, a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and, as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as complete as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined ; and, if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever derived from human testimony.”

“ In Dr Campbell’s Dissertation on Miracles,

racles, the author's principal aim is to shew the fallacy of Mr Hume's argument; which he has done most successfully by another single argument, as follows:

“ The evidence arising from human testimony *is not solely* derived from experience; on the contrary, testimony hath a natural influence on belief antecedent to experience. The early and unlimited assent given to testimony by children gradually contracts as they advance in life: It is, therefore, more consonant to truth, to say, that our *diffidence* in testimony is the result of experience, than that our *faith* in it has this foundation. Besides, the uniformity of experience, in favour of any fact, is not a proof against its being reversed in a particular instance. The evidence arising from the single testimony of a man of known veracity will go far to establish a belief in its being actually reversed: If his testimony be confirmed by a few others of the same character, we cannot withhold our assent to the truth of it. Now, though the operations of nature are governed by uniform

form laws, and though we have not the testimony of our senses in favour of any *violation* of them, still if, in particular instances, we have the testimony of *thousands* of our fellow-creatures, and those too men of strict integrity, swayed by no motives of ambition or interest, and governed by the principles of common sense, That they were actually eye-witnesses of these violations, the constitution of our nature obliges us to believe them."

"These two examples contain the substance of about 400 pages.—Making private abridgements of this kind has many advantages ; it engages us to read with accuracy and attention ; it fixes the subject in our minds ; and, if we should happen to forget, instead of reading the books again, by glancing a few lines, we are not only in possession of the chief arguments, but recall, in a good measure, the author's manner and method."

Dr Campbell having sent the manuscript of his book against Mr Hume's *Essay on Miracles* to Dr Hugh Blair of Edinburgh,
for

for his opinion of the work, Dr Blair proposed to send the manuscript to Mr Hume himself, which was accordingly done; and Mr Hume returned it to the Doctor accompanied with the following letter.

“SIR,

“I have perused the ingenious performance, which you was so obliging as to put into my hands, with all the attention possible; though not perhaps with all the seriousness and gravity which you have so frequently recommended to me. But the fault lies not in the piece, which is certainly very acute; but in the subject. I know you will say, it lies in neither, but in myself alone. If that be so, I am sorry to say that I believe it is incurable.

“I could wish that your friend had not chosen to appear as a controversial writer, but had endeavoured to establish his principles in general, without any reference to a particular book or person; though I own he does me a great deal of honour, in thinking that any thing I have wrote deserves
his

his attention. For besides many inconveniencies, which attends that kind of writing, I see it is almost impossible to preserve decency and good manners in it. This author, for instance, says sometimes obliging things of me much beyond what I can presume to deserve; and I thence conclude that in general he did not mean to insult me: yet I meet with some other passages more worthy of Warburton and his followers than of so ingenious an author.

“ But as I am not apt to lose my temper, and would still less incline to do so with a friend of your’s, I shall calmly communicate to you some remarks on the argument, since you seem to desire it. I shall employ very few words; since a hint will suffice to a gentleman of this author’s penetration.

“ Sect. I. I would desire the author to consider, whether the medium, by which we reason concerning human testimony be different from that which leads us to draw any inferences concerning other human actions; that is, our knowledge of human nature
from

from experience? Or why it is different? I suppose we conclude an honest man will not lie to us, in the same manner as we conclude that he will not cheat us. As to the youthful propensity to believe, which is corrected by experience; it seems obvious, that children adopt blindfold all the opinions, principles, sentiments, and passions of their elders, as well as credit their testimony: nor is this more strange, than that a hammer should make an impression on clay.

“ Sect. II. No man can have any other experience but his own. The experience of others becomes his only by the credit which he gives to their testimony; which proceeds from his own experience of human nature.

“ Sect. III. There is no contradiction in saying, that all the testimony which ever was really given for any miracle, or ever will be given, is a subject of derision; and yet forming a fiction or supposition of a testimony for a particular miracle, which

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might

might not only merit attention, but amount to a full proof of it. For instance, the absence of the sun during 48 hours; but reasonable men would only conclude from this fact, that the machine of the globe was disordered during the time.

“ Page 28. I find no difficulty to explain my meaning, and yet shall not probably do it in any future edition. The proof against a miracle, as it is founded on invariable experience, is of that *species* or *kind* of proof, which is full and certain when taken alone, because it implies no doubt, as is the case with all probabilities; but there are degrees of this species, and when a weaker proof is opposed to a stronger, it is overcome.

“ Page 29. There is very little more delicacy in telling a man he speaks nonsense by implication than in saying so directly.

“ Sect. IV. Does a man of sense run after every silly tale of witches or hobgoblins or fairies, and canvass particularly the evidence? I never knew any one, that examined and
deliberated

deliberated about nonsense who did not believe it before the end of his inquiries.

“ Sect. 5. I wonder the author does not perceive the reason why Mr John Knox and Mr Alexander Henderson did not work as many miracles as their brethren in other churches. Miracle working was a Popish trick, and discarded with the other parts of that religion. Men must have new and opposite ways of establishing new and opposite follies. The same reason extends to Mahomet. The Greek priests, who were in the neighbourhood of Arabia, and many of them in it, were as great miracle-workers as the Romish; and Mahomet would have been laught at for so stale and simple a device. To cast out devils, and cure the blind, where every one almost can do as much, is not the way to get any extraordinary ascendant over men. I never read of a miracle in my life, that was not meant to establish some new point of religion. There are no miracles wrought in Spain to prove the gospel, but St. Francis Xavier wrought a thousand well attested ones for that purpose

pose in the Indies. The miracles in Spain, which are also fully and completely attested, are wrought to prove the efficacy of a particular crucifix or relict, which is always a new point, or, at least, not universally received.

“ Sect. 6. If a miracle proves a doctrine to be revealed from God, and consequently true, a miracle can never be wrought for a contrary doctrine. The facts are therefore as incompatible as the doctrines.

“ I could wish your friend had not denominated me an infidel writer, on account of ten or twelve pages which seem to him to have that tendency ; while I have wrote so many volumes on history, literature, politics, trade, morals, which, in that particular at least, are entirely inoffensive. Is a man to be called a drunkard, because he has been seen fuddled once in his life time ?

“ Having said so much to your friend, who
is

is certainly a very ingenious man, though a little too zealous for a philosopher ; permit me also the freedom of saying a word to yourself. Whenever I have had the pleasure to be in your company, if the discourse turned upon any common subject of literature or reasoning, I always parted from you both entertained and instructed. But when the conversation was diverted by you from this channel towards the subject of your profession ; though I doubt not but your intentions were very friendly towards me, I own I never received the same satisfaction : I was apt to be tired, and you to be angry. I would therefore wish for the future, wherever my good fortune throws me in your way, that these topics should be forborn between us. I have, long since, done with all inquiries on such subjects, and am become incapable of instruction ; though I own no one is more capable of conveying it than yourself.

“ After having given you the liberty of
com-

communicating to your friend what part of this letter you think proper, I remain,

Sir,

Your most obedient

humble servant,

DAVID HUME*.

In

** The following letter was sent by MR HUME to the Author of the Delineation of the Nature and Obligation of Morality.*

“SIR,

“WHEN I write you, I know not to whom I am addressing myself; I only know he is one who has done me a great deal of honour, and to whose civilities I am obliged. If we be strangers, I beg we may be acquainted as soon as you think proper to discover yourself; if we be acquainted already, I beg we may be friends; If friends, I beg we may be more so. Our connection with each other, as men of letters, is greater than our difference as adhering to different sects or systems. Let us revive the happy times, when Atticus and Cassius the Epicureans, Cicero the Academic, and Brutus the Stoic, could, all of them, live in unreserved friendship together, and were insensible to all those distinctions, except so far as they furnished agreeable matter to discourse and conversation. Perhaps you are a young man, and being full of those sublime ideas, which you have so well expressed, think there can be no virtue upon a more confined system. I am not an old one; but being

In the year 1762, Mr Hume wrote the following letter to Dr Campbell, which does much honour to the writer.

“ Dear

ing of a cool temperament, have always found, that more simple views were sufficient to make me act in a reasonable manner; *νηφε, και μεμνησθαι απιστειν*; in this faith have I lived, and hope to die.

“ Your civilities to me so much over-balance your severities, that I should be ungrateful to take notice of some expressions, which, in the heat of composition, have dropt from your pen. I must only complain of you a little for ascribing to me the sentiments which I had put into the mouth of the Sceptic in the Dialogue. I have surely endeavoured to refute the Sceptic with all the force of which I am master; and my refutation must be allowed sincere, because drawn from the capital principles of my system. But you impute to me both the sentiments of the Sceptic and the sentiments of his antagonist, which I can never admit of. In every Dialogue, no more than one person can be supposed to represent the author.

“ Your severity on one head, that of Chastity, is so great, and I am so little conscious of having given any just occasion to it, that it has afforded me a hint to form a conjecture, perhaps ill grounded, concerning your person.

“ I

“ Dear Sir, *Edin. Jan. 7. 1762.*

“ It has so seldom happened that controversies in philosophy, much more in theology, have been carried on without producing a personal quarrel between the parties, that I must regard my present situation as somewhat extraordinary, who have reason

“ I hope to steal a little leisure from my other occupations, in order to defend my philosophy against your attacks. If I have occasion to give a new edition of the work, which you have honoured with answer, I shall make great advantage of your remarks, and hope to obviate some of your criticisms.

“ Your style is elegant, and full of agreeable imagery. In some few places, it does not fully come up to my ideas of purity and correctness. I suppose mine falls still further short of your ideas. In this respect, we may certainly be of use to each other. With regard to our Philosophical systems, I suppose we are both so fixt, that there is no hope of any conversions betwixt us; and for my part, I doubt not but we shall both do as well to remain as we are.

“ I am, Sir,

With great regard,

Your most obliged

Edin. 15th March

humble servant,

1753.

“ DAVID HUME.”

son to give you thanks for the civil and obliging manner in which you have conducted the dispute against me, on so interesting a subject as that of miracles. Any little symptoms of vehemence, of which I formerly used the freedom to complain, when you favoured me with a sight of the manuscript, are either removed or explained away, or atoned for by civilities which are far beyond what I have any title to pretend to. It will be natural for you to imagine, that I will fall upon some shift to evade the force of your arguments, and to retain my former opinion in the point controverted between us; but it is impossible for me not to see the ingenuity of your performance, and the great learning which you have displayed against me.

“ I consider myself as very much honoured, in being thought worthy of an answer by a person of so much merit; and, as I find that the public does you justice, with regard to the ingenuity and good composition of your piece, I hope you will have no reason to repent engaging with an anta-

gonist, whom perhaps, in strictness, you might have ventured to neglect. I own to you that I never felt so violent an inclination to defend myself as at present, when I am thus fairly challenged by you, and I think I could find something specious at least to urge in my defence ; but, as I had fixed a resolution, in the beginning of my life, always to leave the public to judge between my adversaries and me, without making any reply, I must adhere inviolably to this resolution, otherwise my silence on any future occasion would be construed to be an inability to answer, and would be matter of triumph against me.

“ It may perhaps amuse you to learn the first hint which suggested to me that argument which you have so strenuously attacked. I was walking in the cloysters of the Jesuits College of La Fleche, a town in which I passed two years of my youth, and was engaged in a conversation with a Jesuit of some parts and learning, who was relating to me, and urging some nonsensical miracle performed lately in their Convent, when I
was

was tempted to dispute against him ; and, as my head was full of the topics of my Treatise of Human Nature, which I was at that time composing, this argument immediately occurred to me, and I thought it very much gruelled my companion ; but at last he observed to me, that it was impossible for that argument to have any solidity, because it operated equally against the Gospel as the Catholic miracles ; which observation I thought proper to admit as a sufficient answer. I believe you will allow that the freedom at least of this reasoning makes it somewhat extraordinary to have been the produce of a Convent of Jesuits, though perhaps you may think that the sophistry of it favours plainly of the place of its birth.”

In the year 1762, Mr Hume attached himself to the celebrated Rousseau, when the latter was about to be imprisoned, by an *arrêt* of the Parliament of Paris, for publishing his famous romance called *Emile*. Mr Hume was then in Edinburgh. A person, as he says, of merit, but whose name he does not mention, wrote him from Paris, that

that M. Rousseau intended to come to Britain to procure an asylum from persecution in a land where freedom reigns, and genius and literature of every species are eminently encouraged. M. Rousseau, at the same time, asked Mr Hume's patronage and recommendation when he should arrive in London. Mr Hume, accordingly, wrote to several of his friends in London, in favour of this famous exile; and likewise wrote to himself, assuring him of his zeal and strong desire of doing every thing in his power to serve him. Mr Hume, at the same time, solicited Rousseau to come to Edinburgh, and offered him a secure retreat in his own house as long as he should chuse. Mr Hume's principal motives for making this offer were the celebrity of Rousseau's genius and talents, and particularly the persecution he suffered from the bigots of his own country, joined to the weak and decayed state of his body, occasioned by the passing of blood through his urethra. This disorder, like most chronical distempers, rendered his mind peevish, and, of course, made his temper and his actions frequently
bizarre

bizarre and disagreeable, especially to strangers. Mr Hume seems, in some parts of the controversy, not to have made sufficient allowance for the weak and painful condition of his antagonist's body. Pain, when long continued, not only induces general debility, but frets and disturbs the mind, and makes it suspicious and impatient. This circumstance, it is probable, was the principal cause of the rupture that happened between these two learned and most ingenious men. Mr Hume, however, through the whole controversy, treats M. Rousseau with humanity and respect. He, indeed, defends himself strenuously against the calumnies and insinuations of his illustrious opponent; and he was fully entitled to do so.

At the instigation of Mr Hume, Rousseau arrived in England in Spring 1766; and Mr Hume procured a pleasant residence for him in a country house belonging to Mr Davenport, a gentleman distinguished by his birth, by his fortune, and by his merit. This villa is situated in the county of Derby, and is called *Wooton*. As soon as Rousseau

seau arrived at Wooton, he was charmed with the situation of the place, as well as with the adjacent country ; and wrote Mr Hume, in the most polite and grateful terms, how much he esteemed his friendship and patronage.

When on their route to Britain, one evening at Calais, Mr Hume asked Rousseau, if he would accept a pension from the King of Britain, provided it should be obtained ? Rousseau replied, that he found some difficulty in answering the question ; but that he would refer the affair to Lord Marshall, who was a great friend to Rousseau. Encouraged by this response, Mr Hume, as soon as he arrived in London, applied to General Conway, then Secretary of State, and likewise to General Graeme, Secretary and Chamberlain to the Queen, asking a pension to Rousseau, which was readily granted, on the sole condition that the affair should be kept secret. This condition was highly agreeable to Rousseau, who loved to conceal such favours as he occasionally received, and particularly in what related to money-matters, because he thought
they

they degraded that spirit of independency which he always, at least, pretended to possess. But Mr Hume had, for some time, anxiously attended to the ease and interest of M. Rousséau, who continually complained both of bodily pain and of poverty, discovered with astonishment, that the last complaint of extreme poverty was false: He employed this last artifice (for the first was no artifice), Mr Hume remarks, to render himself, as a man of genius, more interesting, and to excite the compassion of the public.

The time which Mr Hume spent with M. Rousséau gradually enabled him to unfold his real character. I at last perceived, says he, with infinite pain, that this ingenious man was born for tumult and storms; but, as Mr Hume had done every thing to accommodate Rousséau, and to render his situation comfortable, he never dreamed that he himself was to become a victim of his rage and peevishness. The origin of the rupture between these two great men took its rise from a ridiculous circumstance.

Mr

Mr Horace Walpole, who, it would appear, was no great friend to Rousseau, wrote a letter, under the fictitious designation of *Frederic King of Prussia*, inviting him to come and reside in his Court at Berlin. Of this affair Mr Hume had no knowledge. But Rousseau, from what circumstances it is difficult to conjecture, imagined that Mr Hume had written and circulated that letter with a view to perplex and burlesque him. Mr Hume, in this more than foolish affair, excuses Mr Walpole by calling it an innocent *plaisanterie*. But, when the genius, the temper, and the diseased state of Rousseau's body are considered, instead of a *plaisanterie*, it was a direct *cruelty*, and had, by a natural mistake, the unhappy effect of converting two cordial and celebrated friends into mortal enemies.

M. Rousseau, though Mr Hume procured him a grant of a pension from his Majesty, actuated by some whimsical ideas of independency, and a notion that his best friend meant to betray him, refused to accept of it. Mr Hume, by friendly letters, pressed

pressed Rousseau to accept of the pension ; but the latter obstinately persisted in his denial, and even reproached Mr Hume, in terms the most indecent, for so successfully endeavouring to serve him, and to render his circumstances easy for life.

The supposititious letter, written in the name of the King of Prussia, after copies of it had been circulated over Europe, was at last published in the *St James's Chronicle*. It was in that News-paper which Rousseau first saw this imprudent and ill-judged production. M. Rousseau immediately wrote to the Editors of the *St James's Chronicle* complaining bitterly of the imposture, and indirectly insinuating that the pretended letter was composed by Mr Hume. When Mr Hume learnt that he was suspected by M. Rousseau to be the author and publisher of this letter, it gave him much uneasiness. Mr Hume remarks, that, after the great attention and beneficent services he had, with unremitting perseverance, bestowed on M. Rousseau, he was suddenly become the object of his resentment and obloquy, upon

no other foundation than a foolish and ever absurd suspicion. Mr Hume, notwithstanding this unhappy affair, continued to protect and cherish Rousseau by friendly letters as well as by good offices. But, soon afterwards, Rousseau threw off every mask, and accused Mr Hume openly as a traitorous enemy, without assigning any reasons but what were evidently capricious, frivolous, and contemptible. I shall mention one example only. The first night after these two remarkable men left Paris, in their way to Britain, they both slept in the same chamber. M. Rousseau, in the last letter he ever wrote to Mr Hume, which is of an enormous length, says, that during the night, Mr Hume, several times, called out, with unusual vehemence, *Je tiens J. J. Rousseau*. He, however, acknowledges, that he knew not whether Mr Hume was sleeping or waking. The expression, in the French language, is strong; but, like many verbs, *tenir* is frequently used in very different and even opposite senses. Rousseau interpreted the expression thus: *I have Rousseau in my possession*, or, *I hold him fast*.

Every

Every time these words were repeated, Rousseau tells us that he trembled with terror. This and some similar insignificant circumstances gave rise to a complete rupture between those too great men.

When the periodical paper called the *Edinburgh Magazine and Review* was publishing in the year 1773, the late Rev. Dr Henry, then one of the ministers of this city, a most laborious clergyman, as well as a facetious and good-humoured companion, brought forth the second volume of his *History of Great Britain*. Dr Henry, it was said, applied, in the most earnest manner, to Mr Hume to give an account of that volume in the Review, to which Mr Hume gave his assent. When the manuscript appeared, after reading it, the praises appeared to be so high-strained, that the Reviewers, in my presence, agreed that Mr Hume's account was meant as a burlesque upon the author. It was, therefore, committed to the farther consideration of one of their number, who still continued to be of the same opinion, and, accordingly, raised the encomiums so high,

high, that no person could mistake the supposed meaning of the writer. The types of the Manuscript, in this last form, were composed, and proof-sheets sent to Mr Hume for his perusal and corrections. To the astonishment of the Reviewers, Mr Hume wrote them an angry letter, complaining, in the highest terms, of the freedoms they had used with his manuscript, and declaring that in the account he had given of Dr Henry's History, he was perfectly sincere. Upon which, Mr Hume's review was cancelled, and another was written by a member of the Society, condemning the book in terms perhaps too severe; so that Mr Hume's intention of serving Dr Henry was not only abortive, but produced an opposite effect.

Another circumstance in the life of Mr Hume must not be omitted. When a young man, he applied to be made *Professor of Moral Philosophy* in the University of Edinburgh. The Scottish clergy took an alarm. They represented that Mr Hume, in his principles, was an *Atheist*, or at least

a *Deist*; and, consequently, that he was very ill-qualified to teach morals to youth in a Christian country. Their remonstrances were effectual; and Mr Hume's application was rejected. From that moment, as was natural, he conceived a rooted antipathy to the generality of Scottish clergymen. This antipathy was not, however, indiscriminate; for he was in intimate habits of friendship and sociality with several of the ministers of the Church of Scotland; as the celebrated Dr Robertson, Dr Blair, Dr Wallace, Mr Jardine, Dr Wishart, Dr Drysdale, Mr Home, the author of the ingenious and popular tragedy of *Douglas*, and many others. These reverend and learned gentlemen, however much they differed from Mr Hume in religious or philosophical opinions, were fully sensible of his Genius as an Author, and of his Worth as a Man.

I shall mention another anecdote.—One summer evening, I went to sup with *Lord Kames*. Soon after, Dr John Warden, a worthy, a respectable, and an useful clergyman

man of this City, came to Lord Kames's house with the same intention. Lord Kames was then dictating to his clerk. When his Lordship had finished, he led us to a drawing room, which was situated to the north, because the night was remarkably warm. Here we had conversed for some time, when Mr Hume joined the party. The conversation went on in the most agreeable manner. A sermon had just been published by a Mr Edwards with the strange title of the *Usefulness of Sin*. Dr Warden told us, that he had read this sermon. Mr Hume repeated the words: *The Usefulness of Sin!* I suppose, says he, Mr Edwards adopts the system of Leibnitz, that *all is for the best*; but, added he, with his usual keenness of eye and forcible manner of expression, *What the Devil does the fellow make of hell and damnation?* Upon Mr Hume's pronouncing these words, for what reason I could never conjecture, Dr Warden took his hat and left the room. Lord Kames followed him, and pressed him with anxiety to return, but he obstinately refused.

After

After a very tedious illness, Mr Hume expired at Edinburgh on the 25th day of August 1776, in the 65th year of his age. —Some particulars relating to his death I have already given to my Readers in the letters of Dr Black to Dr Smith on that occasion.

Some time after Mr Hume's death, two Essays, ascribed to him, were published at London; the one on *Suicide*, and the other on the *Immortality of the Soul*. These essays, from the mode of writing and of reasoning, appear evidently to be genuine productions of Mr Hume. I once intended, in this life of Mr Hume, to give an abridged view of the arguments in these two ingenious and plausible Essays. But, after more mature reflection, as I considered the sophistry of the reasoning, and the injurious effects it might have on society; and as an abridgement of them would only be another mode of administering the poison they contain, I shall now relinquish that part of my subject, and conclude with a few general remarks.

Upon

Upon the whole, Mr Hume was one of those extraordinary characters which sometimes, but rarely, appear, like luminous meteors, in almost every civilized country in Europe. For elegance of composition, for dexterous and forcible reasoning, for good humour and pleasantry in conversation, and for uniformity of temper and conduct, he was not to be excelled. Before his death, Mr Hume had written his last will, in which, beside other appointments, he allotted a certain sum for building his tomb, which he ordered to be erected in the Calton burying-ground, which is situated on a pretty high hill almost within the City of Edinburgh. Like himself, his tomb is built of massy but unadorned stones, with this simple inscription, DAVID HUME, ESQ. After the tomb was finished, one summer day, I was fauntering on the Caltonhill, in company with the late well-known Dr Gilbert Stuart, and Dr John Brown, author of what is called the *Brownonian System of Physic*. Dr Brown, who was a man of rough and coarse manners, observed to a mason, who was hewing a pavement stone,

“ Friend,”

“ Friend,” said he, “ this is a strong and massy building ; but how do you think the honest gentleman can get out at the resurrection ?” The mason archly replied, “ Sir, I have secured that point ; for I have put the *key under the door.*”

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OF
ADAM SMITH, L. L. D.

ADAM SMITH was born of very respectable parents at Kirkcaldy, a town in the county of Fife, on the 5th day of June 1723. During infancy, his constitution was feeble and sickly. When about three years of age, a singular accident happened to him. When amusing himself one day alone at the door of his uncle Mr Douglas's house, at Strathenry, he was stolen and carried off by a gang of vagrants, known in Scotland by the appellation of *tinkers*. His uncle, with some assistants, pursued the banditti, and overtook them in Leslie-wood.

Thus

Thus was young Smith rescued from obscurity, who was destined afterwards to enlighten the world by his teaching, as well as by his ingenious and learned compositions. Mr Smith, very early in youth, attracted notice by his keen application to study, and by an uncommonly retentive memory. Among his companions, though he was prevented from sharing their more active exercises, yet his good humour and placid manners procured from them the most affectionate attachment. Even at that period of life, he had contracted some innocent habits which never departed from him. When alone, he often spoke aloud to himself as he proceeded along the streets. He was frequently *absent*, as it is termed, or inattentive to the conversation which was going on while in company.

In the year 1737, he was sent from the grammar school of Kirkcaldy to the University of Glasgow, where he continued at his studies till the year 1740, when he went to Baliol College, Oxford, as an exhibitor. After residing at Oxford seven
years,

years, he returned to Kirkcaldy, where he lived two years with his mother. Here he engaged in study with his usual ardour, but had not yet determined what plan of life or profession he was to follow. His relations had originally intended him for the Church of England, and, with that view, he had been sent to the University of Oxford; but not relishing ecclesiastical employments, he consulted his own inclination in preference to that of his friends; and, in the year 1748, read lectures on rhetoric and belles lettres, under the particular patronage of the late most ingenious, friendly, and patriotic Lord Kames. Mr Smith, in the year 1751, was called to the Professorship of Logic in the University of Glasgow, where he continued to teach for thirteen years. In the exercise of this profession, he soon perceived that his pupils could derive little or no advantage from the ancient logic and metaphysics of the schools. He, therefore, gave enough to gratify the curiosity of his pupils on these subjects, and spent the rest of the course in delivering a system of rhetoric and belles lettres.

Mr

Mr Smith was afterwards removed from the Logic class, and appointed Professor of Morals in the same University. He divided his course of lectures into four branches: I. Natural Theology; in which he considered the proofs of the being and attributes of God, and the general principles of religion. II. Ethics, which consisted chiefly of the ideas which he afterwards published in his ingenious Theory of Moral Sentiments. III. That branch of morality which relates to justice. IV. He concluded his lectures with an examination of those political arrangements which are founded, not upon *justice* strictly so called, but upon *expediency*, and are calculated to augment the riches and the prosperity of a state. In this branch of his subject, he gave a view of those political institutions which relate to commerce, to finances, and to the affairs of the church and of the military. In his lectures, he delivered the substance of that justly celebrated work, intituled, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. These lectures he delivered almost without the aid of writing or reading.

His

His mode of elocution was always plain and unaffected. But, upon any favourite or interesting topics, his manner was highly animated, and his expression fluent, unembarrassed, and such as commanded attention. His great reputation as a Professor, joined to his extensive erudition and gentle and affectionate manners, brought a multitude of students, from a great distance, to the University.

I shall now give a short account of the writings of this illustrious author.

In the beginning of the year 1759, Mr Smith published his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*. It underwent six editions before the author's death, which happened in the month of July 1790. It is a fundamental principle of Mr Smith's Theory, that the actions of other men are the primary objects of our moral perceptions; and that the judgments we form with regard to our own conduct are only applications to ourselves of these opinions we have previously entertained concerning the conduct of others. He divides this work into two parts.

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The first contains an explanation how we learn to judge concerning the behaviour of those with whom we associate; and the last, in what manner we acquire a sense of duty by the application of these judgments to ourselves. With respect to our own conduct, and that of others, our moral judgments contain two separate perceptions: I. The perception of right and of wrong. II. The perception of propriety or impropriety in the actions of other persons. To the word *rectitude*, so generally employed by moralists, Mr Smith substitutes the term *propriety*. His principles and doctrines on this subject, he comprehends in the subsequent propositions.

I. From our own experience solely we are enabled to acquire any ideas of what is occupying the mind of another person. By supposing ourselves in the same situation in which any person is placed, and, of course, thinking how we should be affected in the same or similar circumstances, is the only mode we can employ of conceiving such ideas. From this imaginary mutation of
place

place with other men, that interest we take in their good or bad fortunes is chiefly derived. Mr Smith elucidates this position by many well-known facts. "When we see a stroke aimed," he remarks, "and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer. The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on the slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies, as they see him do, and as they feel that they themselves must do if in his situation." Mr Smith farther remarks, that the same thing happens when our attention is excited to the condition of our neighbour. "Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator. In every passion of which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of the by-stander always correspond to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he

imagines should be, the sentiments of the sufferer.”

This principle of human nature Mr Smith distinguishes by the epithets of *sympathy* or *fellow-feeling*.

II. Sympathy between different persons is always agreeable to both. When in situations which excite particular passions, it is attended with a peculiar pleasure to perceive that the spectators are, by sympathy, affected in the same manner with ourselves.

III. When a spectator of another man's situation feels himself affected in the same manner as the principal, he approves of the passion or affection of that person as just and proper. Mr Smith remarks, that the exceptions that may be made to this observation are only apparent, and by no means solid. “A stranger, for example,” says he, “passes by us in the street with all the marks of the deepest affliction; and we are immediately told, that he has just received
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the news of the death of his father. It is impossible that, in this case, we should not approve of his grief ; yet it may often happen, without any defect of humanity on our part, that, so far from entering into the violence of his sorrow, we should scarce conceive the first movements of concern upon his account. We have learned, however, from experience, that such a misfortune naturally excites such a degree of sorrow ; and we know that, if we took time to examine his situation fully and in all its parts, we should, without doubt, most sincerely sympathize with him. It is upon the consciousness of this conditional sympathy that our approbation of his sorrow is founded, even in those cases in which that sympathy does not actually take place ; and the general rules derived from our preceding experience of what our sentiments would commonly correspond with, correct upon this, as upon many other occasions, the impropriety of our present emotions."

Hence,

Hence, by the propriety of any passion, or affection, exhibited by another person, we are to understand its suitableness to the object by which it is excited. We can judge of this suitableness solely by the coincidence of the affection with that which we feel, when we conceive ourselves to be placed in the same circumstances; and, upon the perception of this coincidence, the sentiment of *moral approbation* is founded.

IV. Sympathetic affections, though they naturally arise in the mind of a spectator, bear a small proportion only, in degree of vivacity, to what is felt by the person himself. To procure, therefore, the pleasure of mutual sympathy, the spectator is stimulated by nature to raise his emotion, as nearly as he can, to the same height as the object itself would really produce. On the other hand, she prompts the person whose passion this object has excited, to bring it down to a level with that of the spectator.

V. Different species of virtues are founded upon these two mutual efforts. The
effort

effort of the spectator to partake of the feelings of the person principally concerned, and to raise his sympathetic emotions to the same degree as those of the actor, gives rise to the mild and amiable virtues. Upon the efforts of the principal to depress his own emotions, with a view to make them correspond with those of the spectator, are founded the great and respectable virtues, as those of humility, of self-government, and of that command of the passions which subjects all our determinations to what the dignity, the honour, and the propriety of our conduct, in the complicated affairs of life, require. In farther illustration of this subject, Mr Smith treats of the degrees of the different passions which are consistent with propriety; and shows, that it is always indecent or decent to express a passion strongly, according as men are disposed or not disposed to give it their sympathy. For example, it is improper to express any passions which originate from a particular condition of the body; because our neighbour, who is not in the same condition, cannot be supposed to sympathize with them. To
cry

cry out with bodily pain is unbecoming ; because the sympathy of the spectator is greatly disproportioned to the acuteness of the sufferer's feelings.

When indulging the unsocial, rather hostile, passions of hatred and resentment, the spectators sympathy is divided between the person who feels the passion, and the person who is its object : “ We are concerned for both, and our fear for what the one may suffer damps our resentment for what the other has suffered.” From this circumstance arise that imperfect manner by which we sympathize with such passions, and, when under their influence, the propriety of moderating their expression to a greater degree than any other emotions require. In all the social and benevolent affections, the reverse takes place. The spectator's sympathy with the person who feels them, coincides with the interest he takes in the person who is the object of them. This redoubled sympathy makes these affections peculiarly agreeable and respectable.

Mr

Mr Smith next inquires how far the judgments of men, concerning the propriety of human actions, are liable to be affected by the prosperous or adverse circumstances of the agent. On this subject, he endeavours to shew, that, when no envy exists, our propensity to sympathize with joy is much stronger than with that of sorrow; and, of course, that we more readily receive the approbation of mankind when we are in prosperity than when we are in adversity. He derives the origin of ambition, or the desire of superior rank, from the same principle. The great object of ambition is, to attain that degree of pre-eminence over his countrymen or fellow citizens, which places him in a conspicuous view, and, of course, excites general sympathy and attention, and bestows on him a dominion over the affections of other men.

After finishing the analysis of our perception of propriety and impropriety, Mr Smith proceeds to examine our sense of merit and demerit, which he derives from the
same

same source, not from our own characters, but from the characters of those with whom we have intercourse. The terms *propriety* and *impropriety*, as formerly remarked, are meant to express the suitability or unsuitableness of the affection to the *cause* by which it is excited. The words *merit* and *demerit* always refer to the *effect* which the affection has a tendency to produce. When the tendency of any affection is beneficial, the agent appears to be an object of reward; when it has an opposite tendency, he appears to be deserving of punishment. Gratitude and resentment are the chief principles in human nature which stimulate us to reward and to punish. It must, however, be remarked, that we do not altogether sympathize with the gratitude of one man to another, solely because the latter has been the cause of the former's good fortune, or success, in any desirable object, unless that cause has proceeded from motives of which we entirely approve. The same remark is applicable to our sense of demerit. Mr Smith infers, from these principles, that the only actions which appear to merit re-
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ward, are those which have a beneficial tendency, and, at the same time, derive their origin from benevolent motives; and the only actions which seem to deserve punishment are those of a hurtful tendency, and proceed from improper or sinister motives. These and similar observations led Mr Smith to anticipate some inconsiderable parts of the second principal division of his work, by a brief inquiry concerning the origin of the sense of justice as applicable to the conduct of individuals, as well as of the sentiments of remorse, and of self-approbation.

By means of the principle of sympathy, he endeavours to account for our sense of justice, and every other moral sentiment. When we attend solely to the feelings of our own minds, individual happiness interests us more than that of all other human beings. But we are likewise conscious, that, in this excessive preference, other men refuse us their sympathy, and that to them we appear only as part of the vulgar crowd, in whom we take little or no interest. Hence, if we wish to procure their appro-

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bation and sympathy, we shall find it necessary to consider our own happiness, not in the light which it appears to ourselves, but in that light in which it appears to the generality of mankind. If we receive an unprovoked injury, we know, from experience, that society will sympathize with our resentment; but, if we hurt the feelings or interests of another person, merely because they stand in opposition to our own, we instantly perceive that society will sympathize with his resentment, and that we shall become the objects of general indignation and contempt. When we are led to neglect these considerations, by the violence of passion, and to act from motives purely selfish, we naturally incur the punishment of remorse. After our passion is gratified, we can no longer enter into the same motives to which it gave rise. We perceive it to have been improper; we regret the effects produced by it; we pity the sufferer whom we have injured; and we feel ourselves to be objects of general resentment. "Such," Mr Smith remarks, "is the nature of that sentiment which is properly called *remorse*. It is made up of shame from the
sense

sense of the impropriety of past conduct ; of grief for the effects of it ; and of the dread and terror of punishment from the consciousness of the justly provoked resentment of all rational creatures.”

The contrary behaviour of a man who, from laudable motives, has performed a generous action, excites the opposite sentiment of conscious merit.

Mr Smith finishes his Theory by showing how we acquire the *sense of duty*, by applying to ourselves the judgments we had previously formed concerning the conduct of other men. He begins with a well-known fact, that we are conscious of merited praise or blame. He likewise informs us, that the great object of a virtuous man is to act in such a manner as to secure a *just* approbation of those with whom he is conversant, as well as with mankind in general. Though this circumstance may seem to imply the existence of a moral feeling independently of any external incitements, he maintains, that our moral senti-
ments

ments have uniformly a reference to what are, or ought to be, the feelings of others. If it were possible, he remarks, that a man could arrive at maturity without having any communication with his own species, he would be equally unable to form any judgment of his own conduct, as of the beauty or deformity of his countenance. He allows, however, that there is a tribunal in our own minds, which judges of all our thoughts and actions, and frequently depresses us amidst the applauses, and supports us when labouring under the censures, of our species. When young and unexperienced, we are apt to indulge the impossible project of obtaining the approbation and even the affection of every person with whom we have any intercourse. But we soon discover the impossibility of attaining this desirable end. Our conduct, though perfectly equitable, not unfrequently stands in opposition to the interests or inclinations of particular men, who are seldom so candid as to acknowledge the propriety of our motives, or to perceive that this conduct, however disagreeable to them, is perfectly consonant

consonant to our present situation. To defend ourselves against such partial judgments, we erect a judge in our own breasts, whose office it is to decide every question that occurs between ourselves and those with whom we associate in the affairs of life. To accomplish this salutary end, we conceive an imaginary, but impartial spectator to be always present, and to witness all our actions ; of course, we endeavour to act in a manner which we think will receive the approbation of this supposed judge of our thoughts and of our conduct.

Two motives induce us to self-examination. 1st, Before we resolve to act ; and, 2d, After we have acted. When about to act, the force and precipitancy of the prevailing passion does not allow us to consider what men of candour are to think of our conduct. After the action is performed, and the passions which stimulated us to perform it have subsided, though we sympathize with the sentiments of the spectator much more coolly than before ; it is, however, so irksome to disapprove of ourselves, that we turn aside
such

such circumstances as might render our judgment unfavourable.—From this source is derived that self-deceit which gives rise to many mischiefs and calamities in this astonishing world. To guard against the delusions of self-conceit, nature leads us, from daily observations on the conduct of others, to form general rules regarding what actions are proper to be performed or avoided. Some actions shock all our natural sentiments. When we see other people affected in a similar manner, our belief in the justness of our disapprobation is confirmed. Hence we conclude, as a general rule, that certain actions are improper, because they have a direct tendency to make us odious and contemptible. By reflection, however, we endeavour to fix this rule in our minds, with a view to correct the misrepresentations of self-love. Men who indulge the feelings of anger and resentment, if they were to obey the dictates of their passions, would consider the destruction of their supposed enemies as a small compensation for a trivial injury. But their remarks on the conduct of others have shewn them how unreasonable

reasonable and horrid is such sanguinary revenge. Ideas and experiences of this kind establish their authority, check the impetuosity of passion, and correct the motives suggested by self-love. According to Mr Smith, a regard to such general laws of morality constitutes what is denominated the *sense of duty*.

The whole of Mr Smith's doctrine is comprehended in the few following sentences: "When we approve of any character or action, the sentiments which we feel are derived from four different sources. *First*, We sympathize with the motives of the agent. *Secondly*, We enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions. *Thirdly*, We observe that his conduct has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two sympathies generally act. And, *lastly*, When we consider such actions as making a part of a system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or of society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which we ascribe

ascribe to any well-contrived machine." These different sentiments, in Mr Smith's estimation, completely exhaust the compounded system of moral approbation. With regard to the nature of virtue, he thinks it always involves the idea of propriety, or of the suitableness of the affection to the object by which it is excited, which suitableness can only be determined by the sympathy of impartial spectators with the motives of the agent. This account of virtue, however, he acknowledges to be somewhat incomplete: Beside propriety, actions of beneficence possess another quality; for they not only obtain our approbation, but seem to merit recompense, and to create a superior degree of esteem, occasioned by a double sympathy, viz. with the motives of the agent, and with the gratitude of those who are the objects of affection. According to this view, beneficence appears to Mr Smith to be distinguished from the cooler virtues of prudence, circumspection, temperance, vigilance, constancy, and firmness, which always obtain our approbation, but excite no ideas of superior merit.

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I have now given a short account of Mr Smith's *Theory of Moral Sentiments*; which is universally allowed to be a work of singular invention and ingenuity. Though this theory may not receive the approbation of every moral speculatist, the author has the undoubted merit of calling the attention of philosophers to a view of human nature which, till this publication appeared, had almost entirely escaped their observation. Of the sound reasoning exhibited in this theory, its perspicuousness and plausibility afford sufficient evidence; for, as remarked by the author himself, no system of morals can obtain a general assent unless it makes near approaches to truth. But the merit of Mr Smith's performance is not limited to so narrow a compass. No work, perhaps, whether ancient or modern, exhibits so complete and so perspicuous a picture of those facts which regard our moral perceptions, and which it is one great object of this science to refer to general laws. The theoretical doctrines of the work are always interspersed with the most ele-

vated and correct maxims regarding the practical conduct of human life.

To the second edition of his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Mr Smith subjoined a short, but ingenious tract, to which he gives the title of *Considerations concerning the first Formation of Languages, and the different Genius of original and compounded Languages.*

In this tract, Mr Smith naturally supposes, that the denomination of particular objects, or what are termed *substantive nouns*, was one of the first attempts towards the formation of language. A few savages, who had never had any intercourse with other men, would soon begin to form a language, or to utter sounds denoting particular objects. Those objects only with which they were most immediately connected would have particular names assigned to them. The cave which sheltered them from the weather, the tree the fruit of which allayed their hunger, the fountain whose water extinguished their thirst, would
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be denominated by the words *cave*, *tree*, *fountain*, or by other synonymous appellations. These savages, after greater experience had led them to observe other caves, trees, and fountains, would naturally call them by the same names by which they had been accustomed to express the similar objects with which they were first acquainted. The new objects had no peculiar names, but each of them resembled exactly the other objects which had received appellations. Those savages could never behold the new objects without recollecting the appearances of the old ones, as well as their names. Hence, when they wished to point out any of the new ones, they would naturally express the name of the correspondent old one, the idea of which must have presented itself in the most lively colours. In this manner words, which were originally the proper names of individual substances, would each of them become gradually the common name of a multitude. When children are just beginning to speak, they call every person who comes into the house their *papa* or *mama*; and, of course, apply
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to the whole species those appellations which they had been taught to appropriate to two individuals only. "I have known a clown," says Mr Smith, "who did not know the proper name of the river which ran by his own door. It was *the river*, he said, and he never heard any other name for it. His experience, it seems, had not led him to observe any other river." The general word *river*, it would appear, was, in his acceptation, a proper name, denoting an individual object only. Mr Smith gives a number of similar examples, which, in this summary view, it is unnecessary to repeat.

Mr Smith farther remarks, that this application of the name of an individual object to a multitude, the resemblances of which recall the idea of that individual, as well as of its name, has given rise to the formation of those classes which have long been distinguished by the appellation of *genera* and *species*. According to Mr Smith, "What constitutes a species is merely a number of objects, bearing a certain degree of resemblance to one another; and, on
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that account, denominated by a single appellation, which may be applied to express any one of them."

When many visible objects had been in this manner arranged under proper genera and species, and distinguished by such general names, the greater part of that almost infinite number of individuals comprehended under each genus could not possibly have peculiar names appropriated to every individual. Hence, whenever particular objects were to be pointed out, it was necessary to distinguish them from the other objects comprehended under the same general name, either by its peculiar qualities, or by the peculiar relation in which it stood to other things. From these circumstances necessarily arose two classes of words, the one expressing *quality* and the other *relation*. Adjective nouns are words which denote qualities, or are, to use the language of the antient schoolmen, in concrete with some particular subject. Thus the word *green* expresses a certain quality in the object to which it is referred. Appellations
of

of this kind distinguish particular objects from others comprehended under the same generic word. For example, the words *green tree* distinguish a particular tree from others that are blasted or withered.

In the same manner, *prepositions* are words which express *relation* in concrete with a co-relative object. Thus the prepositions *of, to, for, with, by, above, below, &c.* denote a certain relation which subsists between the objects expressed by the words between which any preposition is placed. Words of this kind distinguish particular objects from others belonging to the same species, when these objects cannot, with equal propriety, be characterised by any qualities peculiar to them. For example, when we say, *the green tree of the meadow*, we single out a particular tree, not by the quality only which belongs to it, but likewise by the relation in which it stands to another object. As neither relation nor quality can have any existence in abstract, or as separated from the substances they qualify, or to which they have a relation,
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we must suppose that the words by which they are denoted, when considered in concrete, were more early invented than those which express them in abstract, a form in which we never could see them. The words *green* and *blue* would be sooner invented than those of *greeness* and *blueness*, and the words *above* and *below* than those of *superiority* and *inferiority*. The invention of words of this latter kind requires a greater effort of abstraction than to invent those of the former: Hence, it is probable that such abstract terms would be of much later institution. Their etymologies, accordingly, show that, in general, they are so; for most of them are derived from those which are concrete.

Though the invention, however, of adjective nouns be more natural and easy than that of the abstract nouns substantive derived from them, it would, notwithstanding, require a considerable degree of abstraction and generalization. Those men who invented the words *green*, *blue*, *red*, and the other names of colours, must have
compared

compared a great number of objects, marked their resemblances and dissimilitudes with regard to the quality of colour, and arranged them into different classes and kinds, according to those resemblances and dissimilitudes. Adjectives are general, and, in some measure, abstract words, and presuppose the ideas of a particular species or arrangement of objects, to each of which it may with propriety be equally applied. The word *green* could not have been the original appellation of an individual, and afterwards become the name of a species. *Green* does not denote the name of a particular substance; but a quality peculiar to a substance. This appellation must, therefore, have been a general denomination equally applicable to any substance possessed of the same quality. He who first distinguished an object by the epithet *green*, must have remarked other objects which were not *green*, and accordingly separated them by this appellation. Hence the institution of this name supposes comparison, and likewise a degree of abstraction. The person who invented the adjective *green* must

must have distinguished the quality from the object to which it adhered : The mental operations of classing, of comparison, and of abstraction, must have been used, even before the names of colours, which are the least metaphysical of all nouns adjective. From this reasoning, Mr Smith infers, that, when languages were beginning to be formed, adjective nouns would not be the words of the most early invention.

We have another mode of expressing the qualities of different substances. It requires neither abstraction, nor any conceived separation of the quality from the subject, and it seems to be more natural than the invention of nouns adjective, and which could hardly fail, in the first formation of language, to be thought of before them. This mode or expedient was the making some variations upon the nouns substantive themselves, according to the different qualities with which they are endowed. Thus, for example, in many languages, the qualities of sexes and of the total want of sex, are expressed by different terminations in the

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nouns substantive ; as, in Latin, *lupus*, *lupa* ; *equus*, *equa* ; *juvencus*, *juvenca* ; &c. denote the qualities of males and females to which those animals belong, without the necessity of employing any adjectives. But the words *forum*, *pratum*, *plaustrum*, by their peculiar terminations, denote the total absence of sex in the substances to which they are applied. In all the antient languages, by means of the masculine, feminine, and neuter genders, the most important of all distinctions, that of substances into animated and inanimated, and that of animals into males and females, have been sufficiently characterised without the assistance of adjectives.

Nouns substantive could not possibly, however, without losing entirely their original form, admit of so many variations as were sufficient to express that immense variety of qualities, by which, upon different occasions, it might be necessary to distinguish them. Hence, though the different formation of nouns substantive might, for some time, anticipate the necessity of inventing

venting nouns adjective ; yet this necessity could never be totally forestalled. When nouns adjective were invented, it was natural to form them with some similitude to the substantives to which they were to serve as qualifications or epithets. Men would be led to give the same terminations with the substances to which they were first applied, and, from that love of similar sounds, which is the origin of analogy in all languages, they would be led to vary the termination of the same adjective, according as they applied it to a masculine, to a feminine, or to a neutral substantive. Hence, they would say, *magnus lupus*, *magna lupa*, *magnum pratum*, when they meant to denote a great *he-wolf*, a great *she-wolf*, a great *meadow*. These variations in the terminations of adjective nouns, corresponding to the genders of substantives, which take place in all antient languages, seem to have been introduced chiefly for the sake of a certain similitude of sound, or of rhyme, which is always agreeable to the human ear. Gender cannot properly belong to an adjective noun, the signification of which

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is uniformly the same, to whatever substantives it may be applied. When we say, *a great man*, *a great woman*, the epithet *great* has exactly the same meaning in both instances, and the difference of sex in the substantives to which we apply it makes not the smallest difference in its signification. In the same manner, *magnus*, *magna*, *magnum*, are words which express the very same quality, and the change of termination is accompanied with no variation in the meaning. Gender and sex are qualities which belong to substances alone. No quality, when considered in concrete, can possibly be the subject of any other quality. Hence, no adjective can qualify another adjective. *A great good man*, implies a man who is both *great* and *good*. In this instance, both adjectives qualify the substantive, but they do not qualify each other. On the other hand, when we say, the *great goodness* of a man, the appellation *goodness* denotes a quality considered in abstract, which may itself be the subject of other qualities, and is, therefore, capable of being qualified by the word *great*.

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If the invention of adjective nouns was so difficult, that of *prepositions* would be still more difficult. Every preposition, as formerly remarked, denotes some relation in concrete with a related object. For example, the preposition *above* points out the relation of superiority, not in abstract, but in concrete with some co-relative object. In the phrase, *the tree above the cave*, the word *above* expresses a certain relation between the *tree* and the *cave*, and it marks this relation in concrete with the co-relative object, *the cave*. In order to complete the sense, a preposition requires some other word to come after it. Hence the invention of such words would require a still greater effort of abstraction and generalization than that of adjective nouns. 1. A relation is a more metaphysical object than a quality. Qualities are generally objects of our external senses; but relations never are. Hence, the one class of objects are much more easily comprehended than the other. 2. Prepositions denote relations only. Before men, however, could invent words which signified relations simply, they must have

have been able, in some degree, to have contemplated this relation abstractedly from the objects related ; for the idea of those objects does not, in any manner, enter into the meaning of the prepositions. To invent words of this kind, therefore, required a great degree of abstraction. 3. A preposition is a general word, which may be applied to denote any similar relations. He who invented the word *above*, must not only have perceived the relation of *superiority*, among different objects, but distinguished this relation from many others, such as, from the relation of *inferiority*, expressed by the word *below*, from that of *juxta-position*, denoted by the word *beside*, &c. Hence, whatever difficulties attended the invention of nouns adjective, many more must have embarrassed that of prepositions. In the first formation of languages, therefore, if man, for some time, did not perceive the necessity of adjective nouns, by varying the terminations of the names of substances, they would much more find themselves disposed to evade, by some similar contrivance, the still more difficult

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cult invention of prepositions. In the antient languages, the different cases of nouns were precisely the same species of contrivance. In Greek and Latin, the genitive and dative cases supply the place of prepositions. For example, *fructus arboris*, the fruit of a tree; *sacer Herculi*, sacred to Hercules. Here the variations made in the co-relative words, *arbōr* and *Hercules*, express the same relations which, in English, are denoted by the prepositions *of* and *to*.

The number of cases varies in different languages. In the Greek there are five, and, in the Latin, six. It is not unworthy of remark, that those prepositions, which, in modern languages, supply the place of the antient cases of nouns, are, of all others, the most general and abstract, and, of course, would be the last invented. The prepositions *above*, *below*, and similar ones, denote none of those relations which, in the antient languages, were expressed by cases. But the preposition *of*, denotes the same relation, which, in these languages, is expressed by the genitive case. *Of* denotes relation

tion in general. It marks, that the noun substantive, which goes before it, is related to that which comes after it, without ascertaining, as is done by the preposition *above*, the peculiar nature of that relation. Hence, we often apply it to express opposite relations; because the most opposite relations agree so far that each of them comprehends in it the general idea or nature of a relation. We can say, for example, *the father of the son*, or *the son of the father*; *the fir-trees of the forest*, or *the forest of the fir-trees*. Here it is evident, that the relation in which the father stands to the son, is directly opposite to that in which the son stands to the father; and that in which the parts stand to the whole, is likewise opposite to that in which the whole stands to the parts. However, the word *of* denotes all those relations, because it denotes not, in itself, any particular relation, but relation in general only.

After his ingenious remarks on the preposition *of*, Mr Smith proceeds, and endeavours to show, that what he had said concerning that preposition was, in some measure,

ture, equally applicable to the prepositions *to, for, with, by*, and to every other preposition employed, in modern languages, to supply the place of the antient cases, or flexions of nouns; though none of these latter is so abstract and general as *of*. The prepositions *above, below, near, within, without, against, &c.* are much more rarely used, in modern languages, than the prepositions *of, to, for, with, from, by*. A preposition of the former kind will not twice occur in the same page; but we can hardly compose a single sentence without employing one or two of the latter.

Even in the earliest stages of society, men must have had frequent occasion of mentioning multitudes as well as single objects; it was, therefore, necessary that they should have some mode of conveying the idea of number to each other. Number may be expressed either by single words which intimate numbers in general, as *many, more, &c.* or by a variation upon the words which express the objects numbered. In the first formation of languages, mankind,

it is probable, would have recourse to this last expedient. They would naturally make a distinction when they talked of a single, and when they intimated a multitude of objects, not by metaphysical adjectives, such as the English *a, an, many*, but by a change on the termination of the word which denoted the objects numbered. From this source, in all the antient languages, originated the singular and plural numbers; and the same distinction is likewise observed in most modern languages. All primitive and unmixed languages seem to have a dual, as well as a plural number, as the Greek, the Hebrew, the Gothic, and many others. In the rude commencement of society, *one, two, and more*, would, perhaps, for some time, be all the numeral distinctions which mankind had occasion to use. They would perceive that it was more natural, as well as more easy, to express these by certain variations upon the nouns substantive, than by such abstract and general terms, as *one, two, three, four, &c.* These and similar words, which subsist in all languages with which we are acquainted, though custom
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has rendered them familiar, exprefs, perhaps, the most fubtile abstractions which the human mind is capable of forming. For example, let any man confider what is meant by the word *three*, which fignifies neither three men, nor three horfes, nor three fhillings, nor three pence, but *three* in general, a term equally applicable to any object, or being, which admits of number.

As the fame relations which fubfift between fingle, may likewise fubfift between numerous objects, it is evident, that a neceffity would be perceived for employing the fame number of cafes both in the dual and plural, as in the fingular numbers. From this fource arofe, in the antient languages, the intricacy and complexnefs of the declenfions. In the Greek language, there are five cafes in each of the three numbers. The nouns adjective varied in their terminations according to the gender of the fubftantives to which they were applied, as well as to the cafe and number. Hence, in the Greek, every noun adjective, having three genders, and three numbers,
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and five cases in each number, may be considered as having five and forty variations. The first framers of language seem to have varied the termination of the adjective, according to the number and case of the substantive, for the same reason which induced them to vary it according to the gender, namely, the love of analogy, and of a regularity of sound. Notwithstanding adjectives vary their terminations, according to cases, numbers, and genders, yet their meaning is always the same.—*Magnus vir, magni viri, magnorum virorum*; a great man, of a great man, of great men. In these and similar expressions, the words *magnus, magni, magnorum*, and likewise the English word *great*, have precisely the same import, though the substances to which they may be applied are as numerous as the objects which nature presents to our contemplation.

If the *declensions* of antient languages are complex, much more so are the *conjugations* of their *verbs*. The complexity of the former originates from the same principle with that of the latter, *viz.* the difficulty
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of inventing, in the first formation of languages, general and abstract terms. *Verbs*, it is evident, must have been coeval with the first attempts towards the formation of any language. No affirmation can be made, either approving or condemning, &c. without the assistance of some verb. Impersonal verbs, which express a complete event or fact by a single word, would probably be the first invented species of verbs. *Pluit*, it rains; *ningit*, it snows; *tonat*, it thunders; *turbatur*, there is a confusion, &c. each of them expresses a complete affirmation, the whole of an event, with that simplicity and unity with which our minds conceive it in nature. The phrases, on the contrary, *Alexander ambulat*, *Alexander walks*; *Petrus sedet*, *Peter sits*, divide, in some measure, the event into two parts, the person or subject, and the attribute or matter of fact affirmed concerning that subject. In nature, however, the idea of Alexander walking, is as perfectly one simple conception as that of Alexander not walking. Hence, the division of this event into two parts is purely artificial, and an effect of the imperfection of
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of language, which, on this as well as many other occasions, supplies, by several words, the want of one, which might express the whole matter of fact that was intended to be affirmed. There is obviously much more simplicity in the natural expression, *pluit*, than in the artificial ones, *imber decedit, the rain falls ; or, tempestas est pluvia, the weather is rainy*. In the two last examples, the simple event is split, the first into two, and the second into three parts. In both, the event is denoted by a grammatical circumlocution, and the signification is derived from a metaphysical analysis of the component parts of the idea expressed by the word *pluit*. Hence, the first verbs, and, perhaps, even the first words, employed in the formation of every original language, would probably be impersonal verbs. In the Hebrew language, the radical words, from which the others derive their origin, are all impersonal verbs.

It is not difficult to conceive how, in the natural progress of language, such impersonal verbs should be converted into personal.

sonal. The word *venit*, *it comes*, for instance, was originally an impersonal verb. It then did not, as at present, denote the coming of something in general, but the coming of a particular object, as *the Lion*. The first savage inventors of a language may be supposed, when they saw this ferocious animal approaching, to have called out to each other, *venit*, that is, *the lion comes*. Hence, this word, at that period, expressed a complete event, without the aid of any other. When these savages had afterwards begun to assign names to particular substances, if they observed the approach of any other terrible object, they would naturally join the name of that object to the word *venit*, and cry out, *venit ursus*, *venit lupus*. In process of time, *venit* would come to signify the approach of any terrible object whatever. Having become more general in its signification, it could no longer represent any particular event without the assistance of a noun substantive, to determine its precise meaning. In this state of things, it had already become a personal, instead of an impersonal, verb. In the farther progress
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of society, we may easily conceive how this verb might grow still more general in its signification, and come to denote, as at present, the approach of any object whatever, without regard to the qualities of good, bad, or indifferent.

In a similar manner, it is probable, that most verbs have become personal, and that men have, by slow degrees, learned to split almost every event into a great number of metaphysical divisions, which are expressed by the different parts of speech, variously combined in the members of every phrase and sentence. The same kind of progress seems to have taken place in the art of speaking as in that of writing. When men first attempted to express their ideas by writing, every character, or rather picture, represented an entire word, and, in some cases, a whole sentiment. The number of words, however, being immense, the memory became quite overloaded with the multitude of characters which it found necessary to be retained. Hence necessity obliged them to divide words into their elements, and to invent

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vent characters which should represent, not the words themselves, but the elements of which they were composed. It was a consequence of this invention, that every word came to be delineated, not by a single character, but by a number ; and the expression of it in writing became more intricate and complex than by the former method. Though particular words, however, were, in this manner, represented by a greater number of characters, the whole language was delineated by a much smaller ; for it was discovered, that about twenty-four letters were sufficient to supply the place of that immense multitude of characters which were formerly requisite.

As the event, or matter of fact, expressed by a verb, may be affirmed either of the person who speaks, or of the person who is spoken to, as well as of some third person or object, it was necessary to invent a method of expressing these two relations of the event. This is commonly done, in the English language, by affixing personal pronouns to the general word which de-

notes the event affirmed: *I came, you came, he or it came.* In these phrases, the event of having come is, in the first, affirmed of the speaker; in the second, of the person spoken to; in the third, of some other person, or object. It is probable, that the first formers of language might have proceeded in a similar manner, and, by prefixing the two first personal pronouns to the same termination of the verb which denoted the third person singular, might have said, *ego venit, tu venit*, as well as *ille* or *illud venit*. And they certainly would have done so, if, when they first found it necessary to express relations of the verb, their language had such words as *ego* and *tu*. It is extremely improbable, however, that, in this language, any such words should exist. Both of them, though rendered familiar by habit, express ideas of an extremely metaphysical and abstract nature. *I*, for example, is a word of a very peculiar kind. Whatever being is endowed with the faculty of speech may denote itself by this personal pronoun. Hence *I* is a general word, and capable of being predicated of an immense

menſe variety of objects. It differs, however, from all other general words ; for the objects of which it may be predicated do not form any particular or diſtinct ſpecies of objects. Like the word *man*, *I* does not denote a peculiar claſs of objects ſeparated from all others. It is ſo far from being the name of a ſpecies, that, whenever the word is employed, it uniformly denotes a diſtinct individual, the particular perſon who then ſpeaks.

Perſonal pronouns, it is well known, are among the laſt words which children learn to uſe. Speaking of itſelf, a child ſays, *Billy walks*, *Billy ſits*, inſtead of *I walk*, *I ſit*. Hence, in the beginning of language, mankind ſeem to have neglected the invention of the more abſtract prepoſitions, and to have expreſſed the ſame relations by varying the terminations of the co-relative terms. They would likewise naturally attempt to evade the neceſſity of thoſe more abſtract pronouns by varying the terminations of their verbs, according as the events which they expreſſed were intended to be affirmed

affirmed of the first, second, or third person. Accordingly this seems to have been the universal practice in all the antient languages. In Latin, *veni, venisti, venit*, denote, without any addition, the different events expressed by the English phrases, *I came, you came, he, or it came*. For the same reason, the termination of the verb would be varied, according as the event was intended to be affirmed of the first, second, or third persons plural; and what is expressed by the English phrases, *we came, ye came, they came*, would be denoted by the Latin words, *venimus, venistis, venerunt*. Those primitive languages, too, which, on account of the difficulty of inventing numeral names, had introduced a dual, as well as a plural number, into the declension of their substantive nouns, would, it is probable, observe the same practice in the conjugations of their verbs. Thus, in all those original languages, it was to be expected, that we might find six, if not eight or nine, variations in the termination of every verb, according as the event which it denoted was intended to be affirmed of the first, second, or

or third persons singular, dual, or plural. Again, those variations being repeated, along with others, through all its different tenses, moods, and voices, must, of course, have rendered their conjugations still more intricate and complex than their declensions.

In this simple state, the language of any country would probably have always remained, had it not been rendered more complex by the intermixture of other languages, occasioned by the accidental commixture of different nations by means of war, emigration, and other circumstances. But when two nations, from whatever causes, were mixed with one another, the state of language in each would soon undergo considerable alterations. In order to make themselves intelligible to those with whom they were obliged to converse, each of the two blended nations would be under the necessity of learning the language of the other. Hence individuals, in learning the new language, not by studying its first principles, but from what they heard in conversation, would be extremely perplexed by the intricacy

intricacy of its declensions and conjugations. They would, therefore, endeavour to supply their ignorance of these by every means which the language afforded them. They would naturally supply their ignorance of the declensions by employing prepositions. A Lombard, when attempting to speak Latin, and wishing to express that such a man was a citizen *of*, or a benefactor *to*, Rome, if he was unacquainted with the genitive and dative cases of the word *Roma*, would naturally supply that defect by prefixing the prepositions *ad* and *de* to the nominative. Hence, instead of *Romae*, he would say, *ad Roma* and *de Roma*. Accordingly, *al Roma* and *di Roma*, is the mode by which the modern Italians, who are the descendants of the antient Lombards and Romans, express this and similar relations. In this manner, prepositions seem to have been introduced in the room of the antient declensions. The same change has been produced in the Greek language since the conquest of Constantinople by the Turks. The words are nearly the same as formerly; but the grammar is entirely altered, by substituting

substituting prepositions in the place of the antient declensions. This change unquestionably simplifies the language, both with regard to rudiments and principle. Instead of a great variety of declensions, it substitutes one universal declension, which is the same in every word, whatever be its termination, gender, or number.

By a similar contrivance, men were enabled, in the circumstances above-mentioned, to obviate the intricacies of conjugations. In every language, there is a particular verb, called a *substantive verb*. In Latin, it is *sum*; in English, *I am*, &c. By this verb, not only the *existence* of any particular event, but *existence* in general, is denoted. It is, therefore, the most abstract of all verbs. When, however, it was invented, as it had all the tenses and moods of other verbs, by being joined with the passive, it was capable of supplying the whole passive voice, and of rendering this part of their conjugations as simple and uniform, as the use of prepositions had rendered their declensions. A Lombard, who wished to say, *I am loved*,
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but could not recollect the word *amor*, naturally supplied his ignorance, or want of memory, by saying *ego sum amatus*. *Io sono amato*, is the present Italian expression, which corresponds exactly with the above English phrase. Another verb is likewise common to all languages, and is distinguished by the appellation of *the possessive verb*. In Latin, it is *habeo*; in English, *I have*. When this verb, which is also very abstract and metaphysical, was invented, its application to the passive participle supplied a great part of the active voice, in the same manner as the substantive verb supplied the whole of the passive. A Lombard, when he wanted to say, *I had loved*, but could not recollect the word *amaveram*, would naturally supply its place by saying, *ego habebam amatum*, or, *ego habui amatum*; *Io aveva amato*, or, *Io ebbi amato*, are, at present, in the Italian language, correspondent expressions. Thus, by the intermixture of different nations, the conjugations, by the assistance of auxiliary verbs, made a near approach to the uniformity and simplicity of the declensions.

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The Greek is, in a great measure, a simple, unmixed language, and was constructed from the primitive jargon of the antient Hellenians and Pelasgians, from whom the Greek nation is said to have been descended. In the Greek language, all the words are derived from about three hundred primitives ; a certain evidence, that the Greeks formed their language almost entirely among themselves ; and that, - when they required the use of a new word, they did not, like the moderns, borrow it from other languages, but formed it by composition, or derivation from some other word, or words, in their own. Hence, the declensions and conjugations of the Greek are much more complex than those of any other European language. The Latin is compounded of the Greek and antient Tuscan languages. Its declensions and conjugations are, of course, much less complicated than those of the Greek. It never adopted the dual number. They have no optative mood, and one future only. They have no aorist distinct from the preterite-perfect ; they have no middle voice, and even many of their

tenses in the passive voice are assisted or produced, in the same manner as in modern languages, by joining the substantive verb to the passive participle. In the Latin, the number of infinitives and participles, in both voices, is much fewer than in the Greek.

Both the Italian and French languages are compounded, the former of the Latin and that of the antient Franks, the latter of the Latin and the language of the antient Lombards. Both the French and Italian languages, therefore, are more complex in their composition than the Latin, and they are, consequently, more simple in their declensions and conjugations. In their declensions, both of them have totally lost their cases. With regard to verbs, both of them have likewise lost the whole passive, as well as part of the active voices. The want of the passive voice is supplied by joining the substantive verb to the passive participle. They, in the same manner, make out part of the active voice, by the assistance of the participle passive and the possessive verb.

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The English is composed of the French and the antient Saxon languages. The French was transported to Britain by the Norman conquest, and continued, till the days of Edward III. to be the only language of the law, as well as the chief one of the court. The English, compounded as above, continues now to be the common language of the great bulk of the British nation.

In some parts of Wales, however, and in many parts of the North of Scotland, and of the Hebrides, the Celtic is still the general language of those districts. It appears to be somewhat singular, that Mr Smith, in his ingenious tract upon *the formation of languages*, should have taken no notice of the Celtic or Gaelic language, though the English, the Scots, the Irish, and many other languages of the continent of Europe, as well as that of Asia, are deeply tinged with the Celtic. I believe, he knew little or nothing of it; and, perhaps, for that reason, he declined entering upon a subject of which he had no proper knowledge. Still, however, he might, with the
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greatest ease, have had abundant information from many gentlemen of ability and learning, who had been born in these districts, and understood the language thoroughly. I mention this circumstance with regret; because, from the known ingenuity of Mr Smith, much information was to be expected: Nay, if he had turned his views a little that way, it might, perhaps, have given a very different cast to his elaborate treatise on languages.—But, to return to the analysis.

The English language is more complex in its composition than the Italian or the French; and, of course, its declensions and conjugations are more simple. The two latter languages retain partially, at least, the distinction of genders; and their adjectives vary in termination, when applied to a masculine or a feminine substantive. But, in the English language, no such distinction exists; for the termination of the adjectives admit of no variation, to whatever substances they are applied. Both the French and Italian languages have the remains of a conjugation;

jugation ; and those tenses of the active voice, which cannot be expressed by the junction of the possessive verb to the participle passive, as well as many of those which can, are marked by varying the termination of the principal verb. But, in the English, all those other tenses are supplied by other auxiliary verbs ; so that, in this language, there is hardly the vestige of a conjugation. All the varieties of termination, which most part of English verbs admit of, are, *I love, I loved, loving*. The modifications of meaning, which cannot be denoted by any of these three terminations, must be ascertained by auxiliary verbs. The defects of the French and Italian conjugations are supplied by two auxiliary verbs : But, it requires more than six to supply those of the English, which, beside the substantive and possessive verbs, employs *do, did ; will, would ; can, could ; may, might*. It is in this manner that language, in proportion as it grows more complex in its composition, becomes more simple in its rudiments and principles.

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By this simplification, however, languages are rendered more prolix, several words being now necessary to denote what formerly could have been expressed by a single word. Thus, *Dei and Deo*, in the Latin, sufficiently show, without any addition, the relation the object signified has to the objects expressed by the other words in the sentence. But, to express the same relation in English, and in other modern languages, recourse must be had to, at least, two words, as *of God, to God*. Hence, with regard to the modern languages, the declensions are more prolix than they are in the antient. In the conjugations, the difference is still greater. What a Roman expressed by a single word, as *amavissē*, an Englishman is obliged to employ four different words, *I should have loved*. This prolixness, it is obvious, must enervate the eloquence of all modern languages. By the simplification of the principles of languages, they are rendered less agreeable to the ear. In the Greek and Latin, the variety of termination in their declensions and conjugations bestows on them a sweetness and variety

riety of which modern languages are totally deprived. In sweetness, the Italian may, perhaps, be superior to the Latin, and nearly equal to the Greek ; but, in variety, it is much inferior to any of them. Besides, this modern simplification makes the sounds of our language not only more grating to the ear, but prevents us from disposing the sounds we possess in the manner that might be most agreeable. It fixes many words in a particular situation, which might often be placed in another with more beauty and harmony. Though the adjective and substantive, in the Greek and Latin, were separated from one another, still the correspondence of their terminations conspicuously indicated their mutual connection, and no confusion or ambiguity was occasioned. For example, in the first line of Virgil,

Tityre tu patulae recubans sub tegmine fagi ;

it is easily perceived that *tu* refers to *recubans*, and *patulae* to *fagi*, though the related words are separated by the intervention of several others ; because terminations
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of the cases, as well as of the genders, determine their mutual correspondence. If this line were literally translated into English, and the same arrangement of the words preserved, *Tityrus, thou of spreading reclining under the shade beech*, sense could be made of it by no human being; because there are no difference of termination to intimate to which substantive each adjective belongs. The same thing happens with regard to verbs. In Latin, without the smallest ambiguity, the verb may be often placed in any part of a sentence. But, in English, its position is almost always determined with precision. In almost every case, the verb must follow the subjective and precede the abjective member of the phrase. Thus, in Latin, whether we say, *Joannem verberavit Robertus*, or, *Robertus verberavit Joannem*, the meaning is the same, and the termination, in both cases, fixes *John* to be the sufferer. But, in English, *John beat Robert*, and *Robert beat John*, by no means convey the same meaning. Hence the position of the three principal members of the sentence,

sentence, in the English language, and, for the same reason, in the Italian and French, is almost always precisely determined. In the antient languages, on the contrary, a greater latitude is admitted, and the place of those members is often indifferent. In order to explain some parts of Milton's literal translation, recourse must be had to Horace himself;

Who now enjoys thee credulous all gold,
 Who always vacant, always amiable
 Hopes thee; of flattering gales
 Unmindful—

are verses which, by any rules of our language, it is impossible to interpret. No man, from the nature of the English language, could possibly discover, that, in the first line, *credulous* referred to *who*, and not to *thee*, or that, in the fourth line, *unmindful* referred to *who* in the second, and not to *thee* in the third; or, on the contrary, that, in the second line, *always vacant*, *always amiable*, referred to *thee* in the third, and not *who* in the same line with it. All

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this, however, is sufficiently plain in the Latin ;

Qui nunc te fruitur credulus aureâ,
Qui semper vacuum, semper amabilem
Sperat te ; nescius auræ fallacis ;

because, in Latin, the terminations point out the connections which subsist between the several adjectives and the substantives, which is impossible to be done in English. How much this power must have facilitated the composition, both in prose and verse, of the antients, is obvious.

Having said so much concerning the ingenious productions of this truly great man, I must limit myself to a very cursory view of his last work, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, a work which every where exhibits depth of thought, uncommon erudition, and a most acute discernment of human affairs.

This learned, ingenious, and most useful work, Mr Smith divides into five books.

In

In the first book, he treats of the causes of improvement in the productive powers of labour, and of the order according to which its produce is naturally distributed among the different ranks of the people. The second book treats of the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock. In book third, we have an Account of the different Progress of Opulence in different Nations. Book fourth gives a view of former systems of Political Economy. Book fifth treats of the Revenue of the Sovereign or Commonwealth.

It is almost unnecessary to mention, that each of these books are subdivided into a number of connected chapters, suitable to the different branches of the general subject.

In the third volume of the Edinburgh Philosophical Transactions *, the ingenious Mr Dugald Stewart, Professor of Morals in the University of Edinburgh, has given a pretty full and accurate account of Mr Smith's

* Phil. Trans. Edin., vol. III. p. 115.

Smith's life and writings. In this biographical account, I am much indebted to Mr Stewart both for many facts, and likewise for several pertinent observations. Mr Stewart properly remarks, that the great principle of Mr Smith's work is, to shew the provision made by nature in the principles of the human mind, and in the situation in which men are placed, for a progressive augmentation of the means of national wealth; and to point out the best method of advancing any collective body of people to greatness, by allowing every man to pursue his legal interest, and to bring both his interest and capital into a free competition with those with whom he transacts. Every system of policy, it is evident, which tends to extraordinary encouragements, to draw to a particular kind of industry a greater proportion of the society's capital than would naturally happen, or, by extraordinary restraints, to draw from any species of industry a part of the capital which would otherwise be employed in it, subverts the very purposes it was intended to promote.

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The causes and circumstances which, in modern times, have contributed, in some measure, to derange and even counteract this order of nature, particularly, the great encouragement given to industry in populous towns, and the comparative neglect of a similar encouragement in the country, Mr Smith has diligently investigated, and in a manner so ingenious and masterly as throws much light on the history of that state of society which, at present, exists in this quarter of the globe. On this subject, he shows, with his usual accuracy and acute discernment, that these circumstances were originally natural results of the peculiar situation of mankind in particular situations of society, and that they arose, not from any general views of political foresight, but from the private interests and prejudices of particular orders of men. The state of society, however, which originated from a combination of accidental circumstances, has been prolonged beyond its natural period, by an erroneous, or rather false, system of political economy, adopted and propagated by merchants and manufacturers ; a class of men whose

whose interest is often repugnant to that of the public, and whose professional knowledge gives them many advantages in supporting those opinions which they wish to be encouraged. This system gave rise to fresh obstacles to the progress of national prosperity. Those which originated from the disorders of the feudal ages, had a direct tendency to introduce confusion into the internal arrangements of society, by obstructing the circulation of labour and of stock from one employment to another, and from place to place. The false system of political economy which has hitherto prevailed, whose professed object has been to regulate the commercial intercourse of nations, has produced its effect in a less direct and obvious manner, but which is equally prejudicial to those states by whom it has been adopted.

This system, as it arose chiefly from the interested motives of speculative merchants, Mr Smith denominates *the Commercial or Mercantile System*. The two principal ingredients which constitute this system, which
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has for its object the enriching of a nation, namely, restraints upon importation, and encouragements to exportation, he discusses with great penetration and knowledge. He remarks, that part of these expedients has been derived from a spirit of monopoly, and part from that of jealousy of those nations with whom the balance of trade was thought to be disadvantageous. From his reasonings, all of them appear to have a direct tendency to injure the prosperity of the nation by whom they are imposed. In his remarks upon the jealousy of commerce, he assumes a tone of indignation which is seldom employed in other parts of his works.

“ In this manner,” says he, “ the sneaking arts of underling tradesmen are erected into political maxims for the conduct of a great empire. By such maxims as these, nations have been taught that their interest consisted in beggaring all their neighbours. Each nation has been taught to look with an invidious eye upon the prosperity of all the nations with which it trades, and to consider their gain as its own loss. Commerce,

merce, which ought naturally to be among nations as among individuals, a bond of union and friendship, has become the most fertile source of discord and animosity. The capricious ambition of Kings and Ministers has not, during the present and the preceding century, been more fatal to the repose of Europe, than the impertinent jealousy of merchants and manufacturers. The violence and injustice of the rulers of mankind is an antient evil, for which, perhaps, the nature of human affairs can scarce admit of a remedy. But the mean rapacity, the monopolizing spirit of merchants and manufacturers, who neither are nor ought to be the rulers of mankind, though it cannot, perhaps, be corrected, may very easily be prevented from disturbing the tranquillity of any body but themselves."

These and similar principles of liberality, Mr Smith tells us, ought to direct the commercial policy of nations. How this theory should be introduced into practice, and applied to particular cases, Mr Smith has not attempted to determine. That he was
aware

aware of the dangers to be apprehended from a rash application of political theories is evident not only from the general spirit of his writings, but from some incidental observations which he has made on the subject.

“ So unfortunate,” says he, “ are the effects of all the regulations of the mercantile system, that they not only introduce very dangerous disorders into the state of the body politic, but disorders which it is often difficult to remedy, without occasioning, for a time at least, still greater disorders.—In what manner, therefore, the natural system of perfect liberty and justice ought gradually to be restored, we must leave to the wisdom of future statesmen and legislators to determine.” In the last edition of his *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, he has given us some observations which refer to the same important purpose. “ The man,” he remarks, “ whose public spirit is prompted altogether by humanity and benevolence, will respect the established powers and privileges even of individuals, and

still more of the great orders and societies into which the state is divided. Though he should consider some of them as, in some measure, abusive, he will content himself with moderating what he often cannot annihilate without great violence. When he cannot conquer the rooted prejudices of the people by reason and persuasion, he will not attempt to subdue them by force ; but will religiously observe what, by Cicero, is justly called the divine maxim of Plato, never to use violence to his country no more than to his parents. He will accommodate, as well as he can, his public arrangements to the confirmed habits and prejudices of the people ; and will remedy, as well as he can, the inconveniencies which may flow from the want of those regulations which the people are averse to submit to. When he cannot establish the right, he will not disdain to meliorate the wrong ; but, like Solon, when he cannot establish the best system of laws, he will endeavour to establish the best that the people can bear."

With

With regard to the practical application of general principles, those cautions, from the author of *the Wealth of Nations*, were peculiarly necessary ; as the chief object of his work, an unlimited freedom of trade, by fostering the indolence of statesmen, is apt to suggest to those who are in possession of absolute power, the notion of putting it in execution.

As most men of genius, especially those whose profession obliges them to deliver annually public lectures to numerous and successive races of students, are liable to have their best and most original thoughts and theories stolen and adopted as the property of others, Mr Smith, of course, had great reason to complain of this literary pilfering. Of this practice he complains with some warmth in a MS. which was lately, and perhaps now is, in the possession of Mr Dugald Stewart, Professor of Morals in the University of Edinburgh. In this paper, which was written in the year 1755, many of the most important facts and reasonings,

sonings, now published in Mr Smith's *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, are to be found. "Man," he remarks in that paper, "is generally considered by statesmen and projectors as the materials of a sort of political mechanics. Projectors disturb Nature in the course of her operations in human affairs; and it requires no more than to let her alone, and give her fair play in the pursuit of her ends, that she may establish her own designs." In another place of the same paper he remarks, "Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but *peace, easy taxes*, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things. All governments which thwart this natural course, which force things into another channel, or which endeavour to arrest the progress of society at a particular point, are unnatural, and, to support themselves, are obliged to be oppressive and tyrannical.—A great part of
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the opinions he observes, "enumerated in this paper is treated of at length in some lectures which I have still by me, and which were written in the hand of a clerk who left my service six years ago. They have all of them been the constant subjects of my lectures since I first taught Mr Craigie's class, the first winter I spent in Glasgow, down to this day, without any considerable variation. They had all of them been the subjects of lectures which I read at Edinburgh the winter before I left it; and I can adduce innumerable witnesses, both from that place and from this, who will ascertain them sufficiently to be mine."

Mr Stewart very properly remarks, that the merit of Mr Smith's work is not to be estimated solely by the novelty of its principles, but by the reasonings employed in support of them. The advantages to be derived from a free commerce have been cursorily mentioned by several authors previous to Mr Smith's publication. But none of them have had the credit, in such a complicated

plicated and difficult subject, to trace the principles of political economy to their ultimate consequences. The ingenuity and extent of thought exhibited in his work can be discerned by those only who have compared it with the productions of former authors who have written on similar subjects. His labour in methodising their disjointed ideas is not, perhaps, less valuable than the results of his own speculations. He uniformly expresses his sentiments with a manly and dignified freedom, and never deigns to indulge any of these little passions which the factions of the times in which he wrote might have naturally excited.

Two years after the publication of his *Wealth of Nations*, Mr Smith, by the influence of his friend the Duke of Buccleuch, was appointed one of the Commissioners of his Majesty's Customs in Scotland. These two years he passed at London, in a society too extensive to allow him an opportunity of much study. His time, however, was not entirely lost; for it was spent in the society of some of the first literati in England,

England. Of these, a beautiful and most respectable specimen is given by Dr Barnard, in some verses addressed to Sir Joshua Reynolds and his friends.

If I have thoughts, and can't express 'em,

Gibbon shall teach me how to dress 'em

In words select and terse :

Jones teach me modesty and Greek,

Smith how to think, Burke how to speak,

And Beauclerc to converse *.

Mr Smith, in consequence of his appointment to the Board of Customs, came to Edinburgh, where he spent the last twelve years of his life. Here he enjoyed an affluence more than equal to his wants, beside the prospect of passing the remainder of his days among the companions of his youth. His mother, though now very old, still possessed a considerable portion of health, accompanied him to town ; and his cousin, Miss Jane Douglas, a most prudent, affectionate, and attentive female, relieved him of a charge for which he was very ill qualified,

* Annual Register, 1776.

qualified, by superintending his domestic affairs.

The emoluments of his office enabled him to gratify, in a considerable degree, the natural generosity of his disposition ; and, at his death, the state of his funds confirmed what his friends had often supposed, that a great proportion of his annual savings was bestowed in private charities. The necessary change of his situation when he was obliged to reside in Edinburgh, was not favourable to his literary pursuits. His official duties, though by no means oppressive, were sufficient to exhaust his spirits, and to dissipate any uncommon keenness of thinking. During the first years of his residence in this city, his studies were very much interrupted. He read occasionally, but with no other view than to amuse himself in his leisure hours. His mother died in the year 1784 ; and her death, joined to that of Miss Douglas in 1788, contributed to suspend, and even to frustrate, all his literary projects. These ladies had been, during more than sixty years, the objects of his affection ;

tion ; and, from his infancy, he enjoyed in their society, all the endearments of a family which he ever experienced. By this misfortune Mr Smith was left alone, and, like all philosophers in similar circumstances, almost entirely helpless. Though he bore his great loss with fortitude, and, with regard to his general behaviour, seemed to have resumed his former cheerfulness ; yet his health and vigour gradually declined till the period of his death, which happened in July 1790. His last illness chiefly arose from an obstinate obstruction in his bowels, which was both tedious and painful. But his mind was perfectly resigned ; and he enjoyed every consolation from the tender sympathy of his friends.

Perceiving his end to be approaching with rapidity, he ordered all his papers, except some detached essays, to be destroyed ; and these he entrusted to the care of his executors. The additions to *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, most of which were composed under the pressure of a severe disease, the publication of which fortunate-

ly Mr Smith lived to superintend, were among the last of his literary exertions. In the year 1787, he addressed the following letter to the principal of the University of Glasgow, in consequence of his being elected Rector of that learned body. "No preferment," says he, "could have given me so much real satisfaction. No man can owe greater obligations to a society than I do to the University of Glasgow. They educated me; they sent me to Oxford. Soon after my return to Scotland, they elected me one of their own members; and afterwards preferred me to another office, to which the abilities and virtues of the never to be forgotten Dr Hutcheson had given a superior degree of illustration. The period of thirteen years which I spent as a member of that society, I remember as by far the most useful, and, therefore, as by far the happiest and most honourable period of my life; and now, after three and twenty years absence, to be remembered in so very agreeable a manner by my old friends and protectors, gives me a heart-felt joy which I cannot easily express to you."

Mr

Mr Dugald Stewart, formerly mentioned, near the conclusion of his *Account of Mr Smith's Life*, makes the following elegant and expressive remarks : “The short narrative which I have now finished, however barren of incident, may convey a general idea of the genius and character of this illustrious man. Of the intellectual gifts and attainments by which he was so eminently distinguished ;—of the originality and comprehensiveness of his views ; the extent, the variety, and the correctness of his information ; the inexhaustible fertility of his invention ; and the ornaments which his rich and beautiful imagination had borrowed from classical culture ;—he has left behind him lasting monuments. To his private worth, the most certain of all testimonies may be found in that confidence, respect, and attachment, which followed him through all the various relations of life. The serenity and gaiety he enjoyed, under the pressure of his growing infirmities, and the warm interest he felt to the last, in every thing connected with the welfare of his friends, will be long remembered by a
small

small circle with whom, as long as his strength permitted, he regularly spent an evening in the week, and to whom the recollection of his worth still forms a pleasing, though a melancholy bond of union.*” That Mr Smith had many peculiarities, both in his manners, and in his intellectual habits, (and what man of genius has not?) was obvious even to superficial observers. He was but ill qualified for the general intercourse of society, or for the active employments of life. The various and extensive speculations which he indulged from a very early period of his youth, and the ample materials derived from his own invention, made him often inattentive to common occurrences, and to familiar objects. Even when in company, Mr Smith was apt to be ingrossed with his studies, as appeared from the motion of his lips, as well as from his looks and gestures.

Of what is called *absence* in company, he exhibited frequent and remarkable examples. He often walked for miles with Dr Hutton, one of his most ingenious, learned,

* See Phil. Transf. of Edin. vol. 3. p. 133.

learned, and intimate friends in Edinburgh ; and, though the cheerful Doctor, in order to rouse Mr Smith's attention, talked to him frequently, he seldom uttered a word, but walked on moving his lips, and muttering to himself. It was probably owing, in some measure, to this circumstance, that Mr Smith so seldom joined in the common topics of general conversation, and that he was occasionally disposed to express his own ideas somewhat in the form of a lecture. This practice, however, did not originate from a desire to gratify vanity, or to ingross too much of the conversation. His natural temper led him so forcibly to enjoy in silence the gay sallies of others, that his friends frequently contrived particular modes to direct his mind to such subjects as were most likely to interest and excite him.

His opinions of men, which he sometimes formed upon a superficial acquaintance, were often erroneous. But the natural temper of his mind disposed him more to indulge fond partialities than ill-founded prejudices. Constantly occupied with extensive

tensive views of human affairs, he had neither time nor inclination to employ his thoughts on the peculiarities of common characters. Accordingly, though deeply skilled in the powers of the human mind, as well as in the passions and propensities of the heart ; yet, in judging of individual characters, his estimates were sometimes formed in a manner remarkably false and precipitate. The same remark is applicable to the opinions he occasionally gave of books, and of speculative subjects. These were often not uniformly what might have been expected from a man of his superior understanding and knowledge. His opinions and similar topics were not unfrequently influenced by accidental circumstances and the humour of the moment ; but, when these were retailed by persons who were not thoroughly acquainted with him, they conveyed false ideas concerning his genuine sentiment and character. On such occasions, however, his remarks always contained much truth and ingenuity ; and, if the different opinions, which he expressed upon the same subjects, had been conjoined,

joined, they would have furnished materials for a judgment both just and comprehensive. But, in his friendly associations, he did not take the trouble of drawing those qualified conclusions which are so conspicuous in his printed works. He generally gave a bold and masterly sketch of the object from the first point of view that occurred to his fancy. His pictures were always vivid and expressive, and had a strong resemblance to the originals, when viewed under a particular aspect, but seldom conveyed a just and complete conception of it in all its parts and dimensions. But, however these peculiarities of his manners are to be accounted for, it is unquestionable that they were results of a candid and an innocent mind. His external appearance exhibited nothing very remarkable. In stature, he somewhat exceeded the ordinary size; and his countenance was manly and agreeable. When warmed with the conversation of his friends, his features were often illuminated with smiles of inexpressible benignity, and his gestures were animated, and not ungraceful. His tendency
to

to *absence*, especially in the company of strangers, gave his manner sometimes the appearance of embarrassment.

In his deportment, when walking, there were some singularities. His head had a gentle motion from side to side ; and his body, at every step, had a kind of rolling or vermicular motion, as if he meant to alter his direction, or even to turn back. In the streets, or elsewhere, he always carried his cane on his shoulder, as a soldier does his musket. These may be considered as slight shades ; but, in a picture, slight shades are often highly characteristic.

His library, though not a very large collection, but most judiciously selected, he bequeathed, together with the rest of his property, to his cousin David Douglas, Esq; Advocate. The first time I happened to be in his library, Mr Smith observed me looking at the books with some degree of curiosity, and perhaps surprise ; for most of the volumes were elegantly, and some of them superbly bound. “ You must have remarked,”

ed," he said, "that I am a beau in nothing but my books."

Upon the whole, Mr Smith was one of these extraordinary men whom, at some times only, nature exhibits to the view of mortals. Enough has already been said of his learning and mental abilities. Though his compositions always conveyed distinct ideas ; yet, in language, he is often careless and inattentive. Every reader of taste must perceive the justice of this remark. The instances are innumerable where he employs the same verb or noun, two or three times in the same sentence, when he might, with the utmost ease, have diversified them, and given a greater and more harmonious effect to his composition, without injuring, in the smallest degree, the perspicuity of his thoughts and reasonings.



A
DISSERTATION
ON THE
MEANS OF SUPPORTING AND PROMOTING
PUBLIC SPIRIT.

Wrote, Nov. 1760.

P R E F A C E.

NOTHING can be better calculated for exciting the mind to think with accuracy and precision, than the limiting its operations to some certain determinate subject. If a question is put, or a proposition laid down, how naturally do we make every idea which we possess, however slight its relation or connection with the subject, pass in review before us? This power, or rather propensity of the human mind, enables us not only to investigate the various qualities of material objects, but likewise to unfold many leading qualities and affections of the mind itself. When an unknown plant is presented to a Botanist, he does not content himself with a strict examination of all its external parts. If an inspection of these is insufficient for his purpose, his next step is to compare the ideas excited by its taste and
odour

odour with those excited by the taste and odour of other plants with which he is previously acquainted, in order to discover even the most distant resemblance of qualities. On the other hand, when our thoughts are confined to a single subject, of whatever nature, our ideas generally run on in one continued series or train. But every man of reflection must have observed, that the connections of this train are sometimes so extremely slight, that it is difficult for the thinker himself to trace them.

Though this constitutional faculty of the mind is the source of order and regularity in our thoughts; yet, like other eminent blessings in life, it is productive of many inconveniencies. Some men are endued with such nice discernment, that they can easily perceive the most distant relations of ideas: hence, if a proper choice is not made, their compositions must be obscure to readers of less delicate perceptions. It should therefore

therefore be the constant endeavour of every writer whose aim is to propagate useful truths, or to promote any popular advantage, to neglect the slight or distant relations, and exhibit such only as are conspicuous and intelligible to all. Simplicity will infallibly be the ornament, and general utility the fruit of such an author's compositions.

I was led to these observations by accidentally looking into the public papers containing the premiums offered by the Hon. Select Society at Edinburgh. Amongst many useful spurs to industry, which could have but small influence on a person unacquainted with the particular arts they are intended to encourage, I perceived that a Dissertation on the best Means of Supporting and Promoting Public Spirit was made the subject of a competition. I revolved most of the ideas I had acquired that bore any relation to this subject. Emulation,
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ever natural to youthful minds, sprung up apace. The result was a resolution to submit the following thoughts to the judgment of that learned and truly public spirited body.

A DISSER-

This DISSERTATION and the ESSAYS which follow were written when the AUTHOR was only Twenty years of age.

A

DISSERTATION, &c.

SELFISHNESS, when carried beyond certain bounds, has universally been esteemed a low and grovelling disposition. Neither is this universal censure capricious or unjust. So conscious is the selfish man of the meanness and turpitude of his own motives, that, like the vicious of every denomination, he constantly endeavours to conceal the narrowness of his heart under the species appearance of the contrary virtues. Frugality and prudent foresight are the pretended motives of all his actions. Shrunk into a smaller compass than self, he loses sight of

his real interest, by an over anxious solicitude to ward off imaginary misfortunes, and to turn every thing to his immediate advantage. Excluded from every social joy, his soul is eat up with spleen, and his heart pines with envy at the honour and success which constantly attend those who are actuated by more liberal principles. Self-love in excess is the parent of fear. Hence the man possessed of this temper becomes suspicious of the whole human race. Incapable of friendship himself, no man esteems him any longer than he discovers his real character. Thus hated and despised by all, but most by those who know him best, the selfish man lives without joy, and dies without having tasted the balmy consolations of friendship, or the heart-expanding pleasures of disinterested benevolence.

How opposite to this is the character of the man who is possessed of a liberal and public-spirited disposition? So far is his love from being confined to self, that it extends to the whole of his species. How amiable, how god-like the disposition which
interests

interests the person endowed with it in the happiness or misery of all around him? His very existence is expanded over the universe. He hears of the calamity of no individual, society, or country, without feeling some degree of their pain. Nor, on the other hand, is it possible for him not to exult in the happiness and prosperity of every one on whom such eminent blessings are bestowed. His eyes no sooner behold the afflicted than his hand is stretched out for their relief. Deeply interested in every man's prosperity, his soul is constantly regaled with pleasures which flow from a thousand springs unknown to the selfish heart. Thus endowed with an universal love to his species, if the virtues of individuals, at any time demand his peculiar regard, his breast glows with uncommon warmth of affection. The benevolent man's heart is the only genuine soil of friendship. Here friendship takes root; here it shoots forth its richest blossoms of love and sympathetic affection.

View

View the public-spirited man discharging the duties of civil life. The complacency of his countenance, the affability of his behaviour, the generosity of his actions, and above all, that ineffable something which beams forth benevolence from his eyes, captivate every ingenious heart, and blunt the poignant darts of envy itself.

A discreet well regulated generosity is, in every view, the best selfishness. What a wretch must he be, who will not revere and befriend the man whose constant study is to promote and enlarge the happiness of his fellow-creatures? Envy, it is true, has perhaps too deep a root in human nature; but the powerful instinct of gratitude is, generally speaking, strong enough to disappoint, or totally overcome, its most virulent designs. Liberality joined to discretion is such a noble, such an elevated disposition of mind, that it must of necessity procure the general estimation and friendship of mankind. Add to this the inestimable pleasure which naturally results from the consciousness of bestowing happiness upon a
large

large body of mankind, and then reflect whether a selfish or a generous temper best suits the dependent condition of man.

Without expatiating further on the beauty or utility of public-spiritedness, we proceed to inquire into the means of promoting and supporting this amiable virtue among men of all ranks and conditions.

To have a clear conception of terms is an essential requisite in every literary discussion. An explanation of these shall therefore be the first object of investigation.

Public spirit, in its most extensive sense, may be defined, "An habitual temper or disposition of mind which incites the person endowed with it, uniformly to prefer general advantage to private interest."

Public-spiritedness being thus a mental qualification, it is not matter of surprise, that some men should be indebted for this disposition merely to the bounty of Nature. But as public-spiritedness is far from being
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the general temper of mankind, in their present circumstances, the man who shall point out any certain means of substituting, in the human heart, generosity in place of selfishness, will do a more substantial service to society than if he had discovered the longitude, or solved all the speculative problems that ever were exhibited to the world.

The attempt, it must be confessed, is arduous. Difficulties innumerable spring up on every hand; must we therefore pronounce, that success is impracticable?—Let us rather collect our whole strength, and proportion our efforts to the difficulties to be encountered. Courage and industry often surmount obstacles which make genius shudder, and fly to the downy regions of Fancy, where he may rove at large, unfettered by common sense, or public utility. Indolence and irresolution, not want of ability, are generally the only causes why many useful problems are given up as impracticable, or looked upon as exceeding the limits of human capacity.

What

What are the best means of promoting and supporting public spirit? is so far from being a question of easy solution, that we have no scruple to pronounce it a *desideratum* of the most intricate class. To teach humanity to man; to extirpate selfishness from the human heart; to enlarge the circle of our feelings; to show how all men may be rendered generous and benevolent: The accomplishment of these, and many other consequences included in a proper view of public spirit, may challenge the genius and application of the finest head that ever adorned a human body.

Far from esteeming myself equal to this task, I shall have fully gained my point, if I can show how this benevolent temper might be rendered more general among mankind than it is at present, hoping thereby to pave the way for persons better skilled in the intricate science of the human heart, to prosecute this useful subject to its utmost extent.

Few

Few sciences are sufficiently known to admit of a perfect systematic arrangement. But, that we may not be entirely deficient with regard to method, we shall always have the two following objects principally in view :

I. The causes of the decline of public spirit ; or, in other words, an inquiry into the reasons why the generality of mankind are more swayed by selfish than public-spirited motives.—And,

II. Some regulations shall be mentioned, by the due observance of which this defect might, in a great measure, be remedied.

PART

PART I.

Origin of Selfishness.

THE great Mr Locke, and several other ingenious philosophers, have represented the human intellect, antecedent to its intercourse with external objects, as a *tabula rasa*, or a substance capable of receiving any impressions, but upon which no original impressions of any kind are stamped. Agreeable to this hypothesis, the soul, while destitute of that knowledge we acquire by experience and observation, is a mere passive being, having no natural principles of action, no power of chusing or refusing, but entirely subjected to receive the first impressions that are made upon it, without the capacity of discovering whether they are proper or improper, whether they tend to its preservation or destruction.

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That the mind cannot originally be possessed of clear and distinct ideas of any certain substances, is undeniable; for the acquisition of these depends solely on observation. Indeed, according to the accurate definition of an idea given by the ingenious Lord Kames, it is impossible for the mind to have any original ideas; because an idea, as he has defined it, is a recalling into the mind the image or impression of an object which was formerly examined by one or other of our instruments of sensation; and therefore an idea presupposes the mind's being conversant with external objects. But Mr Locke's definition of that term is by far too loose and general. That sagacious philosopher defines an idea to be, "Whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking." Now, as soon as an embryo in the womb begins to live, it must of necessity be conscious of its existence; if conscious of its existence, that consciousness, of course, implies, that the mind is some how or other, however imperfectly, employed in thinking;
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and therefore, agreeably to this last definition, the embryo is already in possession of at least one idea, to wit, that of its own existence. This certainly deserves the appellation of an *innate idea*, unless by innate ideas is meant, ideas antecedent to existence.

We mean not that a fœtus in the womb is capable of forming an abstract idea of its own existence, as a separate and distinct being ; such an idea is only acquirable by our perceptions and reasoning on these perceptions, which is the work of time and experience. But, in this first stage of human life, which has been hitherto but too little attended to, the mind must undoubtedly acquire several ideas from the sensation of touch, which is a very fruitful source of perception. The extreme tenderness of the muscles and nerves of a fœtus, the various motions and surprising vicissitudes to which its whole system is constantly subject, must necessarily subject this future man to numberless uneasy and painful sensations. Several considerations lead us to imagine, that
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the mind has, at this early period of existence, proper conceptions of pleasure and pain, of joy and sorrow, of fear, anger, and, in general, of most, if not of all the principles which are necessary for regulating its future conduct, call them ideas, perceptions, sensation, or what you please.

Were a child, at the instant of its escape from the womb, endowed with the faculty of speech ; and were it, at the same time, capable of remembering the different thoughts and feelings which occupied the mind during its growth and confinement, we imagine, its first words would be to the following purpose.

“ Many and various are the pains I have suffered ; but of all others this last is the most excruciating*. What I am now about to feel, is to me unknown. This much I know, that, if I am destined to endure as great misery in this my new state of existence, as I have undergone in my former, miserable

* Meaning the pain arising from the compression of the head, &c. at the time of delivery.

miserable indeed is my fate ! Rather let me be reduced to that unfeeling condition in which all consciousness was asleep.—When consciousness first began, I cannot distinctly learn ; for the transition from an unfeeling to a feeling state was so languid and confusedly tranquil, that some time elapsed before I was certain whether I really felt or not.—But, after this indifferent period passed away, with what ardour have I often wished for its return ? Vain, however, have all my wishes been. At one time I felt strange uneasy motions * : I was carried about, but whether, for what purpose, or what was the cause of this motion, I could never perceive. One thing I too certainly know, that many of these gestations gave me exquisite torture. Sometimes my whole body was compressed and squeezed to such a degree that I thought my frame would have been crushed to nothing. At other times I suffered little partial pressures, which were no less tormenting : these did not stun me so much ; but I was more sensible of their sting.—I remember, indeed, that at certain

* When the mother dances, or walks too quick.

tain periods all motion ceased, and I seemed as if sinking back to my former indifference *; then I enjoyed a temporary ease; a grateful languor blunted the instruments of sensation, and in some measure dried up the springs of sorrow. But, alas! what a wretched creature must I be? Even here some unaccountable power, whether external or internal I could not say, frequently interrupted my tranquillity, by placing me in delusive but painful situations, which, when roused by motion, I perceived were not just so real, though not less disagreeable than those which arose from pressure †. But why should I dwell entirely on the hardships I sustained? Pleasure was not always absent. Some fortunate vicissitudes brought along with them a smooth, delicate flow of I do not know what, which titillated every fibre of my substance, and pervaded me with extreme delight ‡. I was, however, frequently deceived by this unknown titillating

* When the mother was at rest, and the foetus falling asleep.

† Disagreeable dreams.

‡ A temperate supply of fresh nourishment.

titillating flow ; for it would sometimes pour so copiously in upon me, that instead of being accompanied with a refreshing pleasure, I found my frame begin to totter and grow giddy, in so much that my existence was almost totally extinguished *.— Strait confinement was added to fill up the sum of my misfortunes. If galled on one side, I instantly made an effort to recede, and fly from pain. But fruitless, alas, was every attempt of this kind. Shut up from every resource ; closely environed on all sides ; I was compelled to bear the most dreadful afflictions, without having the least power of redress. My longings after ease and freedom were great ; but even the little strength I possessed was so limited and circumscribed, that I had not room to exert it. To sum up the whole in a few words ; my life has consisted of one continued series of vicissitudes. Pleasure, when I did enjoy it, was interrupted by the dread of returning pain. My pains, on the other hand, were somewhat softened by the hopes of returning pleasure. Many other strange commotions

* Drunkenness or surfeit of the mother.

commotions and confused fancies, on different occasions, disturbed my peace. But hush ! a world of uncouth objects rush in upon me, and distract my attention *."

We have made choice of this method of conveying our thoughts concerning the state of the human intellect while confined in the womb, because we imagined it could be done in this way both more intelligibly and more concisely. We presume not to oppose what Mr Locke, Lord Kames, and other ingenious philosophers have advanced with regard to the doctrine of ideas. All we intend is, to show that mankind are born with certain ideas or notions of pain and pleasure, of fear, hope, resentment, &c. and peculiarly with strong and lively desires after self-preservation. The experience children necessarily acquire in the womb from their own feelings, and the natural communication with the feelings of the mother, added to reflection on these feelings, may be the origin of all the ideas of infants prior to their connection with external objects.

* Light and visible objects.

jects. There is even reason to suspect, that the human species enjoy the faculty of thinking and reflecting in the very first dawnings of their existence.

It is a pretty general maxim among philosophers, that a child in the womb is merely a sentient being, that is, a being endowed with sensitive powers, but utterly incapable of reflecting on the sensations occasioned by them. This is a very humiliating representation of the human mind; and one would think, that nothing less than the clearest demonstration could make it gain any credit. According to this hypothesis, while confined in the womb, we are little better than mere *vegetables*. The sensitive plant retracts, and shrinks back, when it receives an unfriendly blow; the human fœtus, it seems, is incapable of doing any more. Is it not as good philosophy to suppose, that the fœtus, after having once felt agreeable or disagreeable sensations, has a power of recalling the ideas or images of these sensations at pleasure, or at least when any train, or fortuitous circumstance, has a

natural tendency to bring them to its remembrance? A young cat, or a puppy, may run its nose against a fire the first time such an object is presented to it; but will seldom be found to try the experiment again. Here the young brute enjoys a faculty denied to the human foetus, which, considering the superiority of the human intellect, may be reckoned nearly in similar circumstances. The former recalls in idea the painful sensation occasioned by contact with a burning body, and therefore avoids a second rencounter: the latter must feel again and again, and yet, after the sensation is gone, be unable to recall in imagination the image or form of one single feeling.

From these, and many other observations that might easily be made on this subject, we think it reasonable to conclude, that, if there are not such things as *innate ideas*, there must be ideas *connate* at least with existence itself.

After what has been advanced on this point, we need no longer be at a loss to find

find out the origin of selfishness in the human heart. We are not only born with this principle, but conceived in it. In a word, selfishness is a gift of nature coeval with existence itself.

Some readers may be apt to imagine, that this view of the origin of selfishness represents the great Author of all existence as the cause of one of the most perverse principles which the human mind is capable of entertaining. Stop, zealous reader, and reflect, that it is not selfishness, but the abuse of it, which is criminal. The degree of selfishness we receive from our Creator is nothing more than a powerful instinct, which impels men, and all other animals, to defend themselves from injury and death: it is nothing more than that catholic principle of self-preservation, which is so far from being a criminal principle, that to it alone are we indebted for all the pleasures and advantages of life.

Who can reflect, without indignation, upon that mean, that profane subterfuge, of
charging

charging nature with our own vices and inconsistencies? How common, but how unjust is the excuse we often plead for indulging ourselves in pride, selfishness, envy, spleen, anger, voluptuousness, &c. ? “ It is impossible but I must be passionate,” says the choleric man, “ for such is my natural disposition, and it is needless to oppose what is impracticable to overcome.”

For the honour of mankind, we would wish never to hear of such a palliative. Conscience revolts at the thought!—The great Author of Nature, so far from entailing vicious inclinations on his creatures, has anxiously provided against it, by annexing a severe penalty to every action or affection, which is not confined within the limits of the strictest virtue. Antecedent to our contracting vicious habits, we have a much stronger bias to virtue than vice. Virtue is entirely consonant to the original constitution of our minds. Vice must have recourse to habit, in order to adorn its native deformity, before it can be made in any measure agreeable.

It

It is indeed to be lamented, that when once we allow vice to become habitual, it takes such deep root in the affections, and so fascinates the heart, that we are both unable and unwilling to eradicate it. Habit, in trivial matters, is allowed to be only a *second Nature*; but, in matters of importance, we dignify it still higher, by giving it the title of *Nature's self*. Mankind are endowed with no original principles but what are calculated to promote their own good. We abuse the gifts of nature, and, at the same time, are impudent enough to father these very abuses on our bountiful Creator. The abuse of the faculties which the Supreme Being has been pleased to confer upon us, is the source, the origin, the cause, of almost all the evils incident to the human race. Mankind are by nature endowed with a principle of self-preservation: but selfishness, or an overbearing self-love, derives its being from the improper culture and management of our own faculties.

Selfishness, in a certain degree, being thus one of the most powerful instincts of our constitution,

constitution, we cannot reasonably be surprised, considering how deeply it is rooted in human nature, that it should grow up and luxuriantly over-run the hearts of men, unless timely pruned by a well regulated culture.

PART

PART II.

Of the Education of Children,
with regard to Public Spirit.

MANKIND, it would appear, have entered into a general combination to train up the tender minds of their offspring, by every method which can have the smallest tendency to contract their views, and render them hollow-hearted. In every trifling incident, the mother or the nurse discover the utmost anxiety to protect the infant from the most remote appearances of danger. If the little innocent's nostrils are stimulated, and it sneezes, in order to give itself relief; God preserve my dear child, cries the mother! the brothers, sisters, servants, all join in the same foolish exclamation. If the child be crawling about the room, and chance to roll over to one side, the whole family set up dreadful shrieks, and fly towards him with faces distorted by fear

fear and surprize. When a child perceives that every person about him is so solicitous to protect him from the slightest injury, he must be a dull child indeed, who cannot draw this natural but false conclusion, That he is a very important personage; that his own welfare is the principal concern of the *family*, which, in his circumstances, signifies *mankind in general*; that, if he is safe himself, no matter what befall those who defend him, whom he justly considers as his servants.—Does a child give the signal by extending his hand, and bending forward to any object, it is instantly brought to him: If otherwises, he knows of an infallible remedy; let him but cry, and then, My dearest creature, here it is, here is the candle or the painted glass; now, now, peace, peace, my sweetest, dry up your tears, &c. &c.

It is needless to be more particular on this point. The experience of every person who has ever been an hour in a nursery or a mother's bed-chamber, is sufficient to convince him, that mothers and nurses could

could not fall upon more effectual methods of promoting an enormous self-love in their offspring than they commonly employ, supposing selfishness were the most important of all moral virtues. •

When a man ruminates on the actions and affections of the human race, he is struck with admiration to find such a vast variety of effects proceeding from an inconsiderable number of causes. So fond are we of tracing things to their origin, and of reducing them to general causes, that several philosophers have endeavoured to prove, that no action was ever performed by man, no passion or affection was ever harboured in the human breast, but what is reducible into one single cause or motive. It has been repeatedly denied, that such a thing as public-spiritedness, or disinterested benevolence, ever existed among men. Self-love, according to that sect of philosophers, is the source of every human movement: compassion, benevolence, love, friendship, and all the virtues called social, are mere counterfeit terms, contrived to gratify our

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vanity,

vanity, and conceal the genuine motives which stimulate us to action. In a word, they maintain, that man is a mere selfish animal, incapable of entertaining any feeling or sentiment which has not self for its ultimate object.

If these philosophers are right ; if their representation of the motives by which mankind are universally and constantly actuated, has its foundation in reason, What a world of absurdities do we daily meet with in the common occurrences of life ? Why do all ranks of people applaud friendship and benevolence, into whatever character these noble ingredients seem to enter ? Why are the social virtues so warmly recommended to our esteem and practice ? Why do patriots, clergymen, &c. exhort us to cultivate charity, humanity, and love to our country ? Sure, if any of them belong to this class of philosophers, they must be conscious, that they enforce the practice of what is impossible to perform : They declaim against selfish views, and interested motives, at the same time that they believe
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it impracticable to have any other. What, then, agreeably to these principles, do they recommend to our practice? Why, not only an impossibility, but, what is worse, they would have us to assume the appearance of virtues which are too sublime for our limited powers: they exhort, they implore us to be virtuous and benevolent, and, with the same breath, tells us, that not a single grain of virtue or benevolence is to be found under the heavens.

Even supposing such an hypothesis to be true, it exhibits such a gloomy view of human nature, by representing men as void of every principle which can elevate them above the rank of the inferior creatures, that instead of propagating such despicable doctrine, especially among the vulgar, it would be more generous to imitate the conduct of the great Sir Robert Boyle, who sacrificed the honour of a surprising invention to the safety and protection of mankind. He knew that selfish men would turn his discovery to their own emolument, at the expence of the lives of their fellow-creatures;

creatures ; he did not hesitate on the alternative, but generously condemned it to eternal oblivion.

But let us not rest satisfied with barely expressing our aversion at this hypothesis ; let us rather examine on what foundation it is built.

Several judicious writers have employed all their ingenuity in opposing this mean opinion of the human motives and faculties. But as no writer has so concisely and accurately distinguished selfish motives from those that are social, as the learned author of a late ingenious work, it is hoped, that the following quotation on this subject will give pleasure to every lover of society.

“ Whatever moves me to act, may in one sense be termed a motive ; and in that sense it is the same with a cause. But this is not the proper or ordinary sense of the term ; it is appropriated to actions done as means to an end ; and our conviction of the certainty or probability that the action
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in view will contribute to the desired end, is said to be our motive for performing that action. Thus a motive belongs to intentional actions, not to those which are merely instinctive : these have a cause, viz. the impulse of the passion ; but they cannot be said to have a motive, because they are not done with any deliberation or any view to consequences.

“ We learn from experience that the gratification of every desire is pleasant ; and accordingly the foresight of this pleasure becomes often a motive which swells the original desire we had to act. Thus a child eats by the mere impulse of hunger ; a young man thinks of the pleasure of gratification, which being a motive for him to eat, fortifies the original impulse : and a man, farther advanced in life, has the additional motive, that it will contribute to his health.

“ From the definition of a motive above given, it is easy to determine, with the greatest accuracy, what passions and actions are selfish,

selfish, what social : it is the motive or end in view that determines them to belong to the one class or to the other ; where the end in view is my own good, they are selfish ; where the end in view is the good of another, they are social. Hence it follows, that instinctive actions, where we act blindly, and by mere impulse, cannot be reckoned either social or selfish : thus eating, when prompted by an impulse merely of nature, is neither social nor selfish ; but add a motive, that it will contribute to my pleasure or my health, and it becomes in a measure selfish. On the other hand, when affection moves me to exert actions to the end solely of advancing my friend's happiness, without the slightest regard to my own gratification, such actions are justly denominated *social* ; and so is also the affection that is their cause. If another motive be added, that gratifying the affection will contribute to my own happiness, the actions become partly selfish. Animal love, when exerted into action by natural impulse singly, is neither social nor selfish : when exerted with a view to gratification and in order to make me happy, it
is

is selfish : when the motive of giving pleasure to its object is superadded, it is partly social, partly selfish. A just action, when prompted by the principle of duty solely, is neither social nor selfish. When I perform an act of justice with a view to the pleasure of gratification, the action is selfish ; I pay my debt for my own sake, not with a view to benefit my creditor. But let me suppose the money has been advanced by a friend without interest, purely to oblige me : in this case, together with the motive of gratification, there arises a motive of gratitude, which respects the creditor solely, and prompts me to act in order to do him good ; and the action is partly social, partly selfish. Suppose again I meet with a surprising and unexpected act of generosity, that inspires me with love to my benefactor and the utmost gratitude : I burn to do him good : He is the sole object of my desire ; and my own pleasure in gratifying the desire vanishes out of sight : In this case, the action I perform is purely social. Thus it happens, that when a social motive becomes strong, the action is exerted

ed with a view singly to the object of the passion ; and the selfish pleasure arising from gratification is never once considered. The same effect of stifling selfish motives, is equally remarkable in other passions that are in no view social. An action, for example, prompted by ambition, without any other motive but exaltation merely, is neither social nor selfish : let exaltation be considered as a means to make me happy, and the action becomes so far selfish. But if the desire of exaltation wax strong, and inflame my mind, the selfish motive now mentioned is no longer felt. A slight degree of resentment, where my chief view in acting is the pleasure arising to myself from gratifying the passion, is justly denominated selfish. Where revenge flames so high as to have no other aim but the destruction of its object, it is no longer selfish ; but, in opposition to a social passion, may be termed *diffocial* *."

Thus we see that this elegant Writer, deeply skilled in the science of human nature,

* Lord Kames's Elements of Criticism, vol. 1. p. 62. edit. 2d.

ture, has clearly shown, that all our actions must be estimated according to the causes or motives which produce them. He has demonstrated, in the most satisfactory manner, that we are actuated sometimes by social, sometimes by selfish motives; sometimes by motives which are partly selfish, partly social; and sometimes by mere instinctive motives which cannot be reduced either to the one class or to the other.

It is indeed impossible for any person, whose natural principles are not strangely perverted by vicious habits, carefully to watch the feelings of his heart for a single day, and not to perceive that he is stimulated to actions and affections so purely social, that self is not only entirely out of the question, but even, in many cases, actually injured.

Taking it then for granted, that mankind are at least capable of social motives, we proceed to show how these social motives may be expanded to such a degree as

to produce public-spiritedness or disinterested benevolence.

If we would wish to see public-spirit rendered general in any nation or country, we must begin to cultivate this temper at a very early period of life. The world must by this time be sensible, that, in the education of children, too little attention is bestowed upon that most essential part of it which respects morality and sentiment. To guard against the infection of evil habits and example ; to prevent the growth and expansion of self-love ; to bar the entrance of unnatural principles from the heart ; to cherish and unfold the social affections—These, it must be confessed, are such laborious employments, that, considering the ignorance and indolence of the generality of mankind, it is not surprising to see them very generally neglected.

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SECTION II.

*Of Infants, i. e. that particular Stage of Life
before Children acquire the use of Arti-
ficial Language.*

THE infantine state of children requires a greater degree of care and attention than is commonly bestowed upon it. Upon the proper cultivation of infants depend, in a great measure, the figure which the future man is to make, and the character he is to bear in Society. Here habits and passions commence, which, if allowed to harbour uncontrouled in the mind, will require the strongest efforts both of reason and philosophy to subdue and bring them under proper discipline.

It is no part of our present business to point out what means should be employed to prevent every vicious habit, or to cultivate

vate every virtuous principle. Public-spirit is a single virtue, but a capital one indeed ; to it, therefore, shall our observations be entirely appropriated.

1. That parents, nurses, servants, &c. should constantly beware of betraying any selfish motives or actions in the presence of children ; if a domestic receives an injury before a child, he should suppress all emotions of resentment until the child is removed.

The utility of this maxim is evident ; for, although infants are ignorant of artificial language, yet are they adepts in the natural language of passion. An infant knows, by the motion of the eyes, the distortion of the muscles of the face, and the particular gestures of the body, that a person in this situation is indulging a selfish passion ; and that he is about to pour vengeance on the head of his adversary. All appearances of every passion but what are social and benevolent, ought to be concealed with the utmost vigilance from the eyes of infants.

infants. When an infant frequently beholds the natural marks of dissocial passions, he is insensibly led, as it were by a kind of natural magic, to imitate what is thus repeatedly placed in his view.

Nature teaches an infant, whenever he perceives a certain appearance in the countenance, that the person is eager in the pursuit of some favourite object : the infant naturally employs the same means in order to get possession of every thing that catches his fancy : and hence, if often indulged, he in time acquires a wayward, selfish temper.

2. That the *στοργή* or natural affection of parents to their children, ought to be concealed, as far as possible, from the observation of infants.

The difficulty of complying with this maxim may perhaps be objected to the utility of it.—How successfully do mankind, and particularly the fair sex, employ the arts of dissimulation, when interest is at stake? This is all that is here required. Let
them

them indulge the passion as much as they please ; but let it not appear, by their words or actions, that they are thus obliged to love their children. When once a child perceives, that his parents are deeply interested in his welfare, he naturally concludes, that nothing, however improper, will be withheld from him. But, if not only the parents, but, which is commonly the case, the whole family concur in the same destructive show of affection, the child is infallibly rendered selfish, and his heart is shut up from receiving any social or public-spirited principle. The reason is obvious. He is denied nothing he asks. Every person about him discovers the utmost solicitude to contribute to his pleasure, and gratify his inclinations. He is a kind of tyrant in the family. Every edict he gives out, is instantly complied with. If he gives but the signal, quick as lightning is he obeyed. In a word, the youngest of the family has generally the whole domestics at his back.

What

What can be expected from such conduct as this? Why, nothing but what actually happens every day. Children thus educated have no ideas but of self; no affections, no desires, but what are purely selfish. Were this superabundant affection, this care and anxiety of parents concealed, children would then be led to consider themselves, as they really are, of less importance than their protectors: they would esteem every act of attention and kindness, not as a duty or necessity, but as an unmerited munificence. Hence love, gratitude, and every social affection would spring up in their tender minds.

SECT.

SECTION III.

*Of Cultivating Public Spirit in Children,
from the Infantine Stage, till they arrive
at the Reasoning Period of Life.*

THIS is a subject of such vast latitude, that it would require many volumes to treat it in proportion to its extent and importance. But as prolixity is absolutely incompatible with our present plan, let it suffice, to select a few principal observations, and leave the reader to make what additions his judgment or experience may suggest.

The regulations mentioned in the former section respected the treatment of children before they were acquainted with artificial language. In what follows, we suppose them to know both artificial language and the language of nature. What was there laid down with regard to the management of the dumb animal, applies with accumulated force with regard to the prattling boy.

Indeed,

Indeed, such is the uniformity of the human intellect, prior to the maturity of all its faculties, that instead of requiring a different treatment at every seeming change in its age or constitution, it is indispensably necessary to be constantly inculcating the same invariable principles upon the soft and ductile mind.

To commend children, even when their behaviour is good, tends universally to contract their hearts, and deaden the social affections.

It is justly esteemed one of the greatest instances of self-government, to withstand the stealing insinuations of flattery. From the highest to the lowest rank of mortals, how difficult is it to find a mind strong enough to resist the attacks of this powerful foe? Reason, however well improved, is found to be insufficient for this purpose. Every man lies open, at one quarter or other, to the assaults of flattery. Frequent have been the complaints of philosophers, in all ages, that flattery, when artfully ap-
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plied, never failed to render their noblest efforts abortive.

The cause of the exorbitant influence of flattery over the mind of man, is easily investigated. An excess of self-estimation is the source of this greatest and most universal of all human foibles. Nature has inspired us with a self-preserving principle: the common mode of education, instead of opposing this natural bias to selfishness, which is but too ready to lay hold of every advantage, shuts up our minds from entertaining any other object but self alone. Were the mind properly tutored, love to the whole human race would, in a few ages, become as general as self-love is at present. But let us not condemn the present methods of educating children, without a judicial trial.

Nature hath wisely decreed, that parents should have a strong affection to their offspring. The learned author above-mentioned makes the *ετοπην* an expansion of self-love upon our children. The general
conduct

conduct of parents seems to justify this hypothesis. Were this opinion concerning the love of parents to their children sufficiently propagated, we might hope in time to see fathers and mothers as shy in praising their sons and daughters as mankind generally are of publicly applauding themselves. Although all men possess some degree of self-love ; yet few are so void of delicacy as openly to proclaim their own praise. How would it grate every sensible ear, to hear a man seriously protesting, That he is possessed of great depth of judgment ; that his genius is quick, lively, and comprehensive ; that he has a prodigious fund of sense and erudition ; that he runs through the whole circle of the sciences with the utmost facility ; that he is amazed at the weakness and stupidity of those who find insurmountable difficulties in any branch of learning ; that, for his part, he never met with any problem, the investigation of which could give him the smallest uneasiness ; and, finally, that nothing is too great, nothing too subtle, nothing too obscure for his all-seeing penetration ?

Would

Would not every sober man justly imagine such a person to be either entirely frantic, or wildly intoxicated with self-estimation? Modesty is shocked at the idea of such intolerable vanity.—Be not thunder-struck, delicate reader! if you have acquired the honourable appellation of *Father*, you are the man! if otherwise, such were your progenitors; such are more than nine-tenths of all the fathers and mothers in the universe.—You would incline to see on what foundation these assertions are grounded. The foundation, alas! is too well grounded in the general behaviour of parents toward their children.

Reflect, reader, on your own experience and observation. You are introduced to a gentleman and spouse; common compliments being over, young Master makes his appearance.

Stranger. Come forward, my dear.—A mighty fine boy!

Mother.

Mother. Neighbour-like, Sir ;—but a rambling thoughtless dog.

Father. Not the worse for that, honey ; you would not have a boy of his years as morose and thoughtful as a philosopher :—Sprightliness and activity are the native fruits of a great genius.

Moth. Nay, as to that, my dear, nobody can dispute his capacity ; he is quick as fire at his education.—Mr Pedaneus, his tutor, says that he will turn out to be a great man ; for he himself, and you know he is a very learned man, is astonished at the boy's abilities.—In a word, Sir, he takes it up much faster than his master is able to give it him :—he outstrips all his companions in every part of his learning ;—and indeed, as my husband observes, he does no harm with his roguishness ; for he is naturally of a humane and generous disposition ; he injures no body ;—and, as for his companions, they are all prodigiously fond of him.

Strang.

Strang. Well, young master, I understand you are an excellent scholar.

Boy. I do not know, Sir.

Moth. The boy, Sir, is bashful before strangers :—he is naturally very modest.

Strang. What books do you read, my dear ?

Boy. What books, Sir ?—I read any books my master desires me.

Moth. Cannot you tell the gentleman, you clownish fellow, (affection and vanity burning in her countenance), that you have gone through your Latin, and have begun the French ?—

Strang. Has he indeed, Ma'am !—that's surprising !—Why, sure the young gentleman is not above ten :—

Moth. True, Sir ; but he is a very extraordinary little creature.—Come hither,
Sirrah,

Sirrah, and let the gentleman hear you read your Latin book.—Now observe, Sir, and you'll find my words good.

Here young Master explains a few lines of some classic which he has repeated perhaps an hundred times, without having any clearer ideas of the intention or meaning of the author, than a parrot, when it calls *Oysters* or *Onions*.

Strang. Mighty fine!—

Moth. Now, Sir, you see I did not exaggerate;—he can read all the Latin with the same ease.—Besides, Sir, if you and he were better acquainted, you would find how prettily he can talk upon every subject:—before he was five years of age, every body was astonished at the witty things he would say.—God preserve and bless him for a comfort to me in my old age; for he has always hitherto been a pleasant, well-behaving child, &c. &c.—

I appeal to experience:—he must be a singular reader indeed, who has never had a similar entertainment in a family-conversation. Is it not the general practice of parents openly to commend their children? Some parents there are, who, with a seeming modesty, relate the virtues and exploits of their little ones as it were aside. Fruitless expedient! So greedy of applause are children, and so well skilled in the language of Nature, that if they but perceive your countenance, or hear the most distant sound of your voice, they see into the inmost recesses of thy soul. Cease, then, from wondering. Modesty is a rare virtue. Mankind are never ashamed to celebrate their children; but seldom reflect, that, in this respect, there is no material difference betwixt the parent and the child. Henceforth may it ever be esteemed as great indelicacy and want of good-breeding for a man to speak favourably of his son as of himself: And would to Heaven a period were put to this fullsome, ill-bred, poisonous practice.

Now,

Now, it may be said, granting all this to be true, what connection has it with public spirit? The connection is extremely obvious. The minds of men are very easily intoxicated with flattery. But the tender minds of children are still more liable to be devoured by this enemy of the human kind. Self-love corrodes the very principles of public spirit. If in early youth self-love is, upon every occasion, instilled into the mind, how can we expect ever to see a race of patriots? In every stage and situation of life, self is a favourite object. In the morning of life, self is almost the only object we are solicitous about. Few are at that time the objects of our knowledge; fewer still take any hold of our affections: How destructive, then, must flattery prove to a mind thus circumstanced? To fill the ears of a child with praise, is as noxious to its constitution, as to administer large quantities of alcohol in order to restore a drunken man to the use of his faculties. Such however is the daily regimen of children. No sooner do they come into the world, than they are placed, as it were,

in the very center of adulation ; and never, till too late, are they permitted to go beyond the limits of its bewitching sphere.—What is the result ? When children, thus educated, arrive at the years of maturity ; when they escape out of the enchanted family-walls, and mingle with the more enlightened sons of men ; strange and preposterous is the figure they make. Headstrong, wayward, and selfish, they naturally expect to be caressed, served, and adored as they had formerly been by mamma, papa, &c. But how are they mortified to meet with the derisive laugh in place of the fond embrace ? How struck with admiration, when they discover, that every man they converse with is as selfish and willful as they themselves ? They now find that they are children still, although they had long since esteemed themselves men. They had been accustomed to the service and adulation of every person about them ; now are they galled with repeated denials, and, what is worse, obliged to serve and flatter in turn.

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This reception which young men, trained up in selfishness, meet with upon their first intercourse with the world, has a very good effect. It in some measure counteracts the principles they have imbibed. But so deeply are first impressions engraven on the mind, that neither philosophy, nor the knowledge of mankind, are sufficient to efface them.—A selfish child, generally speaking, will never become a generous friend or a disinterested patriot.

In the treatment of children, we must not only guard them against entertaining too great a degree of self-love, but we must likewise endeavour to substitute public spiritedness, or an universal love to the human species, in its stead. To accomplish this, we must frequently present to their minds every action and every object which has a natural tendency to extend their views: we must convince them, in the best manner we can, that we are so framed by the hand of Nature, that personal ease and security do not constitute one half of that extensive
happiness

happiness which the human mind is capable of enjoying.

To be able to execute this properly, requires a considerable degree of knowledge in parents, for whose use the present observations are chiefly intended : for this reason, our observations shall be levelled, as much as possible, to vulgar apprehensions.

To sow the seeds of public spirit in the minds of children, even after they have acquired a portion of the reasoning faculty, we must not have recourse to the airy suggestions of fancy. Imagination may mislead our inquiries into human motives and actions, but can never be made subservient to the practice of any single virtue. Every man may erect an Utopian fabric of one construction or other. But it may be asked, Have any of these visionary schemes ever had any extensive influence on the behaviour of men? No; not one. Many of them are intitled, *Ideas of Perfection*. Ideas they are; but ideas so ill-suited to the constitution and circumstances of human

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man nature, that they fly off without making any useful or lasting impression. If we would successfully inculcate the practice of any virtue, no observations should be made, no rules of conduct laid down, but what are adapted to our powers, and easily reduced into practice.

Upon the supposition, then, that no selfish habits have been contracted during infancy, it may not be improper to make a few reflections on the nature and tendency of the books usually put into the hands of children*. No sooner is a child capable of mechanically joining letters and syllables together than he is ordered by his preceptors or parents, to read Fables, History, &c.

Of all human compositions, nothing can be so ill-adapted to the capacity, nothing so destructive to the minds of children, as fictitious representations of objects and actions. Not to mention the many evils
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* We are obliged to use the word *child* for all that space between infancy and manhood.

this species of composition actually produces in youthful minds, we shall only take notice of such as are more immediately connected with our subject.

Look back, Reader, and consider what notions you entertained of the various fables you may have read in the morning of your days. Instead of drawing moral conclusions, was you not principally delighted with that animal which devoured all its opponents by the superiority of its strength, or cunningly subdued them by the artfulness of its snares? The strength and ferocity of the Lion; the deceitfulness of the Fox; the arch tricks of the Monkey, &c. were not these the chief objects of thy admiration? Doubtless they were. Neither was you to blame; Nature taught you to do so.—The fault lay in those who instructed you.

When a boy ruminates on the unlimited authority which the Lion is represented to have over the beasts of the field, or on the inexhaustible artifices of the Fox, does he not ardently wish to be possessed of the
power

power of the one and the art of the other ?
—For what reason ?—Why, that he might be enabled to play the tyrant among his Companions, and cunningly to over-reach his Superiors.

Children are naturally and unavoidably led to esteem those animals most which make the greatest bustle in a fable. Fictions of this kind have a very striking but unhappy resemblance to real life. The vicious and unthinking part of mankind generally make the greatest show and noise in the world. True Virtue delighting in tranquillity and frequent retirement, is in danger of entirely escaping the public eye. What is called the Moral, or virtuous character, in a fable, is, for the most part, shut up in some obscure corner, so far beyond the penetration of a school-boy, that it often requires the sagacity of a philosopher to discover its retreat. Hence it is evident, that reading of fables has a natural tendency to excite in the minds of children a spirit of ambition, tyranny, cruelty, and deceit. Were this the only evil which fabulous representations

presentations entail upon youthful minds, children should be as anxiously kept from indiscriminately hearing or reading of fables, as from falling into the fire or tumbling headlong over a precipice.

The historical works which are commonly read in our schools, are as ill-adapted, and have, if possible, still more fatal effects upon the dispositions of children than fables. Cæsar, Quintus Curtius, &c. what benefit does a school-boy derive from such performances as these? If they are not understood, the labour both of the preceptor and pupil are entirely lost;—if they are understood, worse is the consequence. By reading compositions of this kind, which are only fit to be perused by men of sense and coolness, the principles of ambition, selfishness, and inhumanity, are necessarily impressed upon the pliant minds of children.

When a boy is so far advanced as to be able to read Cæsar or Curtius, his soul instantly catches the delusive flame; he would now give a world, were it in his possession,
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to be a Cæsar or an Alexander. Here he is actuated by the same motives which, not many months before, made him wish to be a lion or a fox. Were a school-boy asked, Why he so much admired Alexander? if he was ingenuous, he would reply, "Because Alexander was a strong man, and killed many millions of the barbarians."—To mangle and butcher the human race, is the only quality which school-boys admire in a hero. Never pleased but when the hero is dealing death and destruction around him, their imaginations are heated to such a degree, that, after reading the description of a battle, the little creatures have been frequently observed to put on a haughty air, elevate their bodies, ape the firm pace of a warrior, and cast a supercilious glance on their companions, as if each of them would say, "I am a King, and will be obeyed."

The destructive tendency of such compositions to the minds of children, is so obvious, that it scarce requires any illustration. The mind being accustomed to the ideas of pride, slaughter, and uncontrouled power, a

haughty, ferocious, and imperious temper is necessarily generated.

Besides, children are extremely ill-qualified for comprehending the route and dispositions of an army. It is impossible for them to enter into the views of a leader :—Marches, countermarches, detachments, sieges, encampments, &c. &c. are materials very ill suited to the genius of a boy in his twelfth year.

We would have our children benevolent, and inspired with love to the public, and at the same time arm them with all the implements of war, by which every social principle, every spark of humanity and patriotism is in danger of being utterly extinguished. That such an enemy of mankind as discord exists in the world, ought to be kept an inviolable secret, till the mind has acquired such a degree of maturity as may enable her to perceive the innumerable evils of which it is productive.—It is as impossible for a boy, whose imagination is in a manner totally immersed in blood, not to
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be proud, selfish, and over-bearing, as for a person born in a camp, and trained up to manhood in the midst of slaughter and desolation, not to delight in the butchery of his species. Let children learn discord and the arts of war from the dissensions of their companions: It is the business of parents and teachers to use their utmost industry in opposing every dissocial passion, and in cultivating every humane and benevolent affection.

Imagine not, however, that we here exclaim against history in general. Nothing can be more foreign to our intention. It is only the history of tyrants, the great revolutions and dissensions of empires and nations, which we deem improper to be put into the hands of children.

We rejoice in the capacity of pointing out one peculiar species of history, which, instead of corrupting the tender minds of youth, seems admirably calculated for promoting generosity of temper and a true spirit of patriotism. Biography, or the history
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of the actions and dispositions of particular persons, upon the slightest consideration, will be found to be that species of history which is not only best suited to the capacity of children, but likewise best calculated for inspiring them with a catholic love to the human race. But here it must be remarked, that it is not the lives of warriors that we recommend; the biography from which any advantage can be derived to children, is the history of private lives and private characters;

Here we perceive a formidable objection rising apace, and, like a thick fog, overclouding the imagination of the reader.—Where are such biographical works to be got? The lives of private persons are so common and uninteresting, that few writers of any distinction have ever condescended to employ their talents in exhibiting a deceased personage to the eyes of the world, who perhaps lived and died unknown to nine-tenths of the town in which he spent his days.

The slightest reflection will instantly dispel this doubt. Bad as the world is, virtue is not entirely neglected. The lives of several disinterested lovers of mankind have been already immortalized by authors of great merit : and, were compositions of this nature oftener called for, without the assistance of a prophetic spirit, we may with absolute assurance predict, that the publication of books of this kind, as well as of every other, will always be in proportion to the demand, or number of purchasers. Let the current of the present taste be changed, which, with regard to children, may be easily effected, and the event will infallibly justify the prediction.

Substitute, O ye authors ! real life in the room of fictions ; stem the torrent of romance, which for some centuries has deluged the earth. Exhibit to the world the virtues and vices of men, instead of the distorted visions of fancy. Why do you scourge your imaginations with the invention of facts, events, catastrophes, &c. ? These are painful and often fruitless labours.

bours. Reflect rather on the virtues, actions, and various incidents in the life of your late friend. Celebrate his virtues; but conceal not his faults. Copy your representations of Nature from Nature's self. Your labour will then be less irksome, attended with greater emolument to yourselves, and productive of more intrinsic utility to your readers.

It is true, some ingenious romances do now and then make their appearance. With such we have no quarrel; although even these, with all their advantages, are but ill-adapted to the capacity of children. But what effects do they produce? We have no hesitation to pronounce, that their effects are fatal both to the generality of men and to all children without distinction. A composition of this nature, however excellent, like an unpopular patriot passing along the streets of a country-village, is constantly followed by such a troop of dirty, rascally vagabonds, that its passage is almost entirely obstructed. No sooner does a romance of any merit make its appearance, than
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sholes of noxious imitations are instantly dispersed through the nation, the bad consequences of which more than overbalance the wholesome fruits of the best performances.—One never-failing evil attends these servile imitations of genius. Want of ingenuity absolutely disqualifies such authors for imitating the taste and sentiment of a fine writer. Hence they must either not write at all, or imitate the foibles and defects of their original. For the truth of this, we might appeal to the Reviewers, or any person who is obliged, from the nature of his employment, to read indiscriminately every publication from a two-penny pamphlet to an unwieldy folio. Tristram Shandy made us laugh at his hints, and his blanks, and his asterics: but the servile band he dragged after him, as if eager to instruct the ignorant in the meaning, not only improved the hints, filled up the blanks in plain characters, and served the ladies with a full exposition of the asterics, but, what is worse, stuffed many volumes with such a medley of ignorance and obscenity, that no person of sense or sobriety would

so far defile his imagination as to give them a serious perusal.

It was observed above, that the generality of mankind, and all children without exception, were unable to reap any advantage from romances wrote in a good taste; the natural consequence is, that the far greater part of mankind, who read romances with the utmost avidity, never inquire after those of any merit, but content themselves with the filth and ignorance with which the common herd of romances are amply replete.

These observations are not capricious, or founded on mere hypothesis. Experience, the only support of every solid theory, opportunely comes in to our aid. Examine the houses of that large class of mankind called the *vulgar*, meaning all but men of taste and judgment, and in some corner or shelf you may, *a priori*, be certain of finding romances of one species or other. But we call upon you to declare, if you have ever, in the course of your visiting, found
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one in a hundred of these romances, but what must, from their very natures, prove hurtful, not only to the minds of children; but, in most instances, to the oldest of the family. Children are naturally fond of romances: They are generally the first books which are read by youth of both sexes, without the express commands of a parent or preceptor. Often has young master been seen throwing down his grammar with the utmost contempt, stealing off to some secret corner, and there sitting, fixed like a statue, brooding for hours together over the French Lovers, or some other obscene romance.—Miss manages the matter with more address; but, though less frequently detected, she is not for that reason less criminal than her younger brother.

Now, as experience teaches, that the representations of the actions, characters, &c. of particular persons, are admirably calculated for fixing the attention of children, this natural bent of the youthful mind ought by no means to be curbed. It is the duty of parents and tutors to take advantage

tage of this disposition, by protecting children against the infection of romances, and by placing within their reach books of a similar nature, but whose effects upon their minds will be directly opposite.

What species of composition, then, can possibly so well answer this end, as a decent relation of the various actions, virtues, &c. of men whose stations in life have been similar, or at least not much above that of the reader's parents and acquaintances. It is indeed a subject worthy of regret, that most biographers disdain to hand down to posterity any character, however noble or exalted, unless the person has been either possessed of riches, or employed in some office of distinction.—A bustling statesman, though destitute of capacity, or a fortunate soldier, though a coward at bottom, is sure of being celebrated with all the pomp and solemnity that panegyric can bestow. But let men of inferior stations live ever so virtuously; let them be scrupulously just; let them be possessed of great warmth of affection to every creature of God; let them
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bear misfortunes with fortitude and resignation ; let them be humane, generous, beneficent, &c. with these and a thousand other qualifications, may they go down to the *silent* grave, without having their amiable characters displayed to the eye of the world! —Independently of doing justice to the memory of distinguished virtue, the characters of such men, although they had lived and died in beggary and rags, ought to be set up as beacons to direct the course of their brethren in station or circumstances. By the laws of all nations, a murderer forfeits his life to the public. Why so ? That his unhappy fate, replies the lawyer, may serve as an example to deter others from committing the like atrocious crime.—Good. —But should not the same reason determine us to record the actions of a man of eminent virtue, whatever be his station, That his noble conduct may prove an incitement to others to follow his steps ?

Another observation occurs, to show still farther the utility of this inferior species of biography.—It is at present the general practice

practice of biographers, to chuse their subjects solely from men of high life. Of course, only people of a similar sphere derive any benefit from their works.—Say the body of the people, “ Well might such a man be public-spirited, charitable, and beneficent ; were we as opulent, we would be as benevolent—Had his income been as scanty as ours, his beneficence would have been less diffusive.”

By thus neglecting to give unto merit its due reward, without regard to station or circumstances, a plausible excuse is furnished to the great bulk of mankind, for indulging themselves in selfishness, avarice, and inhumanity.—“ Men of opulence,” say they, “ may do good to their country ; because their riches and sphere of action enable them to give full scope to the inclinations of their hearts :—We wish for the prosperity of our country and the happiness of mankind as ardently as they ;—but as to us, the will must be accepted for the deed : people in our situation and contracted spheres, have not the means of putting our desires

desires in execution.”—Hence it happens, that when any undertaking of public utility is proposed, the whole burden devolves upon a few individuals; whereas, if every individual could be persuaded to contribute in proportion to his circumstances; were public-spiritedness the characteristic of our island; were the feelings of its inhabitants so far improved, and their minds expanded to such a degree, that they found themselves prompted both from motives of duty and of sympathy, to give at least some assistance to every plan formed for the improvement of their country, no undertaking, however great or extensive, would ever prove abortive, from a deficiency either of money or manual labour.

The nature of things stamps it a palpable absurdity, to entertain any reasonable hopes of rendering public-spiritedness the characteristic of a nation, unless we apply our prescriptions to the mind before it has acquired habits of an opposite tendency. Public-spirit, like every other virtue, must be early and repeatedly inculcated, in order to
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make it a permanent and established principle of action.

It is imagined, that the species of history we have been speaking of, if properly managed, might greatly promote, in the minds of children, a noble and disinterested affection to the human kind. Spirited, but simple and genuine narrations of the several actions, affections, and principles of men who have on all occasions discovered an universal love to mankind, a strong, unbiaſſed, and peculiar attachment to their country, &c. I ſay, were books of this kind as frequently peruſed by children as fooliſh or obſcene romances, the good effects of ſuch education would ſoon be diſplayed in the general tempers and diſpoſitions of youth. A generous public-ſpirited temper, like true devotion, is only attainable by an habitual contemplation of objects poſſeſſed of that valuable quality.

To imitate what we naturally admire, or what our minds are frequently converſant about, is a fundamental principle of the human

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man constitution. This principle of imitation is most powerful in the morning of life. Of course, children should never be permitted to see, hear, or read of actions, the imitation of which can in any degree vitiate their taste or corrupt their hearts.

PART

P A R T III.

Means of Promoting Public Spirit, adapted to the Present Situation of Mankind.

TO a diligent inquirer into the motives from which the generality of human actions take their rise, it must appear, that disinterested love to the public, is a very rare virtue. Indeed, every man who has had the smallest intercourse with his own species, will readily acknowledge, that self is the great idol of almost every individual. Some exceptions, it is true, must be made : But these are extremely few in proportion to those who seem incapable of conceiving, or, at least, artfully smother every generous sentiment as soon as conceived. It is impossible for men, on all emergencies, to divest themselves entirely of humanity. Social feelings will, on some occasions, glow in the breast of the miser. Would to heaven
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he were not endowed with the capacity of extinguishing the generous flame.—Give the selfish man but a moment's deliberation, and a thousand cool pretexts will instantly render his soul callous and impenetrable by any motive or feeling which has not self for its ultimate object.

It is a melancholy, but unquestionable truth, that, taking mankind by the bulk, liberality of sentiment bears but a very small proportion to partial and selfish feelings. Whence comes this great, this ignoble fatality?—Blame not Nature, O man! She has stamped upon your constitution the decent, well-meaning instinct of self-preservation; but you have industriously glutted this useful domestic, till it has grown up to be a proud, cruel, and tyrannical oppressor,—of what?—of the human kind, for whose protection and happiness it had been originally destined by their bountiful Creator. Selfishness, as has been shown, derives its origin from indiscretions in the education of children. It is our business now to show, that the behaviour of most men, in the

common affairs of life, instead of eradicating this early bias to narrowness of spirit, tends to make its root still deeper in the mind.

It is a frequent wish of men of contracted views, That all mankind were on a level with regard to power and wealth ; that the terms *superior* and *inferior*, *master* and *servant*, were never heard or understood among the sons of men. This is undoubtedly the language of ignorance and peevishness. Nature has wisely decreed, that certain degrees of subordination should take place through the whole circle of her admirable productions. Men of learning and discernment easily perceive the beauty and utility of such a seemingly unequal distribution : But to the vulgar it is, and must be an inexplicable mystery : And what are the vulgar ? Why, ninety-nine in a hundred of the whole human race. That vast body of men seldom or never think for themselves. Their actions are not the result of reason or reflection. Precedents, habits, and the all-powerful influence of example, are the

the principal sources of all the actions and determinations of the vulgar.—If you ask a clown why he thinks or acts in such a manner? His answer, if he is ingenuous, will generally be to this purpose:—"Because his father did so before him; because he was used to do so all his life;" or more commonly still, "Because the Lord of the manor, or the clergyman of the parish always did so."—One should imagine, that it would be a matter of very small difficulty to alter, at pleasure, opinions founded on such mere shadows of reasoning. Experience, however, evinces, that it is extremely difficult to rectify or change the notions and conceits of such people. Their minds are steeled against the voice of reason, when it comes in competition with any of their prejudices. To endeavour to work upon the minds of the vulgar with fine sense, (says a penetrating wit), is like attempting to hew blocks with razors.—How, then, must the vulgar be treated in order to make them public spirited? or how shall their views be so far extended as to render them subservient to the good of the state, or the interests

interests of society ? There is but one infallible method of solving this problem.—The very same means must be employed in order to make their dispositions liberal and disinterested which were formerly the causes of their illiberality and selfishness.

Example, that great ruler of the human kind, is the only certain means of operating upon the vulgar mind. General example, it must be confessed, is capable, in some measure, of moulding almost every man's motives and actions into whatever shape it pleases to assume. Hence every man is bound by a double obligation to lead a virtuous life. Not only his own safety and happiness depend on his good behaviour, but, if he is a man of rank and figure, his words, actions, and principles will insensibly infect most of his companions, and all his dependents without distinction. Did not the experience of all ages and nations extort our belief, it would be absolutely incredible how far the influence of one man's example may sometimes extend.—Let not those of inferior stations, however, imagine, that

that their natural obscurity and contracted influence, free them from this obligation. That man must be very low indeed, who is not a superior to some. The meanest labourer as well as the greatest monarch, is a man of figure in the eyes of many. Hence the obligation is binding upon every individual. The extent of their influence, their capacity of doing good or evil, must indeed always be in proportion to their power and superiority. Hence the degree of obligation, and the extent of the influence of example will be great or small, according as the person is of a high or a low rank in life.

How great, then, is the happiness of that nation which is blessed with a humane, benevolent, and public-spirited Sovereign? The King is justly styled the Father and Representative of his people; his principles, his actions, his gestures, nay, the very defects of his body, are all subjects of universal imitation. The vices or virtues of a Prince are first communicated to his Court, and, through that all-infecting channel, conveyed

ed to the farthest limits of his dominions. Hence every King may emphatically be said to reign in the hearts of his subjects. —If credit is due to the general voice of the nation, the people of this fortunate island have no reason to call upon their Sovereign to exert the extensive influence natural to his exalted station, in order to diffuse public spirit and disinterested patriotism through the nation. It ought nevertheless to be considered, that the influence of example, however eminent the personage, is slow in its motion. Allowing our present Sovereign to possess the highest degree of public spirit, and the warmest affection for his subjects; yet, as he has been but a short time upon the throne*, and his reign, ever since he arrived at that exalted dignity, has been so much embroiled both by foreign and domestic commotions, that the influence of his example cannot possibly have induced any considerable number of imitators. We may indulge ourselves in the prospect of future happiness, when the devouring mouths of clamour and faction shall be stopped; when that high tide of
passion,

passion, which has excited intestine dissensions among the chiefs of our nation, shall change its current, unite its force, and exert all its vigour, in promoting the interest and prosperity of Britons, and no longer stand, like a mighty barrier, obstructing the powerful influence of Majesty from diffusing a spirit of universal benevolence over the land. Until that happy period arrive, which every lover of his country or of mankind must earnestly wish for, we cannot expect that the example of our Sovereign can have any extensive influence in promoting genuine patriotism among his people.

Next to the example of Majesty, that of men of fortune and property stands forth as the great transformer of the people. Consider all ye on whom Heaven has liberally bestowed the good things of this life, seriously consider your own real importance. On your conduct much depends: The prosperity of your country; the happiness of your inferiors; nay, the eternal as well as temporal felicity of millions, in a good measure,

sure, hangs on your behaviour. Every eye is intent on your actions ; every ear greedily devours your words ; your principles are infused into every heart. Like a lofty mountain in the centre of a wide extended plain, you attract the attention of the whole country round.—Nay more ; you not only attract the general attention, but you possess the singular virtue of *transforming* the beholders into your own likenesses ! If you are virtuous, the generality of the people will be virtuous ; if vicious, the people will be vicious likewise ; if your hearts are narrow, selfish, and overbearing, avarice, chicanery, and pride, will be the characteristics of the multitude : In a word, you have the hearts of the whole nation in your power : Can you then hesitate one moment ? Let your good example shine forth, and you are sure of universal imitation.—Reflect, on the other hand, if you indulge vicious habits, if your conduct flagrantly declares, that you are actuated by selfish, not by public-spirited motives ; that you are ready to desert the interest of your country whenever it coincides not with your private advantage ;—reflect,

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we intreat you, that in place of being public blessings to your country, the influence of your fatal example unavoidably carries misery and destruction wherever it unfortunately extends.

It is almost needless to be more particular upon this subject.—Does any man of property wish to see his lands improved by his tenants? Let himself take the lead, by employing all his skill and ingenuity in meliorating the portion he keeps in his own possession; let him inclose, plant, and otherwise adorn his own gardens and parks; let him be affable and condescending to his farmers and tacksmen; let him openly display the advantages of proper culture; let him, finally, give leases of a reasonable length, and not be too rigorous or oppressive in his demands; then, and not till then, will he ever be able to effect this noble purpose.

Trade and manufactures are no less necessary than agriculture for fortifying and enriching Great Britain. The peculiar si-

tuation of the island naturally demands the greatest attention of its inhabitants to commerce and manual arts. These are too evident sources of national strength and opulence to be neglected by the legislature. It is owing to the peculiar favour and support of government, joined to the protection and encouragement of public-spirited societies and individuals, that the commerce and manufactures of Great Britain have of late made such rapid progress.

Nothing can contribute more effectually to promote public advantage, than the erection of societies for propagating and encouraging arts, sciences, and manufactures. To see men of the greatest opulence and distinction in the kingdom forming themselves into societies, contributing large sums of money, and bestowing both their labour and time, in order to induce men of inferior ranks to improve their own branches of business, &c. must be a pleasing object of contemplation to every liberal mind. The effects produced by these truly patriotic associations fully justify the end of their institution.

institution. When the uninstructed part of mankind perceive, that they are even bribed to do their duty, a spirit of emulation naturally arises in their minds ; each endeavours to excel in his particular profession, that he may obtain the approbation and reward of his countrymen : Indolence and slovenliness retire apace ; and industry, neatness, and ingenuity occupy their place.

The wonderful changes in the manners of the people, the great improvements in agriculture, manufactures, &c. which have appeared, within these few years, in this northern part of the united kingdom, must surprise and delight every benevolent heart. These unlooked for events are the native fruits of two or three public-spirited societies*, the generous members of which have spared neither cost nor labour in exciting their countrymen to industry in every art which can contribute to public utility.

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* The Commissioners and Trustees for manufactures and improvements in Scotland ;—Hon. Select Society of Edinburgh ;—The Society for Propagating Christian Knowledge, &c.

We presume not to make any criticisms on the manner of conducting these noble institutions : we should rather congratulate that country which gives birth to such ornaments of human nature ; and our congratulations should be still more hearty, were the number of such societies increased, or the funds of the present ones greatly enlarged.—We shall in a few words explain what is meant by this observation.

Provided all or most of the men of fortune in each particular county in Scotland would erect themselves into separate societies for the encouragement of arts, &c. within their own particular counties, we imagine that institutions of this kind would in a short time diffuse a spirit of improvement to the farthest bounds of the nation.

The advantages which would attend a prudent execution of this plan are abundantly obvious.—Manufacturers, &c. who live at a great distance from the metropolis, allowing them to be properly advertised of the bounties offered by the Edinburgh Societies,

cieties, must of necessity labour under several disadvantages which those who are less remote from the capital cannot feel. The risk and difficulty of transmitting specimens of their art or industry ; the want of proper persons to direct their behaviour ; nay, some country-mechanics are so very ignorant, that they are unable fully to comprehend the directions contained in a common advertisement. These, and many other difficulties, although of a trifling nature, are more than sufficient to cramp the influence of the societies at Edinburgh, especially in corners of the kingdom where indolence and ignorance are the characteristics of the people. It is even difficult to make persons in this situation believe, that money, or any other reward of merit, will ever be transmitted to them, unless they have had experience of it themselves, or seen it transmitted to others in similar circumstances. Time, and the diligence of the Edinburgh Societies, will no doubt obviate these difficulties. But the plan we have hinted at would, it is thought, be the means of introducing improvements in a shorter time,
and

and of propagating taste, genius, and public-spirit more universally over the kingdom.

Were it practicable for every man of property to offer small premiums for the improvement of arts, &c. among those who reside within the bounds of his own estate, we imagine this would be a still more effectual method of dispelling ignorance, exciting a taste for improvement in every branch of manufacture, &c. than any that could be devised. A noble personage* has lately, by his own example, paved the way for this. May his generous attempt not only prove successful, but incite such of his countrymen as are enabled, by their station and fortune, to pursue the like public-spirited resolution.

The landed gentlemen of any particular county must necessarily know, from its soil, situation, and the genius of the inhabitants, what arts or manufactures, what species of commerce, &c. are most needed, and best suited to the dispositions and capacities of
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* Duke of Queensberry.

the people.—The proprietors of estates are, or should be, best skilled in the means of improving or embellishing their own lands, and best acquainted with those arts, &c. which require the greatest encouragement, and would be most conducive to the prosperity and happiness of themselves and their vassals. Of course, the proprietors of each county, or the proprietors of each particular portion of land, are best qualified for superintending the distribution of premiums, as the rewards of merit and industry in their respective counties or estates.

We have hazarded these observations with a view to excite all lovers of their country to think of this, or some other more practicable scheme of extending a spirit of improvement through this too much neglected part of our island.

No man of any sensibility can travel a dozen of miles from the capital itself without feeling very disagreeable emotions, occasioned by the appearance of vast tracks of barren ground, overspread with heath and
other

other dismal productions of uncultivated nature.—Muir, marshes, and deserts reflect not on any country, but are a keen satire upon its inhabitants. The best soils, the most favourable climates, must be cleared of their native rubbish before they can be made subservient to the various uses of man. —The inhabitants of Britain have for many years been infected with a very strange phrenzy: they go over in flocks to our American colonies, to fell trees, &c. leaving perhaps one-half of their own country over-run with heath, furze, and quagmyres, although, in many respects, it is capable of as profitable culture. We are, however, unwilling to enter upon this subject, as it admits of endless dispute. But we cannot help being surprised, that some method has not been fallen upon to render the culture of the mother-country more universal. The division of commonies may in time have some effect. Would it not much forward this useful design, were private gentlemen, or public societies, to offer premiums for rendering small portions of muir or other barren

barren ground fit for the growth of corn, flax, potatoes, turnip, &c.?

To the farmer, or other person, who shall, in a specified time, make an acre of such a muir fit for the growth of corn, &c. *Ten Guineas*; or any other sum the offerers shall judge proper.

To the person who shall, in a limited time, render fit for the growth of corn, &c. half an acre; a quarter of an acre, &c.—sums proportioned to these several quantities.

We have avoided the dogmatical strain on this subject; sensible of our own inexperience in matters of this nature, we chuse only to give hints, leaving the expediency or practicability of the execution to those who are better acquainted with country-affairs.

As we have all along proceeded on the supposition, that, when inforcing the practice of any virtue, our principal application

should be to the mind itself, we shall now point out some general maxims and modes of behaviour, which are destructive to public spirit ; sometimes barely mentioning the faults, and sometimes giving directions how to avoid them.

SECTION I.

Gaming.

WHOEVER considers the nature and tendency of gaming, will readily admit, that whenever it is much practised in any nation, the ruin of that nation is fast approaching. Idleness, inattention, luxury, profusion, rancour, &c. are the genuine offspring of gaming. But, let us make the favourable supposition, that the spirit of gaming were entirely confined to men of opulence and distinction.—What are the dispositions of a man's mind when keenly busied at game? This question admits of
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an easy solution. While a person is thus employed, he must of necessity be totally divested of every social affection. Wholly occupied about his own fortune, and heartily praying for the loss and misfortune of his antagonists, every generous, every public spirited motive is, during the time he is thus employed, entirely suppressed. Hence a habit of gaming must necessarily generate a habit of selfishness. Allowing gaming, therefore, to be solely the amusement of men of fortune, the matter is but little mended ; for, if the hearts of those whom Nature has constituted patterns of imitation to their inferiors, are selfish and contracted, what can be expected of the common people ?—In every view, therefore, gaming is destructive to public spirit, and, of course, to the general interests of the nation.

How shall this evil, which is but too much practised in our island, be remedied ? Penal laws have hitherto been found insufficient for the purpose. Unless some method can be invented of making gaming dishonourable,

dishonourable, nothing else will ever be able to banish it from the affections of people of fashion. Were gaming once esteemed as mean and infamous as theft or forgery, it would soon sink into obscurity. But how is this to be effected?—Would not a general resolution of the principal noblemen and gentlemen, That from and after such a date, all games of hazard, whatever be their denomination, shall be laid aside, and, in all time coming, be esteemed infamous and disgraceful, produce a total contempt of this baneful practice?—The nation will be infinitely indebted to that county or society who shall publish such a noble resolution to the world: Not only may they expect to see their example followed, but their generous and public-spirited conduct will insure them of the applauses of every virtuous heart.

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SECTION II.

Contempt of the Vulgar.

TO despise the Vulgar, is a very fashionable, and very universal affectation. This modish species of cruelty is practised by almost every person who is able to purchase a *genteel* suit of cloaths.—Strange, that objects of compassion, instead of meeting with sympathy and relief, should be despised and oppressed by their superiors ! If the vulgar are poor or illiterate, we should rather make their poverty supportable by our generosity, and use our utmost endeavours to dispel their ignorance.

Contempt necessarily begets contempt. If men of high rank despise those of inferior stations, they are sure of being despised by them in turn. Hence it happens, that when men of rank, who are haughty and supercilious to the multitude, propose any plan which requires the concurrence of the vulgar,

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gar, they generally find great difficulty in the execution of it. The vulgar are naturally inclined to oppose whatever is proposed by their contemners, whether it relate to public or private advantage. Hence the utility of popularity, and of condescending to the innocent humours of the people.

On the other hand, were men of fortune to look upon the vulgar as their children, and treat them with all the humanity of parents ; would they overlook their ignorance or meanness, humour their innocent foibles or inconsistencies, &c. such a conduct would greatly conduce both to their own interest and that of the nation. Daily experience shows, that when any gentleman behaves good-naturedly to his poor countrymen, not only his own domestics, but every labourer in the county is so firmly attached to his person and interest, that they are more jealous of his honour than of their own. They enter as it were instinctively into all his views: They do their utmost to gratify him in every thing
which

which he discovers the least solicitude to have performed.—Hence one disinterested patriot has it in his power to create a thousand ; *et e contra*.

SECTION III.

Scandal ; or False Judgment of Actions.

MANKIND are naturally anxious to discover the motives from which actions proceed. Some men, indeed, are so charitably inclined, that they are unwilling to find out selfish or sinister motives even when the action is evidently bad. But much greater is the number of those who exert all their ingenuity in resolving the actions of others into bad or interested motives. If a person performs a generous deed, if he contributes money in order to promote any undertaking calculated for the good of the public, or that of individuals ; this is immediately

mediately resolved into mere show and ostentation. A man of virtue will doubtless despise such ill-natured reflections, and consider them as artful excuses contrived to draw a veil over avarice and narrowness of heart. But insinuations of this nature may sometimes deter people of less resolution from doing what their inclinations would otherwise lead them to perform.— To judge of the merit of the action, not of its motive or cause, is all that belongs to man. If the action be good in itself, praise is due to the author of it; if otherwise, the performer merits reproach in proportion to the turpitude of his behaviour.

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SECTION IV.

Of Marriage.

MARRIAGE is one of the greatest bonds of society. It gives rise to a variety of endearing connections. Hence marriage increases that *amor patriae* which, in one degree or other, all are possessed of.—Of course, if ever this institution should fall into disrepute, population will proportionally decrease, and the attachment to the native soil will be greatly weakened.

There seems to be some foundation for a pretty common complaint, that marriage is at present too little esteemed, and too little practised in our island. This is an object which claims the deepest attention of the Legislature,—Taxes on celibacy have been talked of, whether seriously or not is uncertain. Although such a law should be

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passed, the effects it would produce are at best very doubtful.

The root of this evil will be found, upon a strict examination, to take its rise from the prodigious number of prostitutes which are dispersed over the whole kingdom.—It is the interest of prostitutes to use all their art in order to make marriage appear ridiculous, contemptible, and burdensome, in the eyes of unexperienced young men, who are but too liable to catch, and too ready to spread, the poisonous infection. Thus false representations of one of the noblest sources of human felicity are communicated to the whole youth in the nation. It requires a considerable degree of fortitude to resist the attacks of ridicule. Of all other periods of life, youth is most easily overcome by raillery. Hence false modesty, added to habits of licentiousness, are the grand sources of celibacy, especially amongst men of fortune, the influence of whose example procures the imitation of the lower classes of mankind.—The remedy, therefore, resolves into a contrary practice of
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men of figure and distinction, joined to a diminution or extirpation of prostitutes.

SECTION V.

Profanity ; or Contempt of Religion.

TO prove that vice is more prevalent in this than in former ages, although practicable, could serve no useful purpose. Every man's own observation may convince him, that profanity, or a contempt of religion and virtue, is the characteristic of too great a proportion of mankind. Vice as well as virtue is of a progressive nature. It is not our business to inquire into the multiplicity of causes which conspire in spreading the contagion of vice.—Willingly would we decline that disagreeable necessity which obliges us to point out some of the teachers of religion themselves as one chief cause of the prevalency of vice.

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That some clergymen too frequently and too openly indulge themselves in practices which are inconsistent with the nature of their sacred function, is a truth founded on general experience.—That the vices of clergymen are more hurtful to society than those of the laity, is incontestible.

How cautiously, then, O ye servants of God! should you demean yourselves in every varying scene of life!—Jealousy and malice continually watch your steps. If you stumble, or but seem to stumble, the enemies of religion triumph in the opportunity of traducing both your character and office. You declaim against scoffers and despisers of religion. Such declamations are always seasonable.—But consider, we intreat you, whether you are anywise instrumental in propagating this noxious evil. Is it not a pretty frequent practice, especially among the youthful brethren, to throw out portions of sacred writ on the most absurd and incongruous incidents?—Cheerful company, or a social glass, naturally enliven the genius, and create an itch after wit and railery.

lery. But should not every source of ridicule, every fountain of wit be drained to the very dregs, before a clergyman should have recourse to the Sacred Oracles for a supply?—Such conduct may excite a laugh of applause from the inconsiderate; but, if men of sober reflection chance to be present, they will certainly despise you. Reflect on the tendency of such ludicrous treatment of the Scriptures. The vicious part of mankind are confirmed in their favourite hypothesis, That the Christian system is a cheat, and its ministers a set of impostors; and the weak or ignorant believers are in danger of espousing the same opinion.—You complain, that your churches are badly attended: It is true.—But do you not often give orders, or licences, to persons who are extremely ill-qualified for instructing the ignorant, convincing the infidel, and reclaiming the vicious?—We shall constitute you judges in your own cause;—Have you not often blushed at the ignorance and stupidity of some of your brethren when preaching in your own pulpits? Would to God you could answer in the negative!—

Cease,

Cease, then, from complaining, till you are more delicate in the article of licences.—Give no man a commission to explain the nature of virtue, and the duties which religion enjoins, unless he is capable not only of understanding them himself, but likewise of decently enforcing the practice of them upon the minds of a judicious audience.—Besides, do not even the men of sense and erudition amongst you, sometimes deliver their sermons in a very cold, indifferent, unaffecting manner?—No wonder that the hearers are listless and drowsy, when the minister himself scarce seems to have it at heart whether they attend to him or not!—Finally, if you would wish to see the Oracles of Truth more universally respected, and the precepts of religion and virtue more generally practised, never mention the former but with the utmost reverence; never suffer the progress of the latter to be obstructed by your own ignorance or vicious example.

We have thus presumed to mention some of the capital vices which presently subsist amongst

amongst some of the clergy, not to gratify any motives of malice or resentment, but solely because we have often experienced, and as often lamented, that those who are appointed to propagate religion and virtue should be anywise accessary in retarding the progress of both.

Let us now consider the strong harmony which subsists between religion and public-spirit.—A very slight degree of attention is sufficient for this purpose whether we reflect on the qualities of the great Object of religion, or on the wholesome precepts which it enjoins.

The universal object of religious adoration is the Supreme Creator and Governor of every being that exists, or ever did exist, throughout the unlimited paths of immensity.—All the qualities of the Deity known or comprehensible by the human faculties, excite in us not only the ideas of infinite power, but likewise of unbounded goodness and beneficence. He has called myriads of animals into existence not to make a pompous

pous display of power, but to communicate the blessings of life.—That existence, in whatever form or degree, is a blessing to the possessor, cannot be questioned. That this blessing might be communicated in the most extensive manner, is certainly the cause of that vast profusion of animal life with which every element is crowded. It is a maxim in Nature, that no blank should be left in the great scale of being. A strict adherence to this benign maxim, is the reason why such prodigious troops of animals, many of which are not only useless, but even noxious to the human kind, are called into life. Nay, lest any void should be left, man, the undoubted chief of all terrestrial animals, is suffered to be infested, and, in many instances, actually injured both in his person and goods, rather than the blessings of existence should be anywise cramped or circumscribed.

The Author of Nature has not only richly diffused animal life through all his stupendous works, but has provided every species with the means of preserving their existence

istence till they have tasted of every gratification which their several ends and constitutions are capable of receiving: so inconceivably benevolent is the Supreme Being, that he has furnished man and other animals with many objects whose chief end seems to be the recreation and entertainment of the animate creation.

The signatures of the most unbounded benevolence being thus evidently impressed upon every operation of the Great Parent of Nature, what better method can possibly be devised, in order to excite public-spirit-ness and universal benevolence in the human heart, than the frequent contemplation of this most amiable and divine Object?—A powerful law of the human constitution impels every man to imitate the qualities or perfections of any being which draw forth his admiration. Of course, nothing can have greater energy in promoting and supporting humanity and benevolence among mankind, than an habitual contemplation of the perfections and operations of the Deity.

The precepts of religion are no less wisely calculated for promoting benevolence and a public-spirited temper, than the contemplation of its Almighty Object. Benevolence, and disinterested love to the whole human race, is the very genius of Christianity. Every action which the Saviour of mankind performed, every word he spoke was fraught with love and compassion to the sons of men. He commanded nothing to be done by man, but what was strictly connected even with his temporal advantage.—Temperance, and self-government; industry and meekness; submissive resignation to the determinations of providence; supreme love to God; an ardent, unbiassed affection to mankind;—these are the leading precepts of the Christian system.—It seems indeed to be a general maxim in revelation, That the interest of individuals should always vanish whenever it comes in competition with the good of the public.

Upon the whole, then, we must conclude, that true religion and public-spirit are so intimately connected, that the former necessarily

cessarily implies the latter. Hence, if we would wish to see public-spiritedness the genuine characteristic of our nation, every method should be used which can have the remotest tendency to recommend religion and virtue to the esteem and affections of the people.

ESSAY

ESSAY I.

WHETHER are all Animate and Inanimate BODIES Made for the Immediate Use and Convenience of MANKIND ; or, is that only a Secondary END of their EXISTENCE ?*

THAT every created substance was originally designed for the immediate or more remote benefit of mankind, is a very popular opinion.—That it is so, is not to be wondered at, as it is a doctrine which gratifies that arrogance and presumption which so universally characterise the human species.

If we take a survey of man as connected with the numerous objects which minister to his necessities, or with those which serve
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* Read before the Newtonian Society of Edin. 1762.

only to rouse his admiration, and call forth the latent principles of invention and ingenuity, which, without being excited by the contemplation of such objects, would probably never be brought to light; such a survey will doubtless carry a strong conviction along with it, That mankind derive very eminent advantages from the inferior orders of beings. Horses, sheep, cows, dogs, &c. alleviate the toils or gratify the appetite of this Lord of Creation. The vegetable and fossil kingdoms likewise concur with the animal in facilitating his mechanical operations and filling his stomach, with the additional circumstance of curing his distempers, and repairing his constitution when worn out or shattered by the fumes of intemperance.

But that the advantage derived to mankind from these creatures is the primary end of their existence, or was the motive which induced the bountiful Author of Nature to call them into being, is an opinion, not only doubtful, but contradictory to reason itself.

If

If it was originally intended that every thing this world contains should, in some degree, be subservient to the use of man, I am afraid, the following observations will clearly show, that this intention has been frustrated, and missed its aim.

Many species of animals roam wild and savage in the barren mountains or the pathless forest, where never mortal dared to approach, without having cause to repent of his temerity.—The inland parts of America, the sandy deserts of Africa, the frozen mountains of Greenland, and the vast tracts of uninhabited land to the North East of Muscovy and Tartary : These, though seldom trodden by the foot of man, are nevertheless teeming with numberless animals, which never have the smallest communication or intercourse with the human species.—On the contrary, it is well known that they fly from and hate the sight of a human face.

It is remarked by the planters in the Back Settlements of America, That whenever

ever they take up their residence, although in the most uncultivated woods, the wild beasts, which, upon their first approach, they observe crowd together during the night in incredible numbers, howling, and sending forth such hideous cries, as to render the persons incapable of hearing one another in their tents ; as soon, however, as they perceive that men have intruded upon their property, they instantly retire to the inmost recesses of the woods ; and thus, as conscious of the cruelty of mankind, and of their own independence, they endeavour to avoid the society of beings whose fellowship is so repugnant to their own natures.

Besides, all noxious animals, of which there are many species, instead of being useful, are, to the inhabitants of many places of the world, the very bane of society and mutual intercourse. Travellers from one city to another must be very careful in defending themselves from these merciless enemies. Every step they advance, a new degree of terror and anxiety is easily discoverable

discoverable in their timorous and foreboding looks.—I know it will be observed by some of my readers, That many of the noxious animals, such as Rattle-snakes, Vipers, &c. afford powerful specifics against the fatal effects of poison : But, it must be considered, that the fat of such animals, which is the substance principally employed, is only a specific against the effects of those very diseases of which they themselves are the immediate cause. It is likewise found by experience, that the fat or oil of any animal has the same tendency to correct the vicious state of the humours occasioned by the poisonous bite of serpents, as the fat of the Viper or Rattle-snake.

Add to all this, That there are a vast variety of animals, inhabitants of earth, air, water, &c. which have but very lately been discovered, and, since such discovery, have been but seldom subject to the examination, far less appropriated to the use, of man : not to mention how natural the conclusion of the existence of many species which to this

hour have never been discovered by the most industrious naturalists.

Again, if we direct our views to the insect tribe, we will, from paying a sufficient attention to the life and economy of these, find it equally impossible to show, or deduce from any accurate process of reasoning, that the condition of man is any how bettered, or his happiness in any degree promoted, by their existence. That the industry and activity of the human genius has invented the means of converting the manufacture of some, and the bodies of others, into materials fitted either to embellish and adorn the exterior figure, or to repel the force and virulence of some distempers, I am sufficiently aware can admit of no doubt.

But as a counterpoise to such trifling advantages, the experience of all ages concurs in demonstrating, that many of the diseases and calamities that attend human life are owing entirely to these minute but formidable enemies, which are enabled, by the
smallness

finallness of their bodies, to enter into the composition of all kinds of food, and even to pass unobserved into the most important and tender organs of our bodies, and there produce the most violent and fatal effects.

Many similar observations might be made concerning the scarcity, inutility, and deleterious nature of several species of vegetables and fossils.

I presume, that many of my readers have, by this time, prevented me in drawing the proper conclusions from the short historical view I have given of this subject; and are therefore fully prepared to join with me in exclaiming against the absurdities which flow from the supposition, That the principal intention of every created substance was solely the interest of the human race.

Is it not, then, absurd to imagine, that these species of animals, whose existence is barely known, such as the Ourang Outang, &c. who serve no other purpose but to terrify or surprize the unwary traveller; who,
ever

ever since this world was created, have never had any connection with mankind, far less been by them applied to any beneficial purpose : Is it not absurd, I say, to maintain, That the principal design of such animals, of which there are infinite numbers, was the advantage of the human species ?

Again, would it not, if possible, be still more absurd to suppose, That animals of the rapacious kind, whose chief aim is to destroy every person who is so unfortunate as to come within the reach of their power, were intended by Nature to minister comfort or afford real benefit to man ?

Can any thing be more contradictory to common sense, than that noxious animals, such as the Torpedo, Serpents, Tarantula, &c. should be of use to mankind, the poisonous qualities of some of which are so virulent, that instant death is the consequence of their slightest bite or sting : Is it not unreasonable to think, that such creatures are in any degree serviceable to mankind ? especially when it is considered, that there is an
original

original instinct implanted in our nature's which teaches us not only to avoid, but to do our utmost towards an utter extirpation of them from the face of the earth.

Again, can any person, who, in a sultry summer-day, has travelled through a thick wood, or even between two of our common hedges, believe, that such a vast profusion of animals as every where assault his eyes and ears are of singular advantage to him, and that he could not be so happy without them? A man possessed of such a degree of credulity may easily be convinced, that whoever drubs him heartily, or beats the eyes out of his head, is upon the whole his real friend, and that it would have been a disadvantage to him if such a man never had existed.

But, passing such general reasoning, were I asked, What advantage do mankind receive from Moles, Rats, Mice, &c.? I would answer, That we are mightily obliged to them for undermining our houses, destroying the productions of our gardens, defiling

defiling and gormandising our bread, &c. But another person might say, that these animals were made to employ the ingenuity, and fill the stomachs of cats: In this case, I would add; If such animals did not exist, the use of cats would likewise be entirely superseded.

But I foresee a specious objection rising up, which must be immediately obviated.

It will, perhaps, be said by some, That these notions are too confined; that I have taken but a partial view of the works of creation; and seem to have no idea of that vast chain of nature which connects every species of creatures together, and makes them mutually to depend and be subservient to each other; and that this chain of utility advances by slow degrees till it arrives at that noble creature Man, whose good is the ultimate end of every created existence.

I shall always think myself happy in the contemplation of that beautiful concatenation

tion of being : But I cannot admit that beings are thus linked together for the sole benefit of their chief, without any regard to their own welfare and happiness: Were this the case, the Ourang Outang, and all the Monkey kind, as approaching nearest to the human species in wisdom and sagacity, should be more serviceable to mankind than horse, sheep, cows, &c. which I am persuaded none will ever take it into their heads so much as to suppose.

I have already said enough to convince the philosopher : But I have others to convince.

I have looked into the Pentateuch of Moses, and picked out a few verses, relative to this subject, with a view to illustrate them.

Gen. 1. & 28. " And God blessed Adam and Eve, and said unto them, Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth, and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish
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of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth."

It is almost needless to observe here the difference between having the superiority or dominion over any Creature, and the chief end of that Creature's being. On a contrary supposition, the life of all the lower ranks of men would be chiefly intended to gratify the avarice of their Masters. The people would be created for the sake of the King, and the whole world, for the sake of a few ambitious individuals; than which nothing can be more ridiculously absurd.

Verse 29. "And God said to Adam and his wife, I have given you every herb bearing seed which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree in which is the fruit of a tree, yielding seed: To you it shall be for meat."

In order to understand this verse, I must contrast it with its neighbour the 30th.

30th.

30th. "And to every beast of the earth, and to every fowl of the air, and to every thing that creepeth upon the earth, wherein there is life, I have given every green herb for meat."

These two verses are quite irreconcilable to experience, unless we limit the sense of the word *every*. For, without such limitation, men should, in compliance with the institution contained in the 29th verse, without distinction, eat every individual green herb that beareth seed, and every individual tree that beareth fruit. And, if the brute creation complied with the injunctions given them in the 30th verse, every beast of the earth should eat every individual green herb ; every fowl of the air should eat every individual green herb ; and every insect that creepeth upon the earth should eat every individual green herb. This would indeed introduce a most extensive and universal community of goods.

The evident meaning of every tree, fruit, and herb's being given to man for food, is no more than giving him authority to select, from the vast variety of vegetables, whatever herbs, fruits, or seeds, he finds, by experience, to be most proper for the health and nourishment of his body. And, without the assistance of such experience, unerring instinct directs the distinct species of animals to pick out only such herbs as are fitted by Nature for their sustenance.

As I am now tired of the subject; I shall crown the whole by another observation or two, which may be considered as very strong arguments in favour of my side of the question.

When a man endeavours to take a complex view of this lower world, he is apt to be so struck with the immensity of the idea, as to give up all as an inexplicable mystery. Although unable to arrange the whole into any regular plan, he will easily perceive, that the Author of Nature seems to discover a degree of anxiety for crowding every
element

element with as much life as it is possible for it to maintain ; air, earth, water, nay, even the bodies of animals themselves, are overstocked with inhabitants. The cause of this anxiety can be nothing else but the overflowings of beneficence in the Divine Mind, willing that no vacuity should be left, but that all should be filled with beings capable of enjoying the blessings of his bounty.

Of all the inhabitants of this world, man is undoubtedly the most noble. Of course, it is reasonable that he should inherit greater privileges and advantages than creatures of inferior natures ; and, likewise, that he should endeavour to render as many things subservient to his peculiar advantage, as he possibly can. The superiority of his genius, and, I am afraid, frequently the cruelty of his disposition, is the cause of his extensive dominion over the brute creation. This unlimited tyranny may perhaps have given rise to the general, though mistaken notion, That these creatures were made chiefly with a view to his interest.

That

That existence, in whatever form or degree, is a blessing to the possessor, is an undeniable truth. That this blessing might be diffused in the fullest and most ample manner, is the foundation of the wonderful concatenation of animal life above taken notice of. It is a maxim in Nature, That no blank should be left in the vast scale of being. A strict adherence, I imagine, to this catholic maxim, is the reason why such prodigious troops of animals, not only useless, but even noxious to mankind, are called into life. Accordingly we see, that, left any void should be left, mankind are suffered to be infested, and, in many instances, actually injured, by creatures which all his ingenuity is unable to turn to any advantage. This, again, throws light upon another maxim, That all partial evil is universal good ; for even man, the chief of animals, must submit to many evils and inconveniencies, rather than that the blessings of life should be denied to insects and wild beasts.

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Were this doctrine properly pursued, it would, I apprehend, reconcile us to many of the mysteries of Providence, "and justify the ways of God to man."

ESSAY

ESSAY II.

Whether ORATORY, upon the
whole, has been of Use to
MANKIND * ?

IN all our reasonings concerning matters of fact, we ought to lay it down as an invariable rule, to take as general and extensive a view of the subject as the nature of it will admit of: If we observe not this method, we are unavoidably led into a labyrinth of instances and examples; which, in almost every question, are so numerous on both sides, that the mention of them necessarily leads off our attention from the subject, and creates a great deal of foolish and idle disputations concerning their propriety, force, application, &c.

In

* Read before the Newtonian Society of Edinburgh
1762.

In order to adhere as strictly as possible to this rule, I shall begin with observing, That the human mind is subjected to a number of laws or principles of action, which are absolutely necessary either for the immediate preservation of our lives, or for prompting us to perform the several duties that society is entitled to require of us. Ambition forcibly pushes the mind to pay attention to those objects which are warmly recommended to our regard by parents, nurses, superiors, or any person whom we particularly esteem. Hence those who are acquainted with human nature, and who have an affection for the good of society, exert all their talents, and employ the whole energy of words and action, that they may the more successfully fire the ambition of mankind, and excite them to that course of action which is most suited to the dignity of their nature, &c.

In the same manner decent and manly pride is made to spring up in the mind by just and lively representations of the deformity and pernicious qualities of vice, and
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of the rectitude, beauty, and amiableness of virtue. Hence the use and necessity of oratory, which is nothing but the proper dress and colouring of objects, in order to render them odious or agreeable to the mind.

Fear and hope, desire and aversion, and many other useful passions, could not be called forth to action, or could not act with such spirit and resolution without the assistance of a just representation of their different objects, or, in other words, except these objects were placed in a clear and distinct point of view, by the strong and energetical influence of oratory.

Under this view of oratory is comprehended whatever is peculiarly addressed to the passions, in general, or whatever acts upon any one passion as its particular object, in order to call forth that passion into action, either for private or public utility.

Nurses, then, are undeniably very great and powerful orators ; and as they address

themselves particularly to the passions of children, accordingly we find, that, in proportion as nurses are wanting in this faculty, or employ it to wrong ends, the children under their care come forth into the world, either dull and insipid, and altogether void of the springs of action, or having those springs bended towards a perverse course of action, and their minds impressed with mistaken notions of human nature, &c.

Hence the necessity and usefulness of oratory as it brings to light the hidden faculties of the soul, and, by a pathetical description of the several duties of life, powerfully enforces the practice of them.

I believe it will be allowed by all, that oratory in general is of very great benefit to mankind, as its principal business is to give a lively description of the objects which it exhibits to our view ; and, of course, conveys to the mind a clearer and more distinct idea of those objects than any barren or insipid representation. For illustration of this,

I need only appeal to common experience. What an infinite difference betwixt one and the same story related by different persons?

It may perhaps be said, that these observations tend only to show that oratory in general may be very advantageous to mankind, if properly used, and employed towards enforcing the performance of virtuous and praise-worthy deeds. But the question is, Whether this use has been made of it?

And here would be the proper place for producing the numberless examples of the good and bad effects of oratory. But I shall willingly pass over this chaos, and go on to observe, That many of the best passions and affections of the soul would forever lie dormant, or at least their strength would be so greatly impaired, that mankind would, without the assistance of oratory, grow inactive, morose, and tasteless.

Wherever we observe an universal, a catholic law of Nature, and at the same time
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are acquainted with its object, we must necessarily conclude that Nature has mutually adapted them to each other, and that they are in themselves so inseparable, that the one could not subsist without the other. It is almost to no purpose to mention the application of this to oratory and the different affections of the human soul; and the absurdity of supposing that Nature would plant these affections in the soul, and at the same time make the means of exciting them to action hurtful to mankind.

It would be no less absurd to suppose that any catholic law in Nature has, upon the whole, been disadvantageous to society.

These observations, were it needful, might be carried to a very great length; but I think they are so plain and convincing, that it would be in vain to push them any further.

I shall only add, that I esteem it a very happy circumstance, that the whole volume of sacred writings conspire in confirming
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the truth of the above observations. Whatever truth or precept they inculcate, they invariably address themselves to the passions of men ; fear, hope, ambition, shame, and, in a word, every passion of the soul, is warmly wrought upon by the liveliest and most engaging strains of oratory, in order to allure us to obedience. A plain proof this, that mere reasoning is not alone sufficient to restrain mankind from the commission of vice, or to keep them within the paths of virtue. Besides, would it not be the grossest absurdity to suppose, that the inspired writers would make use of any species of writing, the imitation of which would tend to the disadvantage or ruin of mankind ?

Many arguments might be produced to show that Oratory has been of use to mankind ; but I imagine, from the above hints, we may very safely conclude, that Oratory has, and always will be, of singular benefit to the human species.

ESSAY III.

Of POVERTY.

THERE is no situation in life more universally dreaded than that of poverty. We are apt to conceive the poor man's condition as a complication of every species of wretchedness. This natural dread of poverty tends to promote industry, frugality, and temperance. But, at the same time, when it sinks too deep, lays a foundation for avarice, anxiety, and a distrust of Providence.

Some men, in all periods, have felt the real inconveniencies of poverty ; but there
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is hardly any man who has been uniformly exempted from the fear of becoming poor.

The poor man is not destitute of every enjoyment. His desires are few and easily gratified. He cannot reach the luxuries of life ; but his appetite for luxury is not so strong as to make him unhappy. He is obliged to labour ; but labour is not a burden to him ; habit has rendered it not only familiar, but pleasant. Confined to a narrow sphere of action, his mind is not liable to be ruffled by jealousy or interference of interests : His attachments will therefore be few, but sincere, and generally fixed for life. Are these the objects of our horror ? Is this a condition so much to be dreaded ?

There are indeed very material differences between the situation of a person who is born poor, and of one who falls from affluence or moderate circumstances into a state of poverty and dependence. Even a sober mind will look upon the transition with aversion. It is hard to give up all our prospects of rising and making a figure
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in the world ; to be neglected by friends and shunned by acquaintances ; to lose in a great measure that character which for many years we have been labouring to maintain ; and to sink at once into a state of obscurity.

People of an anxious temper are fond of indulging these melancholy thoughts. Upon every cross-incident, or little piece of bad fortune, they have a strong propensity to turn up the dark side of things, and enjoy a kind of gloomy satisfaction in representing to themselves imaginary scenes of distress. This unhappy temper is not peculiar to any age or station. It haunts the rich and opulent, people of business and in the middle spheres of life, as well as those who are on the verge of poverty itself.

If ever this temper can admit of an apology, it must be confined to those persons only who are really struggling with the world. Education, connections, and particular situations in life lay many worthy men under a kind of necessity to keep up

an appearance which their income is but ill-suited to sustain. Such persons feel more than the natural hardships of poverty ; they feel the bitterest effects of a situation much more unhappy. In order to support their character and credit, they must dress decently, and associate at times with companions. They must maintain the common intercourse of society, by occasionally entertaining friends and acquaintances. Their circumstances cannot admit of these necessary expences. When they have a little money, it must frequently be laid out, not on necessaries, but to save their reputation. This obliges them to contract little debts. But, as their external appearance and character is in some measure fictitious, they are in constant terror lest they should be detected and exposed. The very thought of being indebted gives them pain. But when money is asked, they are completely miserable. A man thus situated can hardly avoid the fear of becoming poor : poverty is constantly before his eyes : it is in the power of others to ruin him by a single step.

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The dread of poverty takes its rise from pride, and mistaken notions concerning the condition of the poor.

There is a principle in human nature which makes us abhor every thing that is mean and dishonourable.—When this principle is directed to proper objects, it proves a source of noble and virtuous actions. But an improper application of it not only renders us unhappy in ourselves, but often ridiculous and contemptible to others. Dignity of character has no dependence on wealth: it is a quality of the mind which cannot be affected by external circumstances. A poor man may pass through life and maintain a propriety and dignity in his sentiments and behaviour as well as the rich. A poor man may have a just sense of the importance of human nature; he may entertain sentiments of piety, of fortitude, of benevolence. But the great error lies in attributing the idea of meanness to outward appearances.—Jealous of our dignity, and mistaking its proper objects, we regard the poor man as indicating a low and grovel-
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ling character merely because he is covered with rags.

As a principal antidote to this anxiety about our future condition, I would recommend firmness and resolution of mind. To bear good or bad fortune with calmness and equanimity is the noblest character in human nature. This is the object to which our pride and sense of dignity ought to be chiefly directed. There is a certain meanness in discovering an anxiety to be rich. It is equally mean to value ourselves on account of riches. Such characters are utterly inconsistent with true greatness of mind. If, therefore, we would avoid this imputation, we ought to aim at independence by acting and thinking agreeably to the dignity of our nature.

Religion is another excellent ingredient in the cure of anxiety. The man who is thoroughly persuaded that human affairs are governed and directed by a wise, beneficent, and powerful Being, is in little danger of being over-anxious about his future condition.

condition. Resignation and belief in Providence are so intimately connected that the one cannot subsist without the other. To believe in the moral government of the Deity, requires no great stretch of faith or depth of observation. Every man, if he pleases, can produce instances of it from his own experience. Reflect but a moment. Have you not, on some particular occasions, been so situated, that you thought it impossible to stop the course of some event the approach of which gave you great pain? Have you not, on such occasions, uniformly found relief? Was not the event you so much dreaded either totally prevented; or, if it actually happened, have you not uniformly found, that it always brought some alleviating circumstances along with it; that it was not so bad as you feared it would be? I might ask still further: Can you not recollect disappointed prospects, disconcerted schemes in your life as the evident sources of success and happiness which could not have fallen out but through their intervention?—Here then is a foundation for the mind to rest upon. Beware of fretting and
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vexing yourselves even with what may seem probable views of misfortune. Consider how many difficulties you have already got over, how often you have vexed and terrified your minds in vain with the prospect of poverty and ruined circumstances. Every instance of false suspicion is a powerful argument of the folly of your present anxiety.

Further, the dread of poverty renders us incapable of pursuing the measures of avoiding it. Anxiety sours and depresses the spirits. It renders us weak, timid, and irresolute. While under the influence of this passion, no enterprise, however plausible its appearance, can rouse us into action. We love to gratify the passion by sitting still and brooding over our misfortunes. In such circumstances, we are extremely ingenious in magnifying and increasing the sources of our own distress. We augment what appears to be unfavourable in our situation, and so much undervalue every thing really favourable, that we are often in danger of giving up all for lost. Instead
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of hoping for better days, we look forward with disgust, and think it vain to attempt any thing that promises relief. It is unnecessary to mention the opposition of such a temper to our interest. Prodigality itself is not a more certain road to poverty than the indulgence of a timid and irresolute disposition.

I cannot in this place pass over a practice which is too common in the world. When a person suffers a remarkable diminution of fortune, it is not unusual with his former friends either to neglect him altogether, or at least to treat him with coldness and indifference. This practice is so contrary to the principles of humanity, that I would willingly hope the bare mentioning of it were sufficient. Such a person stands in need of every thing that can have the smallest tendency to reconcile him to his condition. But there is not perhaps any circumstance which gives a man of broken fortune more uneasiness than being obliged to lose the society of his friends and companions. This bears peculiarly hard, if the misfortune

tune falls out in an advanced period of life. It is too late to form new attachments when the mind is become suspicious by age, and soured by disappointment. There is indeed a jealousy accompanying a reverse of fortune which makes us judge of the conduct of our friends with a more than ordinary severity. What before would have passed unnoticed or been regarded as light and trivial, is now interpreted into neglect or ridicule. This natural jealousy makes our behaviour towards a reduced friend or companion more delicate. But it affords no apology for neglect: it ought rather to heighten our attachments, and render us more attentive to his ease and happiness.

I have already mentioned a set of men who are obliged to assume an appearance superior to their income. Poor shop-keepers and students, subaltern officers, masters of trades with a small stock and little employment, and many of other denominations come under this class. I cannot conclude my paper without cautioning men of opulence

opulence or easy circumstances against leading such people into situations which require expence. Solicit not their company to the tavern, to the theatre, or to jaunt with ladies. Perhaps you love them for their sense, modesty, or other amiable qualities. But is it not unkind and ungenerous to injure those you love? Perhaps they too are fond of your company, and wish for nothing more than to be able to associate with you. This will strengthen the temptation, and make them use every possible mean of complying. But does not this lay you under still deeper obligations to caution and prudence: It is true, there is no distinguishing such men by their dress or appearance, otherwise my caution on this head might be more direct and successful. But would it not be a good rule for people of opulence, never to solicit their acquaintances to parties of pleasure or other situations which infer expence, until they are pretty well informed of their conditions?—From mere thoughtlessness and want of prudence in this matter, I have known a single young gentleman of fortune

tune beggar numbers of his acquaintances, and oblige them to leave their country and relations, to seek subsistence from strangers in a foreign land.

FINIS.

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